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ABSTRACT 
 
BODILY BOUNDARIES: INFLAMMATORY BOWEL DISEASE AND RHETORICAL 
ENACTMENTS OF SELF 
 
by 
 
Molly Margaret Kessler 
 
 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2017 
Under the Supervision of Professor S. Scott Graham 
 
 
Chronic illnesses are seven of the 10 leading causes of death in the United States 
and the prevalence is rising. Of the many chronic illnesses, one group of diseases 
present particular concern and mystery—autoimmune diseases. These conditions 
manifest when a patient’s body attacks itself, causing a myriad of symptoms that often 
leave patients debilitated. Since 2013, I have been examining the contexts in which 
patients with Inflammatory Bowel Disease (IBD)—one type of autoimmune disease—
reconsider their bodily boundaries while managing new, challenging communication 
experiences. The results of this research are presented in my dissertation, Bodily 
Boundaries: Inflammatory Bowel Disease and Rhetorical Enactments of self. My work 
suggests that bifurcations such as mind/body, and self/other, and the boundaries of 
patients’ bodies and identities are context-dependent enactments, negotiated through a 
variety of discursive and material actors. I argue that a new theoretical approach to 
dualisms and material agency must be developed through scholarship that calibrates 
the insights of rhetoric, medicine, and humanistic approaches to technology and 
medicine.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Long story short: Our bodies are fighting a Civil War with themselves. –Alisa Briguglio, contributor, The 
Mighty  
 
My identity is very much so tied to my ostomy and how it gave me my life back—Jessica Grossman, 
contributor, Uncover Ostomy 
 
Disease is commonly understood as an infiltrating invader, an enemy within the body 
that does not belong and, therefore, should be attacked and removed. Indeed, rhetorical 
scholars have noted the persuasive power of war metaphors in enabling patients to 
draw productive lines between notions of self and non-self (disease), as well as between 
the mind and body (see, for example Segal, 1997; Sontag, 2001). Such separations 
empower patients to fight these invading entities and compartmentalize the 
involuntary conditions of the body and/or mind as something out of patients’ control. 
Often people “fight” disease or “win the war” against a condition, or on another level, 
people say “it’s all in your head!” or “my body has a mind of its own.”  
However, one category of disease—autoimmune conditions—complicates these 
metaphorical and experiential divides, challenging not only rhetorical and theoretical 
conceptions of bodies and boundaries, but also what it is that we study as rhetoricians 
and technical communicators, specifically in health and medicine. Experiences like the 
ones described in the opening epigraphs are no doubt familiar to many patients with 
autoimmune disease. Bodies attacking themselves, struggles with identity, and the 
necessity of medical technologies characterize life with an autoimmune condition.  
Typically, the immune system works defensively as an internal mechanism to 
identify and destroy cells that do not belong (e.g., a virus or bacteria). As the prefix 
auto- indicates, autoimmune disease occurs when oneself attacks oneself. In other 
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words, autoimmune disease behaves such that a person’s immune system attacks 
naturally occurring cells within the body—those that are not foreign. When this 
happens, a chain of physiological reactions transpires, and depending on the type of 
cells targeted by the autoimmune activity, a range of destructive and even life-
threatening symptoms manifest. 
Unlike conditions in which non-native entities (viruses, bacteria, etc.) enter the 
body and are easily categorized as non-self, autoimmunity complicates commonplace 
divisions between self and non-self and/or between mind and body. For an 
autoimmune patient, a body with a mind of its own might not seem all that figurative. 
In the words of Alisa Briguglio, the bodies of autoimmune patients are “fighting civil 
wars with themselves” (2016). Indeed, autoimmunity raises pressing questions for 
rhetoricians of health and medicine working to understand patient experience. For 
instance, how do patients experience and talk about autoimmune diseases when they 
are unlike most conditions that actually are invaders in the body? How do patients, as 
well as scholars, talk about, conceptualize, and rationalize disease as self? Are the cells 
attacking the intestines, joints, or skin of these patients also self? Where and how are 
boundaries surrounding bodies and identities determined when the body is both self 
and non-self? Even more, when technologies and/or prosthetics are introduced to help 
treat or cope with autoimmune conditions, where do the borders between self, 
technology, human, body, and mind lie? Can non-self become self? Can nonhuman 
become human? 
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These very questions both ground and guide this project. In recognizing the 
complicated and volatile fault lines within and surrounding autoimmunity, patients, 
identities, and bodies, I focus on one type of autoimmune disease—Inflammatory 
Bowel Disease (IBD)—to explore larger theoretical concerns regarding the ways in 
which boundaries are drawn around the body, self, disease, and more. For patients with 
IBD, the innate immune system identifies health, normal cells within the digestive tract, 
specifically in the small and large bowels, as foreign and attacks those native cells. This 
causes inflammation of tissues and results in a range of symptoms from nausea and 
diarrhea to severe dehydration, infection, and even death.  
Furthermore, for many IBD patients, autoinflammatory activity becomes so 
severe that parts of the digestive system need to be removed. In such instances, often a 
prosthetic called an ostomy bag or pouch becomes necessary. To briefly explain, when 
part of the small bowel, and/or part or all of the large bowel and rectum have been 
removed due to disease (such as IBD or cancer) or acute injury, an ostomy pouch is 
worn on the abdomen to collect digestive waste (see Figure 1). Although parts of these 
digestive organs can be removed, they typically cannot go without replacement. 
Therefore, an ostomy is created, which means an opening in the intestine is made and 
pulled to the surface of the skin (to create an opening called a stoma). Through this 
opening on the surface of the abdomen, digestive waste is excreted and then collected in 
an ostomy pouch because there is no longer muscular control over when the remaining 
segments of bowel evacuate.  
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Figure 1. Stoma and ostomy pouch illustration. The first two panels show the diseased colon before and after parts 
have been removed; the third panel shows the ostomy pouch worn on the abdomen to replace removed colon 
section. Source: National Cancer Institute (Winslow, 2008).  
IBD offers a particularly productive case for examining boundaries and 
boundary-making practices for two primary reasons: 1) IBD is an autoimmune disease, 
therefore the boundaries, particularly those surrounding self, non-self, mind, and body 
are blurred; and 2) IBD patients sometimes need an ostomy pouch, which offers a 
second set of identity and bodily boundaries to consider, particularly those around 
human, nonhuman, self, and non-self. Not only do ostomy pouches require patients to 
reconsider literal and figurative boundaries of their bodies, but they are also often 
accompanied by a societal stigma, which makes having a IBD and an ostomy even more 
complicated. These unclear boundaries associated with IBD present rhetorical 
challenges for these patients in a variety of contexts—convincing others of the existence 
of these conditions, establishing identities both within and outside of the IBD and 
ostomy communities, and maintaining a “normal1” life—many of which are under 
examination through this project.  
                                                 
1 I use “normal” here and throughout this dissertation not to impose certain ideologies onto the lives and experiences of the patients 
discussed in this project. Instead, I use normal to reflect the language of the patients with the autoimmune, IBD, and ostomy 
communities.  
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One of my primary goals, then, is to understand how boundaries are established, 
maintained, and influenced in rhetorical practices of IBD patients. However, before I 
can elaborate on the ways in which this project studies and unpacks such rhetorical 
contexts and practices, I must first untangle the myriad scholarship regarding binaries 
to identify which framework(s) might best account for the intricacies and divisions at 
work in IBD and like conditions. 
Indeed, dualisms have been at the forefront of academic inquiry for decades, 
resulting in a range of questions and alternatives regarding the ways we think, discuss, 
and study divisions in the world. In fact, overcoming pervasive dualistic thinking has 
long been recognized as one of the most challenging theoretical problems in Western 
philosophy. As feminist philosopher and physicist, Karen Barad notes, modernist 
Cartesian divisions have become a “habit of mind” (2007, p. 49). Therefore, I begin this 
dissertation by making the case that despite a plethora of potential theoretical solutions, 
the legacy of dualistic thinking still pervades much of Western thought and scholarship. 
Of these potential solutions, two bodies of scholarship have emerged as especially 
influential in humanistic inquiry: postmodernism’s deconstruction of binaries into 
matters of the discursive/social/cultural, and new materialist approaches that argue we 
pay more attention to matter and objects. Consistent across these bodies of work is a 
commitment to dismantling dualisms, but as Elizabeth Grosz points out, the question 
then becomes: “by what techniques and presumptions is a nondichotomous 
understanding…possible?” (1994, p. 21).  
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Using Grosz’s questions as a starting point, this dissertation undertakes a two-
fold theory-building task: first, to develop “enactments” as a balanced and rhetorically-
minded approach toward dynamic boundary-making processes, and secondly, to 
pursue the role of these enactments in patients lived experiences with IBD and 
autoimmunity. The enactment framework I will develop over the cases and chapters of 
this dissertation will push rhetorical inquiry to reconsider our accepted notions of 
boundaries, ontology, and identity, as well as our positions regarding who and what is 
capable of acting in boundary-making practices. As I will argue, entities (like those 
often divided into binaries) not only come into being but become meaningful through 
engagement with one another. Bodies, minds, selves, non-selves, technology, humans, 
diseases, and much more are characterized through and within engagement with other 
entities. The boundaries that surround them are articulated as these entities engage 
with one another, and only through this mutual constitution are rhetorical practices 
possible. Entities ranging from language to technology, then, are equally capable of 
participating and influencing rhetorical practices.     
Notably, the implication of this even-footing for all entities might seem at odds 
with centuries of rhetorical work. That is, much rhetorical scholarship examines 
intentionality (what rhetorical effect was x speaker aiming to accomplish?), symbolic 
action (what does this particular metaphor represent?) and strategy (what is the role of 
ethos in this speech?)—all of which are particular to human action. As such, the tension 
between rhetorical scholarship and the new materialist turn resides at the assumed 
intrinsic division between humans and all else. That entities beyond humans are 
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capable of rhetorical influences, for many rhetoricians, might seem disorienting, if not 
entirely impossible. However, if this dissertation makes only one contribution to the 
discipline, I hope it is this: our work must extend beyond human action.  
Looking at patient narratives regarding IBD would likely foster some of the 
insights in this dissertation. No doubt, I will spend plenty of time looking at how 
patients talk. However how rhetoricians approach patient “talk” and how we 
understand its role in rhetorical practices can and should be expanded. Patient 
narratives alone will not enable me to fully conceptualize the role of the ostomy pouch, 
immune system behavior, or even how images act agentively. We are doing little 
service to ourselves, the field, and those we might hope to engage with, if we maintain 
tunnel vision on humans and language. “Bodies speak,” as Dolmage reminds us, as do 
ostomies, immune systems, images, tweets, gazes, and more (2006, p. 122). Therefore, 
our inquiry would benefit from expanded scholarly boundaries to account for the 
diverse entities that might “speak” and partake in rhetorical practices.  
The diversity of what is capable of having rhetorical influence is especially 
significant in the realm of the rhetoric of health and medicine. As I will argue, one of the 
most explicit but perhaps least frequently attended to goals of rhetorical studies of 
health and medicine is examining lived experience. If we partition off language as the 
sole domain of our inquiry, then, our ability to attend to lived experience is essentially 
impossible. Lived experience for patients includes entities that speak before patients’ 
mouths even open. For example, as I hope to make clear over the next several chapters, 
ostomies, without the mediation of linguistic symbols, speak loud and clear for those 
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that wear them. Ostomies speak to wearers, the public, healthcare providers, partners, 
and more, and in so doing, influence boundary-making practices as well as how 
patients live and participate in the world. What ostomies have to say, I believe, is as 
equally important as what patients say for studying lived experience. The rhetorical 
baggage associated with an ostomy requires a profound shift in what might be 
considered rhetorical practice.  
In order to build a foundation for this theory of enactments, I must begin by 
tracing postmodernist and new materialist scholarship that attends to binaries. In 
outlining this work and the dialogue these two areas of inquiry stage, I hope to 
demonstrate the need for a theory of enactments that builds on the strengths of both 
postmodernism and new materialisms in order to best address binaries. Consequently, 
the remainder of this chapter will elucidate postmodern and new materialist debates 
regarding binaries, focusing on implications for lived experiences and body and 
identity boundaries. Then, I will outline the remaining chapters of this dissertation to 
preview how the theory-building project of this dissertation aims to provide a 
productive approach to rhetorical boundary-making processes, especially regarding 
bodies and identities.  
Beyond Binaries  
Scholarship categorized under the postmodern project has presumptively settled 
debates regarding dualisms by dismantling them into matters of the social, cultural, and 
discursive (for example, Haraway, 1991; Selzer & Crowely, 1999; Wells, 2010; Jordan, 
2004; Butler, 1999). Much of this work, particularly in rhetorical studies, grew from an 
increasing recognition of the tension between materiality and discourse as “one of the 
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most familiar and powerful binaries” (Wilson & Lewiecki-Wilson, 2001, p. 2). For 
instance, Condit’s “proto-theory of linguistic materialism…seeks to bridge the gap 
between the ‘idea’ and the ‘material’ realm” (1999, p. 355) and Dickson’s “material 
rhetoric” offers a “mode of interpretation that takes as its object of study the 
signification of material things and corporal entities” (1999, p. 297). While these are just 
two examples among many, such approaches work to mediate the boundary between 
subject/object, language/matter, and in some cases, mind/body.  
Importantly too, postmodern attention to binaries grew, in many ways, as a 
reaction to modernism, which maintained that truth and reality exist somewhere, 
waiting to be discovered—leading to the privileging of objects over subjects, nature 
over culture, and bodies over minds. In response, postmodernism challenged such 
epistemological frameworks and argued that objects/matter/nature are socially 
constructed through language and culture. Materiality, postmodernism suggests, is 
culturally constituted or socially constructed. For instance, Butler’s notion of 
performativity articulates bodies and materiality such that they are performances 
highly embedded in discourse and social understandings (1999). Similarly, Haraway’s 
cyborg reframes the world in terms of hybridity, not duality, enabling scholars to 
examine the webs of power that constrain and empower various cyborg bodies and find 
“a way out of the maze of dualisms in which we have explained our bodies and our 
tools to ourselves” (1991, p. 181).  
Implied in such arguments is that bodies and internal experiences (e.g., feeling 
pain, experiencing autoimmunity, having an ostomy) are artifacts of cultural mediation, 
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and unmediated bodily experience is impossible. Bodily experiences, according to such 
postmodern positions, are “constructions mediated by a range of cultural practices” 
(Wells, 2010, p. 135). Put another way, the human body is “the most fluctuating signifier 
in the history of cultural expression” (Jordan, 2004, p. 327). These postmodernist 
discussions, taken together, compellingly contend that theories of 
social/cultural/discursive constitution provide a solution to binaries.  
Recently though, a growing body of scholarship has re-opened the Pandora’s box 
of dualisms, calling for a reconsideration of postmodernist constructionism (for 
example, Graham, 2015; Barad, 2007; Mol, 2002; Rickert, 2013; Pickering, 2010; Bennett, 
2010). As Graham puts it, “the postmodernists have been claiming to [reject the two-
world hypothesis and overcome binaries] for years without actually accomplishing that 
aim” (2015, p. 217). Despite years of postmodernist alternatives and solutions to 
binaries, arguments highlighting the continued insidiousness of binaries remains.  
Much of this scholarship, often operating under the broad umbrella of “new 
materialisms,” claims that the postmodern project actually reinscribes dualisms by 
privileging subjects over objects, humans over nonhumans, culture over nature, and so 
on (Gronnvoll, 2013; Graham, 2015; Bennett, 2010; Barad, 2007). Essentially new 
materialisms argue that postmodernist theories have inverted modernism. For instance, 
Gronnvoll writes, “the linguistic turn launched a tsunami of scholarship, of many 
disciplinary flavors, leading inevitably to a tipping point where discourse began to be 
privileged over reality. The latter was sometimes dismissed as entirely constructed by 
language (p. 98). Similarly, Graham argues, “where modernism privileges the real 
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object over the perceiving subject, postmodernism recasts the object as an extension of 
the subject’s perception, and the object becomes an epiphenomenon of the subject” 
(2015, p. 19).  
These critiques further contend that postmodern approaches and the upholding 
of binaries can be both unproductive and damaging in real-world contexts (Graham, 
2015; Mol, 2002; Gronnvoll, 2013; Siebers, 2001; Wilson & Lewiecki-Wilson, 2001; 
Gibson, 2006). I argue—in alignment with new materialist thinkers—that postmodern 
approaches to materiality and bodies authorizes a version of constructivism that reifies 
the very binaries such approaches work to overcome, which has damaging implications 
for materiality and bodies. In other words, while postmodern scholars successfully 
recognize the intimate relationships that humans, objects, language, images, animals, 
cultures, etc., share, to render all such relationships as a matter of discourse, gives 
privilege to discourse.  
Scholars including Siebers, Gronnvoll, Dolmage, and Balsamo, have argued that 
constructivist theories ignore the physical, material realities of bodies. On this, Dolmage 
claims,  
The postmodern model remains influential, often to the chagrin of disabled 
people who feel their experiences of disability are undermined. There certainly 
are dangerous implications for the issues of agency when a focus on individual 
empowerment an bodily reclamation cedes to discussions of social 
construction—particular when a common assumption among ‘abled-bodied’ 
bigots is that people with disabilities are just faking it anyhow, or that they 
should just try harder to overcome their impairment and cure themselves (2013, 
p. 96)  
Similarly, Gronnvoll (2013) contends that when the body is only rendered meaningful 
through discourse, bodily experiences are lost, she says, “erasing the body, or rewriting 
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it as a passive substance upon discourses are sketched, also [brings] harm. To ignore the 
body is to ignore the fact that bodies experience violence, injustice, and pain” (p. 103). 
Summarizing the significance of these positions, Dolmage writes “social 
constructionism, in some ways, can be used as a method of silencing” (2013, p. 98).  
 In addition to these critiques regarding inadequate attention to bodies, many 
have pointed to the legacy of Haraway’s cyborg as problematic, even though the cyborg 
attempts to move out of social constructivist theories toward materiality in its own 
right. Scholars, particularly in disability studies, have argued that the cyborg 
oversimplifies the complexity of human+techno assemblages and treats cyborg status as 
positive or empowering, leaving little space for diverse bodies and identities (Siebers, 
2001; Williams, 1997). Siebers, for example, claims that the cyborg “is always more than 
human…not disabled.” In fact, Siebers argues, in scholarship that advances the cyborg 
metaphor, “prostheses always increase the cyborg’s abilities” as a “source of new 
powers, never problems” (p. 745). Pointing to further concerns over who or what might 
be included under a cyborg or hybridized alternative to binaries, particularly “in an era 
where human-machine couplings are almost infinite,” Williams notes,  
medical technology has at its disposal a variety of means to transform us into 
cyborgs, from cardiac pacemakers to genetic engineering, and from the 
nebulized asthmatic to the accident victim in the intensive care unit. The logic of 
this argument suggests that, in a technological age, such as ours, we are all 
‘cyborgs’ in some shape, sense, or form. In making this claim, however, the 
analytic potential and discriminatory power of the concept is surely reduced” 
(1997, p. 1047).  
If we take seriously Siebers’ and Williams’ critiques here, we might also ask: what types 
of bodies is Haraway (and those who have further built on the cyborg metaphor) really 
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referring to in theorizing cyborgs? If “we are all cyborgs” how do we account for bodily 
difference? If everyone is a cyborg, does every human+technology interaction make 
technology self? Which interactions make cyborgs, and how do we decide? Are those 
with prosthetics cyborgs in the same way as cell phone users with Bluetooth devices? 
And, are all cyborg identities positive? 
Even as Haraway explores paraplegics as a cyborg example, she fails to fully 
account for the range of consequences (both positive and negative) that cyborg identity 
might produce. Erevelles too takes issue with the cyborg, arguing that “constituting the 
disabled subject as a cyborg actually renders as immaterial the actual struggles of 
disabled subjects” (2001, p. 98). Overall, critiques of Haraway demonstrate that 
although the notion of the cyborg provides a strong alternative to binaries, when 
deployed to a range of cases and bodies, the cyborg proves to have inherent problems, 
specifically with recapitulating a division between able and disabled bodies, the social 
and material, and even humans and nonhumans. These concerns, I would argue, are 
highly applicable to the larger concerns with postmodernism.   
Furthermore, scholars including Mol and Graham have highlighted yet another 
problematic implication of postmodernism: the disease/illness dichotomy. In this work, 
however, the issue is framed not in terms of able or disable bodies or humans and 
nonhumans, but instead, in terms of another binary. Specifically, this binary separates 
disease (the domain of medical experts; the physical materialities of bodies) from illness 
(patient narratives; symptoms and reports on symptoms). Under this rubric, disease is 
frequently privileged over illness, and when the two conflict, patient’ accounts are often 
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ignored (see Chapter Two for a more detailed account of the implications of the 
disease/illness dichotomy). And, perhaps most strikingly, Graham clarifies that it isn’t 
merely that the postmodern project is theoretically amiss; but rather, maintaining these 
modernist binaries is an “ethical problem” in which  
The body is the authentic locus of disease, and the mind is confused, crazy, or 
lying. So pervasive is the lack of trust in patient report (as confusion, insanity, or 
malingering) that it is a mainstay of popular representations of medicine (2015, p. 
118) 
In other words, in establishing such divisions, “language and culture” are granted 
“their own agency” while “matter is figured as passive and immutable” (Barad, 2003, p. 
801).  
As suggested through this discussion of postmodernist approaches, overcoming 
binaries by privileging one element of the binary over another the other does little to 
solve the modernist Cartesian legacy. When everything falls to the domain of the social 
and discursive, as is often the result of postmodernism, the reality of bodies is lost or, at 
the very least, in question. Postmodern constructivist theories have perhaps moved 
where the boundaries are drawn or shifted which entity of a binary is considered more 
important, but certainly haven’t fully accomplished the goal of dismantling binaries 
altogether.  
This is not to say however, that all new materialists agree on how to move 
forward. In fact, the umbrella term “new materialisms” emerged precisely from the 
myriad theories and methodologies that have appeared in recent years. Nonetheless, 
new materialist scholars consistently argue, things other than autonomous humans 
have “the ability to make things happen, to produce effects” (Bennett, 2010, p. 5). For 
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example, Bennett explores a variety of rhetorical situations in which the agency of 
objects is compelling if not undeniable: the ingestion of food resulting in an increase of 
fat tissue in a human, or a power grid failing, causing catastrophic events including 
fires, school closures, and certainly a variety of human inconveniences; Mol (2002) 
traces the multiplicity of blood clot matter in various places within a hospital; and 
Graham (2015) investigates the various ontologies of pain, physical and otherwise, that 
emerge in different spaces and practices. These and other such examples of matter 
mattering suggest that even if materiality can be examined through the lens of symbolic 
construction, such approaches fall short in fully exploring the role and implications of 
materiality. 
A new materialist approach, then, does not seek to theoretically ostracize the 
contextual--the social, ethical, cultural, gendered, historical, etc.--instead, new 
materialists advocate that we treat reality not as outright inaccessible and only 
constituted through language, but rather as an enactment of specific, heterogenous 
assemblages, within which language and culture are just a few elements. I do not wish 
to suggest that language and culture do not influence or engage with matter. However, 
to render materiality as merely a product of language, as merely symbolic, would not 
only dismiss a significant portion of materiality’s rhetorical force, but it would continue 
to “separate the world into the ontologically disjoint domains of word and thing” 
(Barad, 2003, p. 811). Put another way, disability scholar, Tobin Siebers, explains,  
I am not claiming either that the body exists apart from social forces that it 
represents something more real, natural, or authentic than things of culture. I am 
claiming that the body has its own forces and that we need to recognize them if 
we are to get a less one-sided picture of how bodies and their representations 
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affect each other for good and for bad. The body is, first and foremost, a 
biological agent teeming with vital and often chaotic forces. It is not inert matter 
subject to easy manipulation by social representations. The body is alive, which 
means that it is as capable of influencing and transforming social languages as 
they are capable of influencing and transforming it (2001, p. 749, emphasis 
original).  
 
 Or, as Booher argues, “there is no (‘natural’) body separable from (‘technology’) world, 
but only shifting continuums of interinvolement” (Booher, 2010, p. 84). It seems, what 
scholars like Graham, Mol, Barad, and Bennett are advocating for is a more moderate 
correction to modernism and postmodernism, or what Graham calls “finding the 
groove” without sliding back into modernist or postmodern paradigms (213).  
Indeed, finding this groove, let alone occupying it, presents challenges for 
scholars moving forward. As Coole and Frost argue,  
society is simultaneously materially real and socially constructed: our material 
lives are always culturally mediated, but they are not only cultural…the 
challenge here is to give materiality its due while recognizing its plural 
dimensions and its complex, contingent modes of appearing” (2010, p. 27).  
With these caveats in mind, a palpable tension remains regarding the relationship 
between language and materiality. This specific tension is highly relevant for 
autoimmune patients, whose conditions, are often characterized as “invisible,” and 
accordingly, whose material realities are not as easily or quickly identifiable. Too, I find 
the continued pervasiveness of binaries particularly problematic for work in the 
rhetoric of health and medicine that attempts to understand and empower patients who 
have lived experience that, to them, is constructed by more than language and culture, 
or even not by language and culture at all.  
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With these tensions at the forefront of this inquiry, my overarching research 
question for this project is: how can rhetorical studies of health and medicine account 
for conditions like autoimmunity, IBD, and having an ostomy pouch—conditions in 
which 1) both material and discursive practices are engaged, and 2) binaries and 
boundaries are not inherent nor static? In pursuit of answering such questions, I must 
also engage two secondary questions: how and why are certain boundaries afforded 
and constrained in different contexts, with diverse audiences, and toward varying 
exigencies? And, what roles do visuality and visibility play in the rhetorical boundary-
making practices of patients with these invisible conditions who are often actively 
concealing or revealing their bodies, identities, and conditions? Finally, in working to 
explore these questions, and in alignment with the interventional goals of rhetorical 
studies of health and medicine, I must also ask, how might a reconsideration of binaries 
benefit patients (autoimmune and otherwise) in their everyday experiences and 
interactions? These questions guide the analysis of this project and frame the thinking 
about each case presented.  
Ultimately, I hope to shed insight on the ways in which we can understand and 
intervene in patients’ practices by taking a closer look at IBD and ostomy pouches. My 
goal is to better understand patient experience regarding their own bodily boundaries 
and understandings of self. Each of the subsequent chapters in this dissertation, 
therefore, explore diverse patient experiences and trace the emergence of such 
experiences. In turn, I aim to use such understandings to identify which theoretical and 
methodological frameworks best account for lived experience while ethically and 
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comprehensively attending to the boundaries that are dismantled or upheld through 
the entanglements of materiality, discourse, selves, diseases, technologies, experiences, 
and more. However, identifying which theories and methodologies are useful is merely 
the first step in cultivating an adequate rhetorical theory to examine lived experiences 
and boundary-making practices. As such, Chapter Two takes up much of this work and 
concludes with an introduction of my enactment framework, but Chapters Three, Four, 
and Five employ this approach. The next section more thoroughly outlines these 
chapters--the content and arguments within them, as well as how each of the chapters 
relates.     
Outline of Chapters  
Thus far I have argued for the need to explore how binaries and boundaries are 
negotiated for patients, particularly those in the context of autoimmunity and IBD. I 
have also contended that more engagement with the entanglements of many entities, 
including but not limited to, discourse, is necessary for rhetorical studies of health and 
medicine to comprehensively attend to patients’ lived experiences. With these claims as 
my foundation, this project will explore a series of cases related to IBD and ostomies to 
suggest that binaries and boundaries are enacted through the mutual constitution of 
many entities. Accordingly, I work to develop enactments as a rhetorically-oriented 
framework to more adequately attend to a reconfigured notion of rhetorical practices 
that includes both discourse and materiality.  
To do so, Chapter Two introduces and calibrates Barad’s theory of intra-activity 
(2007; 2009) and Graham’s rhetorical-ontological inquiry (2015) in order to begin 
developing this theory of enactments. Further, I explain how and why particular cases 
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(both public and during observations and interviews) were identified and selected for 
this dissertation via a brief discussion of Foucault’s concepts of discourse and object 
formations (1973). Then, I briefly explore two patient experiences’ with IBD that directly 
address the negotiation and enactment of particular bodily and identity boundaries. 
Through these cases, I demonstrate the methodological value of a theory of rhetorical 
enactment in enabling me to attend more effectively to all entities (material, discursive, 
and more) that are at work and at stake in a given autoimmune-related context.   
Then, Chapters Three, Four, and Five show both how enactments are staged 
through specific entanglements of diverse entities as well as the range of analytic 
pathways this enactment framework might follow, including kairological, ontological, 
and visual analyses. Specifically, in Chapter Three, I analyze a public and contentious 
Center for Disease Control and Prevention campaign in which a former ostomy pouch 
wearer speaks of her negative and embarrassing experience with her ostomy and the 
public outcry that ensued in rejection of this portrayal of ostomies. I contend that 
Segal’s kairology (2005) enables me to understand how and why certain identities and 
bodily boundaries are not only enacted but made compelling. As Chapter Three 
suggests, whether patients become ostomy pouch wearers or ostomates (a term used to 
self-identify as a person with an ostomy) has much to do with how and when shifts 
between affording and constraining experiences develop through space and time. 
Patients do not simply decide their ostomy-related identifies, but instead, those 
identities are enacted through diverse entanglements and ontologies.  
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Consequently, Chapter Four reveals how various ostomy-related identities are 
staged through ontologically multiple ostomies. Building on Mol’s theory of multiple 
ontologies (2002), this chapter will explore how ostomies become ontologically diverse 
through patient practices. Of particular relevance for rhetoricians, language emerges as 
a particularly influential entity within these practices and boundary-making processes. 
Through Chapter Four, I argue ontological inquiry within rhetorical studies need not 
abandon the discursive; however, an ontologically flattened position is required at the 
outset of such inquiry in order to identify if and when language becomes influential in 
the practices that enact boundaries.  
Finally, as Chapter Five identifies, visual entities can also powerfully influence 
boundaries, resulting in enactments that fit or misfit their contexts (Garland-Thomson, 
2011). Specifically, this chapter takes two well-known figures within the IBD and 
ostomy communities—Bethany Townsend and Sam Cleasby—as cases for examining 
how autoimmune, chronically ill and female bodies are engaged with in the public, 
particularly when these women reveal their ostomy pouches through images posted 
online. I interrogate why one of these women was triumphed while the other was 
ridiculed for looking too disabled as well as not disabled enough. Through this analysis, 
I argue bodies, disease, and identities become marked as disabled, attractive, 
chronically ill, or otherwise, as they entangle and co-articulate. Thus, an enactment 
framework helps to understand how particular enactments become salient via 
discursively, materially, and visually entangled practices.  
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Taken together, these chapters establish the range of analytical capability and 
potential insight a theory of enactments offers rhetorical studies. This dissertation 
moves rhetorical studies, particularly in the domains of health and medicine, toward 
more thorough engagement with materiality. I hope that the theoretical discussions 
throughout this dissertation will make clear that language and materiality cannot be 
untangled from one another—they come into being together and only through 
particular enactments and analyses they momentarily separated.2  
Moreover, I contend just as language and materiality are not inherently distinct 
ontologically, none of the entities under examination in this project have given 
ontologies; instead, ontologies are done in practice. Thus, this dissertation too pushes 
how rhetorical studies might define and engage with ontology and how we might best 
engage with ontological inquiry. Finally, with each chapter, I aim to show that 
boundaries are particular to enactments, and consequently are fluid, shifting, and at 
times, unstable. Such a theory makes possible for patients to have bodies with minds of 
their own and for ostomies to become inseparable from the patients wearing them.  
  
                                                 
2 It is important to note that throughout this dissertation, I refer to language and materiality separately as a sort of shorthand. But as 
Chapter Two will explain, I consider language and materiality, and all other entities we often refer to casually as inherently distinct 
as only separated through entanglements with one another.  
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CHAPTER 2: ON CALIBRATING & ENACTMENTS 
You and I are all as much continuous with the physical universe as a wave is continuous with the ocean--
Alan Watts 
 
In the last chapter, I traced a variety of scholarship working to solve, overcome, or side-
step the manifest issues with modernist dualisms. As I argued, recent scholarship has 
demonstrated, despite this expansive attention to binaries, their legacy continues. In 
particular, the most recent critiques have argued that humanistic scholarship has 
overcorrected, leading to an unbalanced focus on language and culture with insufficient 
attention to materiality3 and bodily experience. I provided this overview to establish 
that the goal of this dissertation is to build a theory with which rhetoricians might more 
effectively address boundaries and boundary-making practices, especially in the context 
of patients’ lived experiences. Thus, I find myself treading deep theoretical waters in an 
effort to attend to the myriad tenets of binary and boundary discussions within rhetoric 
and the humanities more broadly, regarding lived experiences, humans and 
nonhumans, and language and materiality. 
Undoubtedly, these discussions about duality and materiality have specific 
consequences for rhetoricians whose domain of inquiry has historically been the 
discursive and symbolic. Many in the field are questioning how and to what extent 
rhetoricians should embrace new materialist calls and in what ways we are equipped to 
do so. Indeed, this has become a pressing question in the field of rhetoric of health and 
medicine (RHM), which often attends to the complexities of patients and their 
                                                 
3 This privileging of language over matter is indicative too of broader privileging across common binaries such subject over object, 
nature over culture, mind over body etc. 
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experiences, but most frequently does so through examinations of patient narrative. The 
question with RHM then becomes, with what rhetorical tools might we study patients’ 
lived experiences—accounting both for language and material practices?  
Therefore, in this chapter, I will begin by discussing both the importance and 
implications of a more materially-focused rhetorical framework, particularly for work 
in RHM. Then, through an exploration of two preliminary cases that highlight the 
plasticity of entities like self and body that have long been considered ontologically 
stable. In so doing, I will advocate for a new approach, calibrating the insights of Barad 
(2007) and Graham (2015), that I believe enables rhetoricians to at once attend to 
language and materiality, as well as other binaries and boundaries, in a productive and 
balanced way. With these theoretical frameworks as my foundation, I will end this 
chapter by elucidating what I’m calling a theory of enactments—a framework attuned 
to the ontologies staged through (sometimes rhetorical) practices in which divisions and 
boundaries are drawn.  
Lived Experience and the Rhetoric of Health and Medicine 
To be clear, a move toward accounting for materiality in rhetorical practices in health 
and medicine is not simply an effort to be more comprehensive. Instead, many scholars 
have noted the problematic implications of dividing patient narratives from their 
embodied lived experiences. This work has specifically reasoned that focusing 
exclusively on text and language (patient narratives) enforces a false bifurcation of 
patients and their bodies. That is, when patient narrative becomes the sole avenue 
through which scholars come to understand patients, the material, embodied, lived 
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experiences of patients are severed from what is deemed relevant or useful, and in turn, 
often elided entirely.  
As mentioned in Chapter One, this uneven focus on language over 
materiality/experience, especially in the domains of health and medicine, is the result 
of what has been called the disease/illness dichotomy (Eisenberg, 1977; Mol, 2002; 
Graham, 2015). As one of the many “dysfunctional consequences” of Cartesian 
dichotomies, the disease/illness divide drives a wedge between language and 
materiality by separating what patients say from what their bodies do (Eisenberg, 1977, 
p. 9). In part, this dichotomy emerged in an effort to give attention and authority to 
patient narrative, which is often subordinated to physical markers of disease (e.g. signs 
or symptoms made visible through examinations, MRI scans, blood word, etc.). As Mol 
(2002) further explains,  
Social scientists have made it their trade to listen for feelings when they 
interview patients. And they have persistently and severely criticized doctors for 
neglecting psychosocial matters, for being ever so concerned with keeping 
wounds clean while they hardly ever ask patients what being wounded means to 
them. In addition to blood sugar levels, bad arteries, and other physicalities, or 
so social scientists have been arguing in all kinds of ways, physicians should 
attend to what patients experience. This is how they have come to phrase it: in 
addition to disease, the object of biomedicine, something else is of importance 
too, a patient’s illness. Illness here stands for a patient’s interpretation of his or 
her disease, the feelings that accompany it, the life events it turns into (p. 9, 
emphasis original). 
According to Mol, as social scientists and humanists worked to make a way for 
themselves in the study of medicine, they have sequestered patient perspective/voice 
(illness) to their domain, leaving physicalities and bodily practices (disease) to 
biomedical experts. Despite this effort to bring relevance and significance to patient 
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narrative, this dichotomy instead has served to disempower patient narrative by 
granting biomedical experts “a strong alliance with the physical reality” (Mol, 2002, p. 
9), and at the same time, granting humanists and social scientists reprieve from 
materiality.  
Similar arguments have been made by rhetoricians of health and medicine as 
well, pointing both to the relevance and concern over distinctions between disease and 
illness. Segal (2005) writes, “the physician is expert in disease, and the patient in illness” 
(p. 147). Echoing these sentiments, Graham (2015), contends, 
The disease/illness dichotomy so popular in critical/cultural studies of medicine 
turns out, reinforces the line of demarcation between patient and physician, 
further enfranchising the singular ‘reality’ of the disease over the manifold 
‘perceptions’ of the illness (p. 217). 
While I agree that patient narratives and language play a significant role in persuasive 
activity, in many contexts within health and medicine, focusing solely on language 
positions our analyses to overlook important rhetorical entities that have been 
categorized as “disease” including bodies, technologies, physical experience, etc.  
To be fair, many rhetoricians have attempted to more adequately examine 
materiality. For example, Selzer and Crowley’s edited collection Rhetorical Bodies 
(1999) put great effort toward developing a variety of material-oriented rhetorical 
frameworks to explore the role of the body/disease/materiality in rhetoric. However, 
much of that work, like other postmodernist theories discussed in Chapter One, 
ultimately deconstructs materiality into language and culture. According to such work, 
bodies and materiality are constructed or constituted through language, only becoming 
meaningful when articulated symbolically. These theories then, serve to replicate the 
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very problem they are aiming to solve, and rhetoric continues “to ignore the body” 
(Dolmage, 2014, p. 2). 
The disease/illness dichotomy is indicative of larger issues that arise out of 
postmodernist solutions to binaries. Predominately, social constructivism enables logics 
like “it’s all in your head.” If bodily practices, embodied experiences, and material 
realities become “reduced to discourse,” then patient’s embodied, lived experiences risk 
becoming symbolic and somehow less real or valid (Graham 2015, p. 8). Certainly, the 
language/matter distinction is but one divide of relevance to patient. As demonstrated 
throughout Chapter One, divisions between mind/body, self/non-self, human/non-
human, as well as language/materiality are problematic. Indeed, Graham argues what 
he calls the “two-world problem” or the “series of bifurcations,” actually “gives rise to 
and authorizes” many of subsequent dualisms (2015, p. 21). These divisions are 
entangled with one another. That is, divisions between language and materiality give 
rise to divisions between disease and illness, mind and body, and others. Therefore, a 
call for increased attention to materiality in rhetorical studies, is a call for more nuanced 
and balanced approaches to all binaries and boundaries.  
The tension that emerges from the two-world problem is of particular relevance 
for rhetoricians of health and medicine whose commitment to and focus on “illness” 
actually reinforces the very issues that RHM’s goals (attending to and intervening in 
lived experiences) often work to overcome. If by focusing only on patient narrative, we 
excise patients’ physical, bodily experiences from the linguistic representations of those 
experiences, it seems that rhetoricians of health and medicine ought to find new 
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approaches by which we can work toward dismantling assumed binaries, particularly 
between disease and illness. Put simply, if, as a field, we continue to only examine 
language, we actively uphold a binary that disempowers patients by positioning “what 
patients say” against “what bodies do.” In an effort to accomplish RHM’s interventional 
goals, I am suggesting that we take seriously calls for more balanced approaches to 
language and materiality, and more broadly, all binaries.  
Taking up these calls then, the following section will explore two preliminary 
cases of women with autoimmune disease, who engage with the boundaries of their in 
very divergent ways. As I will show with these cases, self is not a stable entity but 
instead is articulated by dynamic boundaries. Furthermore, I will highlight the 
increasing need for understanding patients embodied, lived experiences as enacted 
through such entanglements. As we will see in the first case, the self is becomes non-self 
through entanglements with autoimmune disease. The second case then, will 
demonstrate a case in which the non-self, an ostomy, is transformed through acceptance 
of the self. 
Case One: When Self becomes Non-self  
Sharilynn Battaglia is one of many contributors to The Mighty—a website that 
publishes “real stories by real people facing real challenges” in order to “face disability, 
disease, and mental illness together” (“Who We Are,” 2016). Using one of Battaglia’s 
articles as an exemplar case, I will analyze her account of what it’s like to live with an 
autoimmune condition in order to demonstrate the common autoimmune patient’s 
experience of living with self as non-self.  
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To begin, Battaglia, who has been living with an autoimmune disease for over 
twenty years, describes having an autoimmune disease is “a lot like playing Jenga. Only 
we [autoimmune patients] are the tower” (2016). To help illustrate this comparison, she 
writes,  
When you first start playing, does the tower look like it’s under attack? Does it 
look like it’s in imminent danger of collapse? Of course not. But it is. It’s exactly 
the same with us [people with autoimmune disease]. Why do you think they are 
called invisible illnesses? The attack is all happening on the inside, through the 
blood to whatever the target of the day is. But just because our diseases work 
quietly on the inside, and just because the effects of our diseases aren’t as 
noticeable, that doesn’t mean we aren’t sick.  
Even though autoimmune diseases do not necessarily manifest visibly as Battaglia 
notes, they “work quietly on the inside, “and despite this containment within the self, 
these diseases, at least according to Battaglia, are not self. It is perhaps a little odd to 
think about the internal activity of our body as non-self; after all, the external boundary 
of the body is commonly considered to be the skin. However, for Battaglia, what is 
happening inside of her—her autoimmune disease—is not self. Her immune system 
and its autoimmune “attacks” are separate entities that operate within her in ways that 
she does not control.  
To explain further, she suggests autoimmune patients’ immune systems are 
“always on attack.” She writes,  
[Autoimmune patients’ immune systems] go after blocks of muscles or joints and 
push them out of balance, or they pull at blocks of nerves, creating raggedy areas 
that send tremors through our whole structure…You see, a healthy immune 
system knows what is foreign and what is not. You catch a cold, it sees a virus, it 
attacks. End of story. With us, it’s not so easy.  
Here, Battaglia’s autoimmune disease shifts from self to non-self, or at the very least, 
her experiences with her autoimmunity are enacted such that those specific “confused” 
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responses within her body are not her. Instead, she argues, such immune systems do 
not just “attack body parts,” instead they attack “our bodies. The bodies of people you 
know and love.”  
Importantly too, it’s not just that immune systems are constantly confused; 
instead, “just like in any war, troops take rest periods. So do our diseases. They hide on 
us.” And, when autoimmune diseases decide to come out of hiding,  
they may pick and choose what to attack first in each person, just like you choose 
which block to pull out when it’s your turn in Jenga. But eventually, the attack 
spreads and the tower falls…And it will happen over and over. 
This sort of agentic, intentional behavior attributed to the autoimmune disease further 
deepens the divide between conscious, controlled self, and non-controllable, invading 
non-self.  
In her embodied experience of autoimmunity, Battaglia’s notion of self is under 
attack by what is quarantined off as non-self. To be sure, autoimmunity is the immune 
system behaving in an atypical way, but this atypical behavior does not transform the 
immune system to physiological non-self. The misbehaving immune cells are still native 
to the body, however, when those misbehaving cells lead to painful or unwanted 
experiences (e.g., symptoms) new bodily boundaries emerge. In other words, it’s not 
just that Battaglia conceptualizes the confused immune system activity of her disease as 
non-self, it’s that her experiences (physically, psychologically, perhaps even socially) 
enable her autoimmune system to be divided from her self. Battaglia highlights the 
fluidity of the boundaries surrounding self, non-self, body, and mind, specifically when 
the self becomes non-self. However, the boundaries enacted in her case are not 
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representative of inherent or stable ontological difference. Autoimmune patients do not 
always experience self as non-self. Recognizing these shifting boundaries as contingent 
upon particular entanglements, the next section will track an enactment in which non-
self becomes self.  
Case Two: When Non-Self Becomes Self  
If instances in which the self becomes non-self for autoimmune patients exist, then it 
seems reasonable that there are cases in which the reverse occurs—in which the non-self 
becomes self. As briefly described in the first chapter, for some patients with 
autoimmune disease, the use or integration of technologies as treatments becomes 
necessary, and these cases provide a way in which to explore the potential of non-self 
becoming self. In particular, for patients with IBD, the ostomy pouch is often required, 
and for the many patients with ostomies, notions of self become increasingly complex. 
Is the ostomy pouch self? Is the self a cyborg? Can nonhuman become human? If so, 
how, when, and toward what end? To explore these questions, I turn to Jessica 
Grossman, a contributor to Uncover Ostomy, an online “awareness campaign working 
to break the stigma surrounding ostomy surgery” (“About Us,” 2016).  
 As a contributor to the site, Grossman blogs regularly discussing her personal 
experiences with IBD and ostomies, offering advice and support for others on topics 
ranging from clothing and exercise to dating and wedding planning. Of Grossman’s 
many posts, I will examine just one, entitled, “13 Years of Different: Bag-Mitzvah 
Edition” (2013). In this post, Grossman celebrates her 13-year ostomy anniversary. 
Reflecting on her past 13 years, she writes, “on January 30th, 2003, I was told that I 
needed to choose between life with an ostomy or death. 13 years later, I am here. Alive. 
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Healthy. And celebrating…my “Bag-Mitzvah.” In addition to celebrating the life she 
was able to continue due to her ostomy, Grossman uses this post to offer 13 bits of 
“wisdom” to her readers.  
Over the course of the 13 points, Grossman specifically highlights the importance 
of acceptance, openness, and empowerment for people with ostomies. As I will show, 
through Grossman’s points of advice, she not only highlights the importance of 
acceptance, but she describes her experiences through which her technology became 
self. Specifically, Grossman begins her list with the following sentiment: “There is no 
better choice that you can make in your life than to accept yourself for who you are.” 
On this point, she elaborates, 
Having accepted my ostomy as part of who I am has given me the confidence to 
not only live my life, but to live it the way I want to live it. If there’s one thing 
you can take away from this whole post—do whatever it takes to get yourself to 
accept who you are (emphasis mine).  
Here Grossman does not suggest that readers learn to accept having to wear an ostomy. 
Instead, she advocates for acceptance of the previously non-self, nonhuman ostomy into 
her notion of self. Accepting the ostomy means accepting herself for who she is, the self 
enacted through her lived experiences, and she recommends others with ostomy 
pouches do the same.  
Building on this acceptance of self, Grossman then recommends that people with 
ostomies must educate others about their “difference” because people “won’t 
understand what your difference really is.” To support this point, she offers her own 
experience,  
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I was able to explain that the ostomy is a lifesaving surgery and that, without it, I 
would be dead. I can explain that it’s not gross, it is weird, but it’s me and I am 
damn proud to be alive (emphasis original).  
Grossman explicitly identifies the ostomy as self in this passage, which suggests no 
boundary between self and technology for her. Her ostomy becomes part of her self. 
Note, Grossman explains the ostomy “is me,” not “I decided the ostomy is part of me” 
or “I talk about my ostomy as if it’s part of me.” It’s not that Grossman simply decided 
her ostomy was self, but rather that through engagement with the technology, through 
her practices and experiences, non-self becomes self.  
 In addition to reminding readers to “not let [your] difference stop you from 
doing what you want to do,” Grossman specifically tells readers that being different 
and having an ostomy, makes them “special” and such specialness is not only valuable 
but tied to identity and self. Reflecting on her personal experience, Grossman writes, 
“My fiancé treats me like gold because he loves everything about me—including my 
stubbornness and my ostomy. It makes me who I am and that’s all he cares about” 
(emphasis original). It is because her ostomy is part of her self that she is special, 
unique, and loved. Ultimately, the borders of Grossman’s body and self are not limited 
to the boundaries of her physical body (e.g., the skin), enabling the ostomy to become 
self.  
On Calibrating Intra-Activity & Rhetorical-Ontological Inquiry  
The cases of Grossman and Battaglia demonstrate a few critical points. First, these cases 
enact two incompatible versions of self. For Battaglia, boundaries around self arranged 
internally, allowing her autoimmune disease to be partitioned from her self. 
Conversely, Grossman’s self extends beyond the commonplace boundary of the skin to 
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surround her ostomy as self. Looking at these contradictory cases brings to bear the 
pressing need for a theoretical and rhetorical approach for understanding such 
inconsistencies. Secondly, these cases point out that autoimmunity requires a nuanced 
approach to divisions, particularly, to understand how boundaries between and around 
language, materiality, self, non-self, mind, body, human, and nonhuman are dismantled 
as well as established and maintained. Battaglia’s and Grossman’s cases reveal, at least 
in certain instances, establishing and maintaining binaries can be quite productive for 
patients or certain bodies and identities.  
Many scholars too have noted this point, suggesting that an additional concern 
regarding postmodernist solutions to binaries is the desire to dismantle all binaries in 
every context (Manderson, 2005; Bennett, 2009; Wells, 2010, Krummell, 2001). For 
instance, while examining how patients react after life-altering surgery, Manderson 
identifies the “need” for patients to separate themselves from their bodies, highlighting 
the “important and ongoing tension” that exists for “people who, on an everyday basis, 
have to deal with their bodies as objects” (p. 406).  
Additionally, in an autoethnographic piece regarding her own experiences with 
MS, Krummell explains that dealing with her condition has led to an “inevitable 
distrust of her own body, requiring her to rely more and more on her mind” (2001, p. 
68). Bennett, too, suggests divisions between subject and object have even ameliorated 
human suffering and promoted happiness and well-being in certain instances (2009). In 
such examples, a tension arises between the theoretical or philosophical desires to 
overcome binaries and the lived divisions that scholars experience or observe. 
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Consequently, a theory that attends to both the concerns over upheld binaries while 
maintaining a space for productive binaries seems necessary on both theoretical and 
practical levels.  
In looking at cases like Battaglia and Grossman, in which boundaries are enacted 
in diverse ways, it becomes clear that it’s not simply that we need a better theory to do 
away with binaries. Instead, we need a robust framework in which we can more 
adequately understand how boundaries and divisions become rhetorically possible and 
powerful. Such a framework not only has the potential to better account for what’s 
happening in these cases on a theoretical level, but also to help patients (as well as other 
stakeholders, no doubt) make meaning out of their experiences to in an effort to cope, 
understand, and move forward given the circumstances of their patienthood. In 
searching for such a framework, I turn to Barad’s intra-activity (2007) and Graham’s 
rhetorical-ontological inquiry (2015) as the first step in developing theory of enactments 
to capture and examine autoimmunity, embodiment, and selfhood. In drawing on 
Barad and Graham, I am working to make a space in which binaries can be dissolved 
(e.g., my ostomy is part of me) as well as space for binaries to be established (e.g., my 
immune system is not me).  
Boundaries that Do Not Sit Still 
In developing her theories of agential realism and intra-activity, Barad begins by 
recognizing,  
what is needed is an analysis that enables us to theorize the social and natural 
together, to read our best understandings of the social and natural phenomena 
through one another in a way that clarifies the relationship between them (2007, 
p. 25). 
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In other words, what is needed is a theory that accounts for the messy relationships 
between various entities while not reinscribing inherent dualisms. In developing such a 
theory, Barad asks many of the same questions I am posing throughout this 
dissertation,  
What is entailed in the investigation of entanglements? How can one study 
them? Is there a way to study them without getting caught up in them? What can 
one say about them? Are there any limits to what can be said…how to 
responsibly explore entanglements and the differences they make? (2007, p. 74)   
Working to answer these very questions, Barad fosters her theory of intra-activity 
founded on the premises that “boundaries [between human/nonhuman, 
culture/nature, language/matter] do not sit still” (p. 171) and “the line between subject 
and object are not fixed” (p. 155).  
Indeed, according to Barad, there are no preexisting entities in the world, no a 
priori subjects, objects, bodies, or minds, but rather such phenomena emerge in “intra-
actions.” Barad clarifies,  
the notion of intra-action (in contrast to the usual ‘interaction,’ which presumes 
the prior existence of independent entities or relata) represents a profound 
conceptual shift. It is through specific agential intra-actions that boundaries and 
properties of components of phenomena become determinate and that particular 
concepts (that is, particular material articulations of the world) become 
meaningful (p. 139).  
Put another way, entities (things, words, objects, subjects, etc.) are constituted through 
their mutual entanglement with other entities (note the difference here from the 
common postmodern idea that language and culture constitute objects). There are, 
therefore, no preexisting entities that can be categorized into inherent binaries. The 
world “is a dynamic process of intra-activity” (Barad, 2007, p. 140). 
 36 
Barad’s intra-activity requires that “matter” is not a “mere effect or product of 
discursive practices” but instead an “agentive factor” within entanglements (2007, p. 
32). Accordingly, meaning is not confined to “individual words or groups of words” 
but is enacted through intra-actions (2003, p. 820). Entities become meaningful through 
articulations with other entities, through intra-actions. If no preexisting entities exist, 
but are distinguished through enactments, then boundaries and binaries too are enacted 
through intra-active entanglements (often including both materiality and language). 
And, through these intra-active entanglements both entities and distinctions emerge 
and dissolve. This approach has the potential to help rhetoricians more adequately 
attend to materiality by offering a productive alternative to binaries, but an alternative 
in which language is still often an integral part. For Barad, language and materiality 
(and all other entities) are not naturally separate in the world, but their separability is 
staged through what through specific “cuts.”  
Drawing contrast with inherent, stable “Cartesian cuts,” Barad offers the notion 
of “agential cuts”—distinctions that emerge through practices (2003, p. 815). Critical to 
the idea of agential cuts is that we reconsider the role of nonhuman entities without 
taking the distinctions between human and nonhuman as “foundational” or given 
(2007, p. 32). Through intra-actions, specific agential cuts are enacted; in one intra-action 
a cut between subject and object might be enacted, while in another, a different cut that 
unifies subject and object might be enacted. Consequently, intra-activity requires a shift 
in conceptions of agency:  
agency is a matter of intra-acting; it is an enactment, not something that someone 
or something has…Agency is ‘doing’ or ‘being’ in its intra-activity. It is the 
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enactment of iterative changes to particular practice—iterative reconfigurings of 
topological manifolds of spacetimematter relations—through the dynamics of 
intra-activity (2007, p. 178)  
In other words, agency is enacted as entities come together in specific intra-active 
practices, and agency is certainly not confined to human entities. Who and what are 
capable of participating in agentic practices is shifted to include human, nonhuman, 
language, matter; although, as Barad sees it, even those categories are not fixed or 
inherent in the world. Instead, the entities that make up the world come together in 
space and time, and any entity is capable of participating and influences these agential 
enactments.  
The significance of this reconfiguration of agency and attunement to intra-
activity is that the world is no longer made up of preexisting objects, subjects, cyborgs, 
minds, and bodies, and the need to overcome or uphold binaries is no longer necessary. 
Instead, under Barad’s rubric, the entities previously understood as binaries or hybrids 
only emerge through their activities within enacted phenomena. As such, different 
practices stage different agential cuts, and we can begin to see enactments of binaries—
upheld or dismantled—as agential cuts that are enacted in time and space. The benefit 
of this shift from “questions of correspondence between descriptions and reality” to 
“practices/doings/actions” Barad explains, “bring[s] to the forefront important 
questions of ontology, materiality, and agency” (p. 802).  
Instead of assuming or reinscribing “hardwired” divisions in the world, intra-
activity provides a way for scholars to make sense of how phenomena come into being 
through practices. Under an intra-active framework, different patients are engaged in 
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different practices in which different agential cuts are enacted. Entities including self, 
non-self, disease, immune system, language, ostomy, and others are fluid and enacted 
intra-actively through specific practices. Accordingly, I adopt a lexicon of “doing, 
“enacting,” and “becoming” to suggest the lively, agentic processes that stage different 
enactments of boundaries and divisions surrounding patients’ lived experiences, 
bodies, and identities (processes that I will more fully elucidate in Chapters Three, Four, 
and Five). In so doing, I attune my focus to the enactments in which the intra-actions in 
which agential cuts are enacted. 
It’s important to note, however, Barad’s theory of intra-actions and agential cuts 
considers language in particular ways, such that discourse does not directly equate to 
language. Barad quite explicitly recognizes the important role language plays in intra-
actions; however, she attunes our understanding of language such that discourse does 
not have inherent boundaries. Instead, she argues, “discursive practice are ongoing 
agential intra-actions of the world through which local determinacy is 
enacted…meaning is not a property of individual words of groups of words but an 
ongoing performance in the world” (pp. 820-1). Barad begins theorizing the role of 
language in intra-actions, but as philosopher, not rhetorician, she does not fully engage 
the implications such a paradigm shift might have on rhetorical studies. 
Therefore, in the following section, I calibrate Barad’s intra-activity with 
Graham’s rhetorical ontological inquiry, which, according to Graham, “seeks to balance 
the opposing forces of human- and object-centered accounts” (2015, p. 209). Indeed, 
Graham’s rhetorical-ontological inquiry of pain compellingly demonstrates the 
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simultaneous importance of attending to materiality and language, as both act in 
important rhetorical ways (p. 84). Combinging Barad and Graham for this project on 
IBD and autoimmunity results in a useful heuristic for attending to all agentic entities 
including materiality, objects, bodies, non-selves, language, subjects, minds, selves, etc. 
Embodied Doings in the World 
Of the many new materialist frameworks, few take specific care to maintain a 
productive space for language in combination with materiality. Graham’s rhetorical-
ontological inquiry (2015), however, emerges as one of the most promising and 
productive tools with which rhetoricians might address materiality, particularly of the 
body, without abandoning the commitments of rhetorical work. A rhetorical-
ontological inquiry, according to Graham, balances the language/matter divide, and 
subsequently other modernist dualisms, through a “study of practices” (p. 88) in which 
“the material and the ontological are at the center of inquiry” (p. 7). One goal of 
rhetorical-ontological inquiry, Graham explains, is to “transcend” the problematic 
legacy of dualistic thinking that I have been outlining over the course of this 
dissertation so far.  
Clarifying the way in which language should be accounted for, Graham builds 
on Mol’s study of ontologies in medical practice, in which she too examines language 
but in a very strategic way. In contrast to analyses of patient narrative, Mol advocates 
that we “listen to” each person (and their reports) under analysis as if she is her “own 
ethnographer. Not just an ethnographer of feelings, meanings, or perspectives. But 
someone who tells how living with an impaired body is done in practice” (Mol, 2002, p. 
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15). Thinking of the cases presented in this chapter as entangled phenomena of bodies, 
diseases, and experiences “done in practice” has specific implications: 
It is possible to listen to people’s stories as if they tell about events. Through such 
listening an illness takes shape both as material and active...This illness is 
something being done to you, the patient. And that, as a patient you do” (Mol, 
2002, p. 20).  
As such, Graham argues, “language is doing” (p. 84), therefore, his rhetorical-
ontological inquiry studies different “doings” in the world including “the practices of 
speaking, writing, visualizing, representing” (p. 36). By shifting our analyses to 
practices and sites of practices (following Mol, 2002), we can best understand the ways 
in which such practices stage particular realities and object formations (p. 31).  
Through his analysis of pain management and the formation of “pain” as an 
object across sites and practices, Graham develops rhetorical-ontological inquiry as a 
“form of inquiry that can go all the way from the microscale, local practices…to 
networks” of many, diverse entities. Importantly too, rhetorical-ontological inquiry is 
grounded in multiple ontologies theory (see Chapter Four for a more thorough 
discussion), which, put briefly, “is a theory of doing and being” in which “the kinds of 
actions you habitually perform” stage the reality in which you engage” (p. 31).  
This aspect of rhetorical-ontological inquiry is integral to what I am attempting 
throughout this dissertation: to find ways to simultaneously account for all entities 
involved in a rhetorical situation as a means of understanding how specific boundaries 
are done and how the entities involved in those boundary-making practices enact 
specific notions of self. For instance, Graham uses rhetorical-ontological inquiry to 
demonstrate the entanglement of medical expertise, imaging technology, patient report, 
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diagnostic testing, and pharmaceuticals to enact and bring into being fibromyalgia as a 
disease. Similarly, in my calibration of intra-activity and rhetorical-ontological inquiry, I 
am interested in investigating the entities involved in the intra-activity that enacts 
specific practices and stages divergent ontologies of ostomies, selves, and bodies.  
Bringing Graham and Barad together on this point is especially insightful. 
Rhetorical-ontological inquiry helps attune my work to the kinds of intra-actions 
“habitually performed” in various IBD contexts that result in specific doings or 
enactments of boundaries and divisions. The point here is that intra-actions are enacted 
in specific entangled, embodied practices. These practices, habitually done, stage 
specific ontologies of self, ostomy, non-self, etc. Through intra-active practices, 
ontological borders are drawn. To unpack the complexity here further, the following 
section details the ways in which the integrating intra-activity and rhetorical-
ontological inquiry sheds light on the cases of Grossman and Battaglia. However, first, I 
must explain how calibrating Barad and Graham demands a particular strategy of 
curating artifacts for this dissertation (including the cases presented in this chapter). In 
what follows, I will summarize discourse and object formations part of Foucault’s 
enunciative analysis as the artifact curation approach necessary to leverage the insights 
of Barad and Graham for rhetorical studies.  
Enunciative Analysis: Discourse Formation and Formation of Objects  
A key aspect of calibrated intra-activity and rhetorical-ontological inquiry for a theory 
of enactments is that all entities are examined as they emerge in intra-actions. An 
enactment analysis cannot assume any divisions even in the artifacts curated. However, 
rhetorical analyses often make an a priori agential cut and only collect and analyze 
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language and linguistic artifacts. In order to avoid this cut at the outset of my work and 
to fully and appropriately employ Barad and Graham, however, I turned to Foucault’s 
formations of discourse and objects as data curation heuristics that enabled me to 
identify intra-active phenomena without assuming an agential cut between language 
and other objects for analysis. That is, Foucault’s discourse and object formations (1972) 
serves as a platform for gathering intra-active phenomena, rather than only linguistic 
phenomena. This approach enables me to explore the role of language within intra-
actions and agential cuts, without enforcing agential cuts on phenomena myself. To 
elucidate this data curation method further, this section will introduce Foucault’s 
discourse and object formations with particular focus on its relevancy for rhetorical 
studies.  
Over the course of three years, I have worked to curate public cases and 
associated artifacts relating to patient experience with IBD and ostomy pouches. 
Artifacts assembled in this process include campaign materials for a health advocacy 
campaign by the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (Chapter Three), news 
articles and blog posts written by and for patients with IBD and ostomies (Chapters 
Two, Three and Four), interviews and observational data of with women with IBD and 
ostomies4 (Chapters Three and Four), and social media content including artifacts with 
                                                 
4 Over the course of three years, I conducted a qualitative study including ethnographic observations, interviews, and surveys in 
order to capture and analyze the lived experiences of patients with IBD and/or ostomies. In total, I conducted approximately 200 
hours of ethnographic observations at an annual retreat for women with IBD and/or ostomies. During these observations, I had 
permission from organizers and attendees to observe at any time (including focus groups, guided activities, and social time). 
Additionally, I conducted follow-up interviews with 9 women, all of which attended this retreat (a list of interview questions is 
included in Appendix A). Lastly, as part of this study, I conducted an online, national survey to gain further insight into this patient 
population (see Appendix B for a list of questions). I do not directly include findings from that survey in this dissertation, however, 
 43 
several social media awareness and fundraising efforts including Get Your Belly Out, 
OstomyOutdoor, and #IBDSelfie (Chapter Three, Four, and Five). 
In managing these artifacts, I employ Foucault’s enunciative analysis, which has 
been explored extensively by rhetoricians (Graham & Herndl, 2011; Phillips, 2002; 
Biesecker, 1992; Blair & Cooper, 1987; Longo, 1998). Such an analysis guides rhetoricians 
to examine what Foucault calls discourse formations and the formation of objects, by 
asking two primary questions:  
• “How is it that this statement appears rather than some other?” (Foucault, 
1972, p. 22)  
• “How do rules and constitutive regularities of a discursive formation 
produce a statement about a specific type of object and not some other 
statement?” (Graham & Herndl, 2011, p. 151)  
Put another way, these questions require attention to how and why certain statements 
were made possible and what types of objects are made possible with those statements. 
 In his discussion of enunciative analysis, Phillips (2002) highlights the value of 
Foucault’s discourse formation, particularly in relationship to the rhetorical study of 
invention. Phillips defines discourse formation as “the emergence of statements in a 
broad field of discourse” (p. 333), and through these formations, objects are formed. For 
example, in Graham & Herndl’s deployment of enunciative analysis, they examine 
discourse formations that establish and influence the object of “pain” (2011). 
                                                 
I’ve no doubt that conducting and analyzing that survey influences the overall findings of this dissertation, therefore I make 
mention of it here. This qualitative study was approved by UWM’s Institutional Review Board. 
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Importantly though, such discourse formations, as well as the objects that emerge with 
them, are highly governed by knowledge, power, and subjectivity, and through this 
regulation, particular discourse formations are made possible while others are 
constrained.  
Who speaks, the sites from which the speaker speaks, and the positions of that 
speaker highly influences the formation of discourse and its associated objects (e.g. in 
my work, these objects might include the self, ostomy, IBD, body, etc.). And, as I argued 
in Chapter One, rhetoricians must remember, who is capable of “speaking” is not 
limited to humans; ostomies, immune cells, images, also “speak” and influence these 
formations. Therefore, as I will clarify later in this chapter, a theory that accounts for 
how such entities come into being and how they influence rhetorical practice is 
necessary.  
Essential to enunciative analysis, too, is the notion that these formations are not 
“wholly coherent entities” but instead are “riddled with incoherence and contingency” 
(Phillips, 2002, p. 333) Through these incoherences and contingencies, “points of 
possibility” for alternative discourse formations and objects are staged. Phillips notes, 
“contradictions are important not only as new statements and different discourses, but 
also as points of possibility…spaces within which certainty and regularity are disabled 
and possibilities become possible” (pp. 333-4). Explaining further, Phillips suggests,  
These are spaces of dissension because they are places where the incoherence 
and contingency of the discourse is experienced directly and, therefore, the 
production of dissenting discourse becomes possible for those who have 
momentarily recognized the instability. Spaces of dissension, thus, can be 
conceived as inventional spaces (p. 334).    
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These points of possibility, the incoherence and contradictions, are precisely where I 
focused during my artifact curation--where, when, and why contradictions and 
inconsistencies emerge in the discourse formations related to IBD, ostomies, and the 
related binaries and boundaries.  
That is, I narrow in on instances in the discourse in which incoherence or 
contradictions developed in the formation of self, identity, ostomy, IBD, etc., in order to 
map the emergence, boundaries, and differences across those formations. Much like 
Graham and Herndl’s study in which they argue “enunciative analysis suggests that 
‘pain’ is a discourse object constituted differently in different professional disciplines” 
(2011, p. 151), my project illuminates instances in which self, ostomy, body, identity, 
and disease are enacted differently to uncover why and how these objects emerge as 
contradictory or incoherent. However, Graham and Herndl (2011) emphasize that fully 
understanding the object formation of “pain” required they “supersede” assumed 
boundaries and ontologies of pain (p. 151). Therefore, I use enunciative analysis as a 
way to “supersede” a priori agential cuts regarding the artifacts that stage objects like 
self and ostomy.  
That is, discourse and object formations enable rhetoricians to identify the 
agential cuts and boundaries enacted in phenomena. Rather than select only linguistic 
representations for this dissertation then, I worked to identify object formations in 
which I could trace the incoherencies and contradictions with the IBD and ostomy 
communities. As such, the chapters in this dissertation feature a series of dueling cases, 
so-to-speak, much like the cases of Battaglia and Grossman presented in this chapter. To 
 46 
illustrate both the value of curating object formations rather than language cut from its 
phenomena, as well as the analytic potential for calibrated intra-active and rhetorical-
ontological approach, the next section deploys enactments as my way of doing analysis.  
Lived Experience & Enactments  
As mentioned previously, calibrating intra-activity and rhetorical-ontological inquiry 
results in the development of a new analytic frame that examines enactments. As the 
composite of Barad’s and Graham’s insight, a theory of enactments navigates various 
boundaries and binaries, examining how they come to be and how they come to have 
agentive influence in the contexts of IBD and autoimmunity more broadly. Essentially, a 
theory of enactments reframes rhetorical activity as both diffuse through entanglements 
of many entities (intra-active) and persuasive toward a particular exigency, whether 
intentional or not, in which a specific ontologies and boundaries are staged through 
patient practice (rhetorical-ontological). This reframing makes space for fluid 
boundaries and works then to understand how and why certain agential cuts are 
enacted and how and when they become meaningful.  
Moreover, thinking of practices in health and medicine as enactments pushes the 
purview of our inquiry beyond patient narrative to richer accounts of the intra-activity 
that stage specific experience and practices. In focusing this analysis on enactments, I 
can treat the reports of women not as descriptions of their feelings or perspectives, but 
as reports on events—on things that happened through their own practices as they 
entangled with the practices around them.  Subsequently, my analysis does not attend 
to the ways in which Grossman or Battaglia said or described certain experiences or 
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ideas, instead, my analysis focuses on what types of boundaries and binaries were done 
and enacted in the events upon which Grossman and Battaglia report. 
Indeed, a theory of enactments in rhetorical studies of health and medicine is a 
methodological posture—a way of being that attunes us to particular insights—through 
which we might help stakeholders identify how meaning-making happens in given 
contexts, what entities are intra-actively involved and toward what end, and how those 
stakeholders might use that insight to navigate those contexts. For example, ignoring 
the material agency of autoimmune activity makes it difficult to understand patient 
lived experience, and equal important, to find ways to intervene in those experiences. 
Therefore, a study of enactments aims to effectively engage with the range of entities at 
work in a given context to explore the rhetorical practices involved in autoimmunity.  
Together Barad’s and Graham’s theories are apt to examine how patients with 
IBD and ostomies experience and engage boundaries of their selves, bodies, and 
conditions. Accordingly, a theory of enactments accounts for which entities are at work 
in a given space, practice, and moment within a rhetorical situation, whether discursive, 
material, or else. Calibrating Graham and Barad enables me to orient my analysis to the 
entities that co-constitutively intra-act in specific practices to enact particular bodies, 
objects, binaries, identities, boundaries, etc. For instance, in Grossman’s case, the intra-
activity of her self, ostomy, disease, society, husband, body, and perhaps more, are 
staged through her everyday practices, that, in turn, enact the specific boundary of her 
ostomy as self. This enactment has specific rhetorical consequences as made manifest in 
her post celebrating her Bag-Mitzvah. The specific enactment of her ostomy as self 
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works rhetorically to bring positivity and empowerment to the IBD and ostomy 
community. In sharing this specific enactment of self through her blog post, Grossman 
calls others to both engage in specific practices as well as share those specific practices 
with others in a celebratory, accepting way.  
In contrast, the intra-activity entangled with Battaglia—her body, self, 
autoimmune cells, intestinal walls, immune system—are staged through her practices 
and enact a boundary around her autoimmune disease, in which it becomes non-self. 
The enactment of autoimmune disease as non-self too has specific rhetorical 
implications. For one, this division draws attention to the seriousness of autoimmune 
disease and the little control she has over it. Too, with her autoimmune disease as non-
self, she can further explore her everyday lived experiences that shape and are shaped 
by this division. Sharing such experiences sheds light on the difficulties of living with 
an autoimmune disease, drawing attention to the “invisible” disease as well as its 
consequences for the person in which the non-self acts.   
To review, in either of the cases explored in this chapter, boundaries and 
divisions are enacted through intra-actions of disease, self, non-self, bodies, technology, 
minds, language, culture, and more, in specific rhetorical contexts. Postmodernism 
might suggest we make sense of autoimmunity by seeing it as socially constructed by 
the current medical culture and constituted through language within that culture, while 
new materialisms risks losing sight of the powerful role language and culture play in 
the meaning-making of autoimmunity. Therefore, examining autoimmunity and its 
associated experiences as enacted provides a way to more adequately account for and 
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balance the roles of the diverse entities involved. A theory of enactments is concerned 
with the specific practices that divide various entities, as well as the practices in which 
no such divisions are enacted. Barad and Graham productively investigate the vibrant 
intra-actions of entities across and through time. Calibrating their insights, I propose 
enactments as a methodology for 1) examining who and what are involved in the 
boundary-making practices within IBD, ostomies, and autoimmunity and 2) evaluating 
the ways in which certain enactments become influential and salient. Tracing these 
enactments allows me to understand the powerful role boundaries play in these 
contexts. 
Furthermore, in calibrating Barad and Graham, I hope to respond to Graham’s 
calls for “increased attention to the reciprocal relationship among words and things” (p. 
206) and for future rhetorical-ontological work that is “interventional” (p. 218), by 
expanding rhetorical studies of health and medicine into the domain of enactments. 
Graham suggests, “rhetorical-ontological inquiry can use its investigational resources to 
catalyze and assist interventional and emancipatory projects in a wide variety of 
domains” (p. 215). Calibrating intra-activity with rhetorical-ontological inquiry has set 
me on the path to take up both of these calls. A theory of enactments builds on new 
materialist and ontological inquiry by examining entities and the practices that stage 
them, and in so doing, has the potential for identifying ways in which we can intervene 
in those practices. For my work in particular, I am advocating that combining 
rhetorical-ontological inquiry and intra-activity provides a way to do theory that 
examines when, why, and how certain boundaries and divisions are enacted toward 
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particular rhetorical exigencies, and helps to map the spaces in which I might be able to 
improve the multifaceted complexities of living with IBD, ostomies, and autoimmunity.  
Continuing to build this calibrated theory, in Chapters Three, Four, and Five, my 
goal is to trace how and what enactments are staged through particular patient 
practices. To do so, I will examine a series of contradictory or incoherent objects (e.g., 
self, ostomy, disease, body) as they are staged through specific enactments. In Chapter 
Three, we will meet Julia, a CDC representative who grew famous in the IBD 
community for making public her particular ostomy experience. As we will see, the 
enactments in Julia’s case, in comparison to many others in the IBD community, stage 
particular identities through particular trajectories of intra-active experiences. As I 
examine Julia and conflicting cases through an enactment lens, I am to expose why 
divergent identities are staged across seemingly similar entanglements of humans and 
ostomies.  
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 CHAPTER 3: WEARING & BECOMING: ENACTING DIVERGENT IDENTITIES  
You go wherever it goes. You have no control. If it comes loose, it smells. I had no control. I had to wear it 
for a whole year. I was at home the majority of the time because I was scared that it would come loose 
and it would smell and I didn’t want to be around anyone. I was really kind of like stuck at home –Julia, 
CDC Spokesperson and cancer survivor 
 
I know what it’s like to see your reflection in the mirror and feel unattractive. I used to be disgusted at the 
very thing that restored my health. But then I realized, that anything that has the power to save a life can 
be nothing but beautiful –Gaylyn Henderson, Founder of the advocacy organization Gutless and 
Glamorous 
 
To begin this chapter, I’d like to introduce one of the most famous figures within the 
IBD and ostomy communities in the last several years: Julia.  
 
Figure 2. Julia in one of her Tips from Former Smokers video. 
Julia and her fellow “former smokers” have been featured on TV for the last three years 
as part of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) Tips from Former 
Smokers campaign, a nationwide effort to decrease smoking. At first, anti-smoking 
efforts might seem unrelated to my work on IBD, ostomies, and autoimmunity, 
however, Julia and her participation in the CDC’s campaign, grew famous because of 
the experiences Julia presents regarding her temporary ostomy pouch after she was 
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diagnosed with colorectal cancer. Otherwise outside of the IBD and ostomy 
communities, Julia, and the experiences she highlighted, steeped her in a nationwide 
controversy regarding the CDC and Julia’s decision to broadcast explicitly negative 
experiences with an ostomy pouch as an effort to persuade viewers to quit smoking.  
That is, Julia and the CDC were highly criticized for their willingness to use the 
ostomy pouch as a scare tactic, much in alignment with the other videos and ads in this 
campaign, to confront viewers with the “reality” of smoking. Although assuredly well-
intentioned, Julia’s video subordinates the life-saving potential of ostomy technology to 
the seemingly more important mission of decreasing smoking across the US. That the 
CDC elided alternative, more positive, experiences with the ostomy, provoked outrage 
on the national stage by organizations like the Crohn’s and Colitis Foundation of 
America and the United Ostomy Association of America, as well as thousands of 
individual patients who flooded the CDC’s social media accounts and even developed a 
massively popular petition, calling for an apology as well as a recall of Julia’s video.  
I introduce you to Julia and the controversy she incited as they provide a 
particularly rich site for deploying the enactment framework developed over the course 
of Chapter Two. As I contended in that chapter, bodily and identity boundaries, 
particularly around self, are enacted through specific intra-actions staged in everyday 
practices. In looking at cases like Battaglia and Grossman (see Chapter Two), it becomes 
clear that diverse, often contradictory, enactments are made possible through the intra-
activity of many entities (words, technology, society, disease, bodies, identities, etc.). A 
theory of enactments, then, is deliberately calibrated to examine the specific practices in 
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which boundaries—in terms of bodies, identities, objects—are enacted or done. To do 
this theory, to put it into practice, my goal for this chapter is to move out of the dense 
theoretical conversation of Chapter Two, and into a more applied discussion of what a 
theory of enactments brings rhetoricians and technical communicators. Accordingly, 
this chapter will examine a range of cases including Julia, in which diverse object 
formations are staged in order to understand why and how those divergences came to 
be and what consequence those objects have on identity. As I will detail later in this 
chapter, I identify two primary ostomy-related identities within this community of 
patients—ostomy pouch wearer and ostomate. 
Importantly, as part of this application of an enactment approach, Segal’s 
kairology (2005) is highly useful to understand how these divergent identities come to 
be through intra-actions and enactments. Attending to the role of kairos in enactments 
is especially helpful to explain when and how particular enactments become possible 
and persuasive. After all, a key concern of this dissertation is understand how 
enactments surface as powerful and influential. Much has already been said on the 
notion of enacting, performing, or doing (Butler, 1999; Mol, 2002; Graham, 2015; 
Pickering, 2010), however, to build on Graham, this chapter is interested in what makes 
enactments relevant to and capable of rhetorical activity, and, what that might mean for 
patients with IBD and ostomies. Throughout the rest of this chapter then, I will briefly 
describe Segal’s kairology and its relevancy as a heuristic for 1) understanding the 
experiences and identities enacted across the cases presented and 2) bringing these 
cases into conversation with rhetoric of technology scholarship.    
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A Kairology of Enactments  
In an effort to examine the relationships among and consequences of enactments, 
throughout this chapter, I will deploy what Segal (2005) coined a “kairology.” A 
kairology, Segal explains, is “a study of historical moments as rhetorical opportunities” 
(p. 23). Such an approach enables a rhetorician to understand how, when, and why 
certain moments and arguments are persuasive by investigating the “conditions of time, 
place, and audience” (p. 22). Importantly, as Segal carefully notes, a kairology is more 
than a chronology; it is a study of “contingency and fitness-to-a-situation” (p. 22). That 
is, Segal advances this approach to kairos in order to examine when and how 
“arguments have a quality of truth” in specific situations. By examining those 
arguments (enactments) in relationship to the rhetorical situation from which they 
emerge, we can begin tracing (hi)stories rhetorically. It is worth reminding here that an 
enactment analysis is focused on listening to people’s stories as if they are “events”—
that which is done in practice. Therefore, as I deploy a kairological analysis in this 
chapter, the “rhetorical opportunities” under examination are events or doings staged 
through specific intra-actions and agential cuts.  
Further, Segal’s kairology focuses on “vectors,” the opportune alignment of 
rhetorical threads that make possible a given moment. Segal explains,  
An illness is an illness by fitting into a taxonomy of illness (the medical vector), 
by being situated in a certain way between cultural elements (the cultural 
polarity vector), by being visible as a disorder (the observability vector) and 
providing some otherwise unavailable release (p. 23).  
In other words, an illness comes into being when and where these vectors intersect. In 
the lexicon of an intra-active framework, Segal’s insights can be reframed as follows: 
 55 
when the medical vector, cultural polarity vector, and observability vector intra-act, 
illness is enacted. The alignment of these vectors are intra-actions. When vectors align, 
when entities intra-act, enactments come into being and potentially become rhetorically 
powerful.  
This kairological approach is particularly useful in understanding the 
enactments of patients because it is shifts my focus toward practices and agential cuts 
enacted through space and time. Put another way, kairology builds a foundation to 
examine the emergence, transformation, and relationship between different IBD and 
ostomy pouch experiences, specifically helping me to understand 1) how these 
experiences and events gained traction persuasively, publically, and personally, 2) how 
these various experiences are connected across time and space and 3) how the 
unfolding of experiences over space and time enact particular identities through 
agential cuts.  
In this chapter then, I am guided by the following question: how do some 
patients become ostomy pouch wearers while others ostomates? I build on the notion 
that only certain conditions make possible given enactments and objects to explore how 
kairologies of intra-actions in which the ostomy is involved enact diverse identities 
through particular patient experiences. That is, this chapter is focused on the alignment 
of vectors that make particular identities possible. This kairological approach is 
especially useful in studying how various discourse formations come into being 
through time because it works to understand how and why such formations emerge. 
However, before jumping into a kairological discussion of how identities unfold within 
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the ostomy community, it is important to recognize that rhetoric of technology 
scholarship has already identified a recurring kairology of technology (Clark, 2007; 
Koerber, 2000). While this scholarship is not typically connected to kairos, revisiting this 
scholarship through a kairology provides a valuable foundation to examine enactments 
of ostomy pouch identities.  
Kairology of Technology: Moving from Affordance to Constraint 
Many rhetoricians and allied scholars have demonstrated that entanglements of 
humans and technology are often framed as positive, empowering, and beneficial 
(Jordan, 2004; Clark, 2007; Koerber, 2000). One need not look far to find an example in 
which life with technology is pitched as better than life without it: A vacuum that cleans 
the house for you!; Need to lose weight? Wear this watch and see the pounds melt 
away; For when there’s just too much snow to shovel—the Snow blower 3000! Of course 
these are fictitious gimmicks, but they are no doubt of a familiar flavor. Technologies + 
human = empowered human.  
Recognizing this mainstream discourse regarding technology, rhetoricians of 
technology have challenged the fundamental affordance of technology, revealing that 
often constraints materialize once technology is circulated (Clark, 2007; Koerber, 2000; 
Balsamo, 1996; Toffoletti, 2007). That is, human+technology entanglements are often 
pitched as liberating and positive, yet when introduced and incorporated into society, 
often technology actually serves to constrain or control users in particular ways. 
Koerber compelling argues, “after technologies are designed, produced, and marketed,” 
they are “always touted as liberating, but then lose this liberating potential once they 
become established parts of our lives” (2000, p. 68).  
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Moreover, Clark recounts Tapscott’s 1996 example of the so-called liberation of 
Wal-Mart workers who receive a handheld device that scans barcodes and are suddenly 
empowered by faster and more direct access to product information (e.g., history, price, 
stock, etc.). Perhaps equipping disenfranchised workers with technology is empowering 
in some regard; however, as Clark notes, it does little to solve the more complex social, 
economic, and ethical inequalities surrounding often disenfranchised and low-wage 
workers. As Clark argues, “there is a long history of empowerment narratives 
associated with the birth of new technologies” but this is a “utopian story”—one that 
falsely purports the empowerment of human and technology assemblages (2007, p. 
157).  
In other words, the intra-action of humans, technology, society, space, and time 
enacts positive experiences; however, over time, these intra-actions shift and negative 
experiences are made possible. Accordingly if intra-actions of patients and ostomy5 
follow this kairology of technology, ostomy patient enactments should also move from 
affordance to constraint. The ostomy might first emerge empowering and affording, but 
once fully integrated into the everyday practices of the wearer, should become 
constraining.   
To explore this further, I navigate my way through a range of divergent 
experiences, intra-actions, and identities that emerge kairologically for patients with 
                                                 
5 I am collapsing a much more complicated intra-action here. All the entities involved in these intra-actions cannot possible detailed 
here. I’d like to also clarify that I refer to the entities “human” and “ostomy” so as to not continually distract my argument by 
unpacking that such entities are constituted through the intra-actions, not prior to it. As Barad would have it, ostomy and human do 
not exist prior to intra-acting. Since I’m taking this position at the outset of my analysis, I will often refer to entities by commonplace 
names as a sort of short hand.  
 58 
ostomies to pursue the following questions: Do the intra-actions emergent for patients 
with ostomies follow the already identified kairology of moving from affording to 
constraining experiences? Does shifting from affordance to constraint enact particular 
ostomy pouch identities? How might the identity enacted differ in cases where the 
kairology unfolds differently? In so doing I will 1) look for ways in which the intra-
actions of ostomies relate to this already identified kairology of technology and 2) 
attempt to correlate these kairologies with diverse identity enactments.  
In what follows, I begin with a more detailed consideration of Julia. As we will 
see with Julia and other cases like hers, constraining experiences play a particularly 
influential role in the identity enacted, but Julia’s experiences and identity are not 
necessarily representative of the experiences and identities of all patients with ostomies. 
Therefore, I situate Julia’s case within the context of other patients with ostomies that 
both align and conflict with Julia in an effort to identify if there are consistent 
kairologies correlated with the ostomy pouch identities. I will make the case that 
constraining and affording experiences are enacted through specific intra-actions with 
ostomies, and in so doing, I will complicate the current kairology of technology. Finally, 
I will end by describing the value of kairological tracings of enactments, drawing 
connections between the findings of this chapter and larger implications for the 
rhetorical studies.  
Enacting Constraint  
While Julia and her experiences might have received the most attention and criticism, 
other such cases have gained traction in the IBD and ostomy communities as well as the 
mainstream media. What ties these cases together is a common experience in which 
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wearing an ostomy pouch shifts patient experiences from affordance to constraint, 
challenging the wearer in negative, unwanted ways. How such experiences emerge in 
relationship to intra-acting with an ostomy over time is the focus of this section.  
First, I explore Julia’s case in conjunction with an instance regarding a Cincinnati 
police lieutenant who used the potential of receiving an ostomy pouch as a scare tactic 
with high school teens, as well as experiences I noted during my ethnography. The 
ostomy intra-acts with these patients transforming the embodied, lived experiences of 
patients’ from affordance to constraint. What’s more, when the ostomy entangles intra-
actively with these patients a particular identity—ostomy pouch wearer—is enacted. 
And, when this identity is enacted, a particular agential cut is staged between ostomy 
and self.   
Julia 
In early 2014, the CDC’s on-going Tips from Former Smokers campaign released its 
latest TV and online commercials, one of which featured Julia, a middle-aged former 
smoker diagnosed with colorectal cancer due to long-term smoking. Despite developing 
colorectal cancer and undergoing chemotherapy and several surgeries, Julia devotes the 
majority of her video to the ostomy pouch she had to “wear for a whole year” as a 
result of her cancer (Centers for Disease Control, 2015). Taking advantage of a visual 
opportunity, Julia holds her ostomy pouch up for the camera as she explains, “I had 
chemo and two surgeries, but what I hated the most was the colostomy bag” (Centers 
for Disease Control, 2015). In this moment, Julia situates receiving an ostomy pouch as 
the worst of her experiences with cancer—worse than chemotherapy and two 
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surgeries.6 To explain her experience with the ostomy pouch even further, she goes on 
to say, 
You go wherever it goes. You have no control. If it comes loose, it smells. I had 
no control. I had to wear it for a whole year. I was at home the majority of the 
time because I was scared that it would come loose and it would smell and I 
didn’t want to be around anyone. I was really kind of like stuck at home (Centers 
for Disease Control, 2015). 
Julia builds on her negative experiences with the ostomy pouch by explaining that she 
felt like she had “no control” and that she could not leave her house because her pouch 
might “come loose” and “smell” (Centers for Disease Control, 2015.). Further 
establishing that the requirement of wearing this technology was the most negative, 
life-changing result of having cancer, Julia holds her ostomy pouch as far away from 
her body as possible, extending her arm fully toward the camera (see Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3. Julia in one of her Tips from Former Smokers video. 
                                                 
6 Importantly, Julia’s ostomy pouch was temporary, as evidenced by her use of the past tense when describing her experiences. 
That is, after about a year, Julia was able to have what’s called a “takedown” surgery, in which her ostomy pouch is replaced by an 
internal re-routing of her intestines, such that the ostomy pouch is no longer needed.  
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Even more compelling, Julia’s “tip” for smokers is not to quit smoking because it can 
cause cancer; instead, she warns, “my tip is to get over being squeamish. You’re going 
to be emptying your bag six times a day” (Centers for Disease Control, 2015). When 
Julia suggests to “get over being squeamish” and explains, “you have no control” and 
that she was “stuck at home,” she focuses on the ways in which her everyday 
experience of wearing her ostomy pouch limited her. Implied here is that in Julia’s life 
prior to receiving her ostomy, she had control and she was not stuck at home. Intra-
actions with Julia’s ostomy shifted her life from positive to negative, from affording 
experiences to constraining ones. These intra-active experiences then result in a distinct 
division between Julia and the ostomy. Her ostomy is agentially cut from her self 
through the kairological transformation from affordance to constraint. 
Cincinnati Police Lieutenant  
Not long before the release of Julia’s video, in 2013, a Cincinnati, Ohio, police lieutenant 
spoke with at-risk teens as part of a larger effort to decrease the city’s gun violence and 
youth gang participation. As a means to persuade and likely shock these high school 
students, the lieutenant described the following scene during his presentation: “You’re 
not killed, but you’re walking around with a colostomy bag7 and that’s just not the way 
to get a girl’s attention, by limping down Warsaw Avenue with a colostomy bag” 
(Warren, 2013). Though it’s unclear what ostomy pouches have to do with limping, the 
lieutenant urges his audience to perceive the risk of needing an ostomy pouch as more 
                                                 
7 A colostomy bag is a specific type of ostomy pouch, used when all or part of the colon is removed.  
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persuasive and frightening than participating in gun violence by presenting particular 
constraining ostomy-wearing experiences.  
Moreover, these comments exclusively position the ostomy pouch as a 
consequence of such gun violence, ignoring the far more common medically necessary 
reasons for needing an ostomy pouch. To be fair, a gunshot wound to the abdomen 
could necessitate an ostomy, but of the many consequences of participating in gun 
violence, needing an ostomy pouch is far less likely than other results (e.g., injury, jail, 
homicide). It remains unclear if the lieutenant had first-hand experience wearing an 
ostomy pouch; however, based on public comments made regarding his presentation to 
the students, he was only speculating how having to wear an ostomy pouch could affect 
these teens. 
Regardless of the lieutenant’s personal intra-actions with an ostomy, this case 
both exemplifies and is contingent upon a broader public stigma surrounding ostomy 
pouches.8 Because the generalized public perception regarding ostomy pouches is 
negative, it likely seemed appropriate and compelling for the lieutenant to use wearing 
this technology as a means of persuasion vis-à-vis fear. Overall, the police lieutenant 
suggests the lived experiences entangled with an ostomy will transform the lives of his 
audience negatively enough that his audience should avoid practices that might risk 
needing an ostomy.9 
                                                 
8 Scholarship on ostomy stigma and the psychosocial implications of undergoing ostomy surgery is expansive. See, for example, 
Smith, et al., 2007; Danielsen, et al., 2013; and McLeod, et al., 1986.   
9 Of course, I do not mean to downplay the seriousness or the admirable intentions of either Julia or the police lieutenant. I do not 
wish to argue that a correlation between long-term health consequences and gun violence is not a serious concern nor that Julia did 
not suffer or struggle with colorectal cancer; the details of her personal health journey are unknown. 
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Wearing an Ostomy Pouch  
The everyday practices and embodied experiences of both Julia and the police 
lieutenant suggest constraint and decreased ability as a result of intra-acting with an 
ostomy. In order for Julia’s and the lieutenant’s comments to resonate specific intra-
actions had to occur in a specific unfolding. The constraints experienced by Julia and 
threatened by the police lieutenant rely on previous affordances. Life without or prior 
to an ostomy is experienced (or hypothetically experienced) as more affording than life 
with the technology. Importantly too, the sites in which these intra-actions are staged 
are consequential. That is, both Julia/CDC and the police lieutenant speak from 
positions of authority and credibility, therefore, an audience unfamiliar with ostomy 
pouches would likely be more inclined to accept the experiences enacted by Julia and 
the lieutenant as accurate and demonstrative of the norm.  
Despite the unlikelihood of gun wound-related ostomy pouches, the ostomy 
pouch experience presented by the lieutenant was contingent upon his audience—high 
school students—and their knowledge and understanding (or lack thereof) of an 
ostomy. That is, the lieutenant’s comments make sense in a specific medico-cultural 
milieu, one that readily accepts wearing an ostomy pouch as negative and undesirable. 
The lieutenant’s matter-of-fact way in describing experiences with these technologies 
suggests a correlation between gun violence and ostomy pouches is obvious, and 
according to the lieutenant more horrible than death or paralysis, even though, 
receiving an ostomy pouch post-gunshot wound could very well save the life of that 
victim. I make note of this here because I would argue in both cases that neither the 
lieutenant nor the CDC were working from ill intent. In each case, the implications of 
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presenting these negative experiences of wearing an ostomy pouch becomes 
subservient to a larger goal, be it anti-smoking or anti-gun violence. In so doing, the 
ostomy pouch is staged as a persuasive tool that represents the negative, disabling 
consequences of other risky behavior, and wearing an ostomy pouch is far worse than 
any potential non-ostomy experiences.   
Even more, in my ethnographic work, several interview participants reported 
similar experiences with their ostomies. One interviewee admitted, “I can’t wear the 
clothes I want to…I can’t be a normal 22 year old. I can’t go to the bar or club or take 
dance classes. My friends want to hang out, but I can’t go to parties with them.” Here, 
my interview participant focused on a series of experiences she could not participate in 
due to her ostomy pouch for a variety of reasons. She suggested that the anxiety of 
having an ostomy pouch in addition to the difficulty of concealing it under her clothes 
and finding the energy to leave her apartment all lead to this series of activities she 
longed to engage in but felt she couldn’t. Additionally, during my ethnographic 
observations, I noticed several instances in which women who would soon have 
surgery that would result in no longer needing the ostomy pouch celebrated the 
“death” of their ostomy pouches by writing sort of jovial obituary-like statement like 
“RIP” or “You will not be forgotten or missed” directly onto the ostomy pouch. These 
sort of symbolic goodbyes to ostomy pouches suggest that the ostomy was not 
considered part of the wearer and therefore could “die” a separate “death.” Even more, 
celebrating that death or separation for the ostomy suggests that the experiences 
associated with a non-ostomy life are preferred.  
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Becoming an Ostomy Pouch Wearer  
Following the same kairological trajectory as that described by Clark and others, these 
intra-actions with the ostomy pouch shift the everyday experiences for these wearers 
from affordance to constraint, resulting in specific identity enactments. Taken together, 
these wearers' embodied experiences stage an identity of ostomy pouch wearers. By 
that I mean that for people like Julia, the intra-active entanglement of the ostomy pouch, 
the wearer’s knowledge and experiences, and even societal perception, enacts an 
identity in which the focus lies in the act of having to wear this technology—being 
limited or constrained by what wearing the technology entails. Ostomy pouch wearers 
subsequently enact specific boundary-making practices in which an agential cut 
between ostomy and wearer is maintained. 
For Julia, because her everyday experiences seem to move from those that are 
more positive (life without an ostomy) to her negative experience of wearing an ostomy 
pouch, a boundary is enacted between herself and the technology, resulting in an 
identity in which a separation between herself and the ostomy pouch is maintained. 
Distancing herself from the technology, Julia calls her ostomy pouch “it” several times, 
and even holds the ostomy pouch away from her body with full arm extension, 
signifying the separation of her able body from the constraining technology. Such a 
separation is intra-actively staged and makes possible an identity in which the ostomy 
pouch is not only different, even foreign, to the wearer, but also restricts (often 
negatively) the wearer’s physical and mental state. Julia, her experiences, the CDC, anti-
smoking efforts, and her audiences intra-act to agentially separate the ostomy from her 
self.  
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These experiences were undoubtedly persuasive for certain audiences and 
perhaps Julia’s video and the lieutenant’s comments were successful in decreasing 
smoking and gun violence. However, that is not to say that audiences of these 
enactments were exclusively smokers and at-risk teens. The experience of constraint 
highlighted by Julia and the lieutenant becomes problematic precisely because their 
audiences included a more general public. The embodied experiences, intra-actions, and 
identities enacted with Julia and others like her “have a quality of truth” in certain 
contexts, but when circulated with broader audiences including the larger IBD and 
ostomy communities tension emerges regarding what enactments are most 
representative of common ostomy intra-actions and identities (Segal, p. 23).  
Despite the compelling experiences presented in the cases of Julia and the police 
lieutenant, reactions to their cases suggests that alternative intra-actions and enacted 
identities are both possible and rhetorically influential. In the next section, I aim to 
explore these reactions as well as conflicting experiences and identities staged in the 
contexts of OstomyLife and Gutless and Glamorous. As the analysis will demonstrate, it 
is not that perspectives of people like Julia are different from the cases I’m about to 
describe. Rather, the kairological unfolding of the everyday lived experiences follow a 
different trajectory, which, in turn results the enactment of in different identity and 
bodily boundaries.  
Enacting Affordances 
In the previous section I discussed the kairology of affordance to constraint; that is, how 
for some patients intra-acting with the ostomy transforms their embodied experiences 
from positive, acceptable, or desirable to negative or constraining experiences. Such a 
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transformation results then, in an enactment of an ostomy pouch wearer identity in 
which an agential cut is staged between ostomy and self. However, as alluded to 
through this chapter, this kairology is not consistent with the experiences of all patients 
with ostomies. In fact, the backlash that both Julia and the police lieutenant received 
indicate drastically different experiences with ostomies that many in the community 
share. The kairology of affordance to constraint is clearly a common one for ostomy 
pouch wearers, however, it is certainly not representative of a universal ostomy 
experience. 
Consequently, in this section I will explore an inverted kairology, one that shifts 
from constraint to affordance, enacting entirely different identity and bodily 
boundaries. For many with ostomies, life prior to ostomy surgery is burdened by 
constraining experiences like long hospitalizations, debilitating symptoms, and frequent 
surgeries, medical tests, and appointments. Receiving an ostomy often enables patients 
to move beyond these constraining experiences, affording opportunities that without 
the ostomy were not possible. To explore these alternative experiences further, I will 
first outline responses to Julia and the police lieutenant and then explore several 
additional cases align with this alternative kairology. In doing so, I aim to illustrate not 
only that an alternative kairology is possible through different intra-actions, but also 
that this kairology of constraint to affordance enacts an entirely different identity—the 
ostomate—in which patients come to self-identify through their ostomy.  
Response to the CDC and Cincinnati Police Lieutenant 
In response to the CDC’s campaign, thousands of IBD patients, ostomy wearers, and 
allies rallied in an effort that resulted in the CDC’s temporary removal and ultimate 
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revision of Julia’s video. While the updated video maintains Julia’s negative experience, 
comments describing the ostomy pouch as “gross” and technologies that “smell” have 
since been removed. A petition to take down the video, which garnered over 10,000 
signatures, explains, the “fear of being stigmatized, including the extreme negative 
body image that our society has placed on those with ostomies, sometimes leads people 
to forego those lifesaving surgeries” (Rund, 2015). Further, the petition argued, the 
video “sends the wrong message to the general public, at a time when those of us who 
have permanent ostomies are trying to educate others about this condition” (Rund, 
2015). These comments provide valuable insight regarding the strong pushback against 
Julia’s video. Those who spoke out against the video did not reject Julia’s experience 
outright or argue that the constraints of wearing an ostomy pouch do not exist. Instead, 
the focus of much of the resistance to Julia was that wearing an ostomy pouch was 
being positioned solely as negative—gross and constraining—ignoring that for many, 
wearing an ostomy pouch enables a life that would otherwise be impossible due to the 
disease or condition that preceded the ostomy.  
Responses to the Cincinnati police lieutenant note similar concerns. A local news 
station quoted one Cincinnati citizen with IBD: 
When this went out publicly it presented an image of a colostomy bag as 
unattractive, disgusting, and related to gangs. It created a negative image for 
those who have never heard about a colostomy. That image would be very 
difficult to change to a positive one (Warren, 2013). 
This commenter notes that the lieutenant’s comments are particularly persuasive and 
concerning because they reached an audience of “those who have never heard about a 
colostomy” (Warren, 2013). Those with previous experience or knowledge of ostomy 
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pouches may have been more critical of the lieutenant’s comments, or at the very least, 
may have had broader medico-cultural context within which to situate the comments. 
However, for those who have no previous knowledge of these technologies, the sole 
experience associated with these technologies would be that of negativity and 
constraint. These responses highlight the variability across the intra-actions of patients 
like Julia and others within the ostomy community. While Julia felt her ostomy 
constrained her, those who publically responded to this enactment of life with an 
ostomy revealed that their experiences moved in the opposite direction. Intra-acting 
with an ostomy afforded experiences that were otherwise constrained without an 
ostomy.  
Relatedly, many advocacy organizations, outreach and support groups, social 
media campaigns, and blogs exist that are doing the very work of trying to overcome 
the stigma associated with IBD and ostomies that is frequently cited in the responses to 
Julia and the police lieutenant. I’d like to explore two such efforts here: Gutless and 
Glamorous and OstomyLife. These two are both campaigns actively opposing the 
mainstream negativity and stigma tied to IBD and ostomies through blog posts, social 
media efforts, and visual displays of their ostomies. Common across Gutless and 
Glamorous and OstomyLife is the message that ostomies save lives and afford their 
wearers with the ability to engage in otherwise impossible experiences. A brief 
description of these efforts follows.  
Gutless and Glamorous  
Founded by IBD patient and ostomy pouch wearer Gaylyn Henderson, Gutless and 
Glamorous is both an online advocacy organization and social media campaign that 
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circulates with the hashtag #GutlessandGlamorous. After struggling for years with a 
“never ending cycle” living with IBD and undergoing “multiple hospitalizations, 
multiple surgeries, multiple procedures, and millions of doctor visits,” Henderson 
founded Gutless and Glamorous to “provide support, education, and awareness” and 
“to erase the stigmas and misconceptions” regarding both IBD and ostomy pouches 
(Henderson, n.d.). Unlike Julia and the Cincinnati police lieutenant, Gutless and 
Glamorous celebrates wearing an ostomy pouch and the organization’s website features 
several pictures of Henderson in which she reveals her ostomy pouch.  
 
Figure 2. Gutless and Glamorous founder, Gaylyn Henderson displaying her ostomy pouch. This image is featured 
on the landing page for Gutless and Glamorous. 
The landing page for Gutless and Glamorous includes the following quote in 
large, bold letters:  
My body tried to kill me. Yet I survived. But it left behind a constant reminder 
that I must look at daily. I know what it’s like to see your reflection in the mirror 
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and feel unattractive. I used to be disgusted. But then I realized that anything 
that has the power to save a life can be nothing but beautiful (Henderson, n.d.).  
Here, Henderson not only recounts how, before her receiving her ostomy, her body 
“tried to kill [her]” but she also draws attention to the fact that she initially felt 
“unattractive” and “disgusted,” much like Julia did. The difference between Julia and 
Henderson, though, is that over time and her everyday practices with her ostomy, 
Henderson has grown to “realize” that her ostomy’s “power to save [her] life can be 
nothing but beautiful.” It is not that Henderson never experienced wearing her ostomy 
pouch as negative or inhibiting; instead, as she explains, through her everyday 
experiences with technology, its critical affordance became clear: the ostomy saved her 
life. Overall, intra-acting with the ostomy affords many experiences that would 
otherwise have been impossible for Henderson. As she recounts, multiple 
hospitalizations, surgeries, procedures, and doctor visits constrained her prior to her 
ostomy surgery, but as her ostomy was integrated into her life, her experiences shift 
from constrained to empowered.  
OstomyLife 
Much like Gutless and Glamorous, Laura Cox, an “Ostomy Lifestyle Specialist” who 
contributes to an online community called “Ostomy Life” uses her online platform to 
explore how her life has improved since receiving her ostomy. I’d like to focus on a 
specific post from Cox, entitled “10 Things I’ve Done Since Having Ostomy Surgery.” In 
this piece, Cox shares her “short-list” of the things she has “accomplished and 
experienced” so that readers realize they “can do anything with an ostomy!” (Cox, 
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2016).  Among the things on the list, Cox includes traveling abroad, graduating college, 
running competitively, and backpacking the Canadian Rockies.  
She explains that prior to her ostomy surgery, she “gave up” running, an 
“activity [she] loved” due to her Ulcerative Colitis diagnosis.10 But after receiving her 
ostomy she “realized she was in the best shape of [her] life, even with an ostomy” 
which enabled her to finish a half-marathon and three different obstacle course races.  
In addition to being able to return to running post-ostomy surgery, Cox also graduated 
college, an accomplishment she did not think was possible prior to receiving her 
ostomy. She recounts,  
There were many hospitalizations during my semesters, a few medical 
withdrawls from classes and countless tears. I remember my college boyfriend 
pulling me on his longboard to class for two months because it hurt so much to 
walk.  
However, due to the health that she regained after her ostomy surgery, she was able to 
finish the necessary requirements and graduate cum laude.  
Adding to the list of things her ostomy “has allowed [her] to accomplish,” Cox 
includes “carry[ing] out normal life/work/exercise/social schedule” and “go[ing] to 
professional sports games and concerts” even those she admits these might seem like 
“small” accomplishments. For her, though, “compared to [her] life before getting 
ostomy surgery” these are “huge” even in comparison to being able to go on extended 
backpacking trips. Regarding such trips, she adds that her ostomy is actually beneficial 
for going to the bathroom in the woods, so she considers her ostomy an “advantage.”  
                                                 
10 Ulcerative Colitis is one of the most common diseases categorized under the umbrella of Inflammatory Bowel Diseases.  
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All of these accomplishments considered, Cox summarizes that her “ostomy has 
allowed [her] to live the life [she’s] always wanted to live.” Throughout this post, Cox 
draws contrast between her previous life without an ostomy and the life she feels she is 
now able to live. Without her ostomy, she explains that her Ulcerative Colitis inhibited 
her from participating in many of the activities she so enthusiastically accomplishes and 
writes about now. Like Henderson and the other members of the IBD and ostomy 
communities who responded to Julia and the police Lieutenant, Cox’s experiences shift 
from negative, undesirable ones prior to her ostomy surgery to empowered, positive 
experiences with her ostomy. As, Cox emphasized, her disease prior to ostomy surgery 
was so severe that she had to “give up” many of her favorite activities. But receiving her 
ostomy pouch alleviated her of those devastating symptoms and enabled her to return 
to many of the activities she thought had become a part of her past. Transitioning from 
negative life experiences to positive life experiences through the addition of her ostomy 
enables the ostomy to become fully integrated into Cox.  
Integrating the Ostomy 
The positive, life-saving experience of wearing an ostomy pouch has publically 
emerged largely in an effort to draw contrast and provide an alternative to the 
constraining experiences presented through figures like Julia or the Cincinnati 
lieutenant. Many IBD patients, including Gutless and Glamorous’s Henderson and 
OstomyLife’s Cox, battle chronic disease and suffer for extensive lengths of time before 
receiving their ostomy, therefore, when they receive their ostomies, which enable them 
to experience life beyond hospital stays, doctor visits, painful symptoms, and surgeries, 
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their embodied experiences are transformed from constraining to empowered. Indeed, 
ostomy surgery and receiving an ostomy pouch often saves the lives of patients.   
This is not to say that wearing an ostomy pouch is free of challenges for these 
patients, but instead, that often ostomy pouches relieve them of crippling symptoms 
and other unwanted everyday experiences, allowing those patients to return to 
activities that were not possible prior to ostomy surgery. Intra-acting with an ostomy 
pouch for people like Henderson and Cox becomes life-saving and enables a quality of 
life that was impossible prior to receiving the ostomy pouch. The negative experiences 
leading up to ostomy surgery are worse for these patients than the challenges presented 
by wearing an ostomy pouch; therefore, their ostomy pouch wearing experience shifts 
from constraint to affordance through the intra-activity staged through wearing an 
ostomy.  
Moreover, the responses to Julia and to the lieutenant’s comments highlighted 
here are reflective of a larger, community-wide sentiment that experiences with ostomy 
pouches are life-saving and empowering. The UOAA argues ostomy surgery “enables a 
person to enjoy a full range of activities, including traveling, sports, family life and 
work, even though they have a stoma, and may wear a pouching system” (United 
Ostomy Association, 2011). The president of the UOAA explains, “People consider it 
[ostomy surgery] disfiguring and gross. Ostomies, like mastectomies, save lives, period. 
Unfortunately, all people can focus on is crapping in a pouch” (Yakich, 2013). It seems 
reconfiguring the portrayal of and perceptions regarding ostomy pouches and 
overcoming the experience put forth by more powerful institutions and people is a 
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difficult and complicated task. The material realities of “crapping in a pouch” are 
undoubtedly challenging for wearers and are accompanied by unfortunate and deeply 
embedded cultural stigmas. Despite these challenges, however, campaigns and 
organizations like Gutless and Glamorous and OstomyLife continue to gain popularity.  
Much like Julia and the lieutenant’s experiences, the successes of Cox and 
Henderson are contingent upon their audiences. Unlike the experiences enacted by Julia 
and others that focus on constraint, the primary intended audiences for OstomyLife and 
Gutless and Glamorous are those who have IBD, already wear ostomy pouches, and/or 
are allies to those communities. Therefore, these audiences are likely already aware of 
the constraints of wearing this technology and are perhaps seeking a space or 
organization in which wearing an ostomy is accepted and even embraced. The ostomy-
positive focus of Gutless and Glamorous and OstomyLife fits the given medico-cultural 
moment precisely because it provides an alternative experience of ostomy pouch 
wearing. Instead of further participating in a culture of stigma, Gutless and Glamorous 
and OstomyLife “aptly meet” the “conditions of time, place, and audience” by offering 
ostomy pouch wearers, and society more generally, a new sense of what it is and can be 
like to wear an ostomy pouch (Segal, 2005, p. 22). Further, the experience of wearing 
enacted in these cases is most persuasive in contrast to constraint experiences for an 
audience of ostomy pouch wearers who 1) are open to or already consider wearing their 
ostomy pouch as a positive experience and 2) have long-term or permanent ostomy 
pouches.  
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Perhaps most importantly, this group of ostomy pouch wearers often self-
identifies differently than ostomy pouch wearers like Julia. When these experiences and 
perspectives intra-act with a positive and/or permanent experiences with the ostomy, 
often the resulting identity enactment is not an ostomy pouch wearer, but instead the 
ostomate, a way of self-identifying through the technology that suggests its full 
integration into notions of self. In order for the ostomate identity to be enacted, agential 
cuts surrounding self must include the ostomy. The ostomy becomes self through the 
kairology of constraint to affordance and enables this ostomate identity.  
Becoming an Ostomate 
The particular embodied intra-activity of moving from constraining to affording 
experiences stages agential cuts in which boundaries between self and ostomy are 
dissolved, enacting the an ostomate identity. Consequently, patients become ostomates. 
As one blogger described, “I am an ostomate…removing my colon has saved me much 
pain and misery…it is a legitimate lifesaver” (“An Open Letter,” 2015). In my 
ethnography as well, I identified several instances in which those wearing ostomy 
pouches explicitly shift from “ostomy pouch wearers” to self-identified “ostomates.” 
For these wearers, the ostomy pouch saves lives and empowers wearers to live, as they 
describe it, “normally.”  
Indeed, many of the IBD patients whom I spoke with throughout this project 
suggested that embodied practices with their ostomy enabled them to integrate their 
ostomy as part of themselves. One interviewee told me, "Getting my ostomy was the 
best decision I ever made for me. I’m not trapped in the bathroom anymore. I can live 
my life.” Even more, another interviewee said, “I definitely consider myself an ostomate 
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and I let my [ostomy] bag hang out.” She further shared her pride in her ostomy when 
she explained, “I’m not ashamed if people see it under my clothes. It keeps me alive—
why would I want to hide that?” This participant’s desire to share her identity as an 
ostomate, or at the very least not hide it, uncovers important insight: as the ostomy 
pouch is integrated into her identity, she finds confidence and pride in her ostomy.  
The ostomate identity enacted here aligns in informative ways with Dolmage’s 
insight regarding disability and identity. Dolmage argues “almost all disability labels 
work through synecdoche, urging us to see the disabled person as their broken ‘part’” 
(p. 102). Here, Dolmage refers to the labels through which mainstream society tends to 
categorize differently abled bodies. For ostomates, this undoubtedly rings true. 
However, ostomates themselves urge mainstream society to focus on their “broken 
part” by identifying with their technological augmentation. Enacting an ostomate 
identity “urges” others to see these patients as inseparable from their ostomy.  
This identity is characterized by intra-activity with the ostomy pouch in which it 
is not separated from the wearer, with an emphasis on the life-saving function of the 
ostomy, and a desire to make visible their “ostomateness.” Their ostomy pouches are an 
integrated, important, and positive part of themselves. This self-describing practice also 
builds community and expresses pride that would be less explicit otherwise. Such 
acceptance of wearing the technology is conducive to ostomy-positive experiences and 
is made possible through the embodied intra-action in which the ostomy pouch saves, 
relieves, or enables the wearer. As such, the agential separation between self and 
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ostomy enacted with ostomy pouch wearers is not enacted here. Instead, the boundary-
making enacted with ostomates encompasses the ostomy into self.  
Ostomy Kairologies: Affordance and Constraint 
The analysis presented here examines kairological shifts on the intra-active level. By 
that I mean, this analysis works to understand how various lived experiences stage 
intra-actions in which particular boundaries and subsequent identities are established. 
On one hand, the experiences enacted with Julia and the Cincinnati lieutenant suggest 
that when lived experience prior to an ostomy is more positive than that of after 
receiving an ostomy, the resulting intra-action and boundary making practices separate 
self from ostomy. When a patient is engaged in an affordance to constraint kairology, an 
enactment of the ostomy pouch wearer identity becomes possible. On the other hand, 
the experiences enacted with women like Henderson and Cox indicate that when the 
lived experiences prior to receiving an ostomy are negative, challenging, or 
constraining, often results in experiences with the ostomy in which intra-actions stage 
an ostomate identity, dissolving the separation between self and technology. When a 
patient is engaged in a constraint to affordances kairology, the enactment of an 
ostomate identity becomes possible.  Investigating the kairological conditions within 
which these various enactments emerged and how they relate to one another highlights 
the importance of taking into account both space and time in an enactment analysis, as 
well as the importance of audience—who hears or see these enactments and how they 
participate in the enactments and intra-actions in rhetorically powerful ways.  
 What this kairology also shows is that the ostomy pouch itself  becomes neither 
empowering nor constraining, but rather affordance and constraint emerge from intra-
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actions among the technology, its wearer, previous experiences and perceptions, 
society, stigma, symptoms, medical history, engagement with advocacy campaigns, and 
more, that occur in specific moments and spaces. Paying particular attention to when, 
how, and why these enactments emerge. This point is especially relevant because it 
sheds insight on current rhetoric of technology scholarship that suggests a particularly 
kairology or trajectory for engagement with technology. In fact, the analysis provided in 
this chapter actually challenges what has been considered the general kairology for 
technology: shifts from affordance to constraint as technology is introduced and 
entangled with humans, society, discourse, etc. While affordance to constraint is 
certainly common within the ostomy community, it is not the only kairology that is 
possible and it is certainly not the only kairology that can be rhetorically influential.  
A comprehensive kairology of ostomy pouch wearing complicates enactments 
even further. As my analysis demonstrates, broader public conversations regarding 
ostomy pouches often positions them as negative and constraining, yet many ostomy 
pouch wearers are working against that enactment to show that wearing an ostomy 
pouch actually enables and empowers those who wear them—as evidenced by Gutless 
and Glamorous and other “ostomy-positive” campaigns and advocacy organizations 
including Get Your Belly Out, “World Ostomy Day,” OstomyLife, and Uncover 
Ostomy, to name a few. This enactment analysis suggests that simply equipping a 
patient with an ostomy pouch does not grant that patient with the agency or ability to 
decide whether or not the experience is positive or negative, nor whether or not that 
patient will be a wearer or ostomate. Instead, through patients’ everyday practices and 
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the intra-actions that are staged through such practices, a range of boundaries regarding 
identity, body, and self become enacted.  
In other words, it is neither accurate to suggest that intra-actions between 
humans and technology11 result in increased agency or control, as Clark demonstrates 
with the case of the Walmart price-check gun or as often theorized through the notion 
of the supercrip; nor, is it accurate to suggest that human and technological intra-
actions automatically constrain agency or leave it unchanged, as might be the case with 
Julia. Instead the potential for both of these to occur is made possible through the 
diverse intra-actions staged within the everyday lived experiences enacted with Julia, 
the police lieutenant, or Gutless and Glamorous and OstomyLife. And, in none of these 
cases is the experience or identity enacted a matter of personal perspective, attitude, or 
ability.  
As I continually emphasize, the rhetorical work in each of these cases is that of 
enactments of self, non-self, ostomy wearer, ostomate, or otherwise. Focusing that the 
practices or experiences that are enacted or done “suggests that activities take place but 
leaves the actors vague” (Mol, 2002, p. 33). No individual entity is the actor in these 
cases, despite my focus on particular figures like Julia or Henderson. I simply focus on 
the human as part of my methodological effort to treat these humans as ethnographers 
of their own lives, reporting on the events and practices in which they participate and in 
which intra-actions are staged and boundaries are done (Mol, 2002, p. 15). I should also 
                                                 
11 Importantly, Barad would strictly resist describing intra-actions in such a away as she argues that “humans” and “technology” or 
any such entities do not exist outside of their intra-actions. However, for the sake of expediency and simplicity here, I am making 
discursive choices so as to not muddy this particular line of thinking.  
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note, although examining such cases enables me to categorize them into larger identity 
groups like ostomy pouch wearer and ostomate, it is not that these identities are static. 
Intra-actions shift, no doubt, in space and time, based on the everyday practices 
involved.  
Finally, a kairology of ostomy pouches is more than a chronological tracing of 
the technology; it is a tracing of experiences and intra-actions as they emerge in 
opportune moments. Investigating the relationship between wearer and worn reveals 
the entanglements of bodies, identities, discourse, technology, society, medicine, and 
culture that make a given narrative of ostomy pouch wearing possible and persuasive 
within a given medico-cultural moment.12 Analyzing these cases as they emerged 
kairologically helps to account for the differences in that are enacted through divergent 
intra-actions in experiences vis-à-vis discourse and object formations.   
What’s more, a kairological approach reveals the intricate ways in which 
particular identities develop through these multifaceted relationships between wearers 
and worn. With ostomy pouches, divergent embodied experiences stage at least two 
identities: ostomy pouch wearer and ostomate. This kairology highlights not only that 
divergent identities exist within the ostomy community but also helps to expose how 
these identities develop and maintain over time. To focus exclusively on certain 
technologies or to rely solely on synchronic analyses of technology limits the depth of 
                                                 
12 To be clear, it is neither my intention nor within the scope of this essay to trace the entire rhetorical history of ostomy pouches. 
Instead, I am focused on exploring the embodied experience of wearing an ostomy pouch via several individual accounts of 
wearing to more fully understand how and why such divergent narratives exist.  
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what a rhetoric of wearability need include. Instead, examining the conditions that 
made Julia’s case compelling to some but deplorable to others, or those conditions that 
make Gutless and Glamorous a successful organization, provides rich insight into how 
ostomy pouches are worn over time, resulting in experiences in which one wearer’s life 
is debilitated while another’s is saved. Undoubtedly, a kairological approach has much 
to offer rhetoricians and allied scholars interested in exploring the larger contexts in 
which technologies play a role.  
What remains uncertain, however, is the status of an ostomy when these 
divergent experiences and identities are enacted. I made the case that for ostomates, the 
ostomy becomes part of self, while for ostomy-pouch wearers, it does not. However, the 
findings of this chapter about ostomy-related identities prompt several additional 
questions regarding the role and status of the ostomy: Does the ostomy remain an 
ontological cohesive entity in these intra-actions and enactments? Is it possible for the 
ostomy to ontologically diverse? If so, what would that mean for a theory of (rhetorical) 
enactments, and more importantly, for patients as they engage with these technologies 
in their everyday lives? Taking up these questions, the next chapter draws Mol’s theory 
of multiple ontologies to more thoroughly explore the intra-actions behind diverse 
identities highlighted in this chapter. Foregrounding my analysis in notion that 
ontologies are not static, but instead enacted in practice, Chapter Four contends that the 
ostomy, across these diverse identities, becomes ontologically multiple. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE OSTOMY MULTIPLE 
In practice a disease, atherosclerosis, is no longer one. Followed while being enacted atherosclerosis 
multiples—for practices are many. But the ontology that comes with equating what is with what is done 
is not of a pluralist kind. The manyfoldedness of objects enacted does not imply their fragmentation. 
Although atherosclerosis in the hospital comes in different versions, these somehow hang together. A 
single patient tends to be supplied, if not with a single disease, then at least with a single treatment 
decision. Clinical findings, pressure measurement, social inquiries, duplex outcomes, and angiographic 
images are all brought together in the patient’s file. Together they support the conclusion to treat 
invasively—or not to do so. This, then, is what I would like to term multiple to convey: that there is 
manyfoldedness, but not pluralism. In the hospital the body (singular) is multiple (many)—Annermarie 
Mol, The Body Multiple  
 
Questions about the material nature of discursive practices seem to hang in the air like the persistent 
smile of the Cheshire cat—Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway 
 
Examining cases ranging from Julia to Gutless and Glamorous in the last chapter 
demonstrated that enactments of particular bodily divisions are, at least in the case of 
IBD and ostomies, highly entangled with identity. For patients, like Julia, the addition 
of the ostomy shifts life experiences and everyday practices in negative, constraining 
ways, which results in the continued separation between self and ostomy. In contrast, 
for patients with similar experiences to those of Gutless and Glamorous, the life prior to 
receiving an ostomy was hospital-ridden, painful, and even verging upon death, 
therefore, receiving the ostomy is transformative such that patients entangle with their 
ostomy and learn to see themselves with and through their new “colon” so-to-speak. 
Such cases show the range of patient identities enacted through everyday practices and 
experiences and the important role kairos plays in enactments.   
Chapter Three’s analysis is telling of the types of identity and bodily boundaries 
that are possible and common within this community, but falls short in fully exploring 
just how those enactments come to be. That is, how are specific intra-actions and 
agential cuts, particularly around the self, enacted in those identities? It’s clear that 
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divisions relating to self actively influence which identity is enacted, but not exactly 
how different notions of self are possible. Based on the cases presented in both Chapters 
Two and Three, the ontological stability of self remains unclear—is it possible for 
multiple “selves” to be enacted? Taking up these questions, this chapter will address 
the self in its diverse becomings for patients. To do so, I will first return to the work of 
Barad, Graham, and Mol to clarify the methodological position necessary for this work. 
Then, using a series of divergent object formations of self and ostomy, I will outline four 
emergent ontologies of the self, making particular note of the way in which these 
ontologies are enacted toward rhetorical ends and what that might mean for future 
rhetorical inquiry.  
Ontological Flattening  
Driving this chapter is one important stipulation: I will not make a priori distinctions 
between the entities at work in a given enactment, that is, no assumed divisions 
between words and things, humans and nonhumans, selves and non-selves. Instead, 
the goal of this chapter is to examine a series of conflicting object formations in order to 
understand how different separations or agential cuts are made. To explain this point 
more thoroughly, I must return to my calibration of Barad, Graham, and Mol.   
Barad’s theory of intra-activity and agential cuts is contingent upon a chaotic, 
messy, and highly active sense of the world. As she explains:   
The world is a dynamic process of intra-activity and materialization in the 
enactment of determinate casual structures with determinate boundaries, 
properties, meanings, and patterns of marks on bodies…through which part of 
the world makes itself differentially intelligible to another part of the world and 
through which causal structures are stabilized and destabilized” (2007, p. 140)  
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In other words, the “stuff” of which the world is made comes into being through 
relationships with one another. Often, at the outset of an inquiry, categories are taken 
for granted. The stuff of the world is neatly, often unconsciously, boxed into self, non-
self, human, nonhuman, mind, body, etc., While such boxes undoubtedly bring 
efficiency to an analysis by relying on categories that have been calcified through 
centuries of inquiry, they do little in cases where those entities shift and transform, 
taking on new borders in different enactments. When the self of Julia is done differently 
than the self of Gutless and Glamorous, how do we understand self? Can these different 
selves share an ontology? Can these selves be the same?  
Taking Barad seriously here, my analysis takes as its foundation that there is no 
ontological difference until this stuff of the world—“phenomena”—intra-act to enact 
“agential separability” (p. 140). Entities co-articulate with one another through space 
and time and in so doing enact agential cuts—divisions that separate and differentiate 
entities within and from each other. As Barad puts it, 
The world is not populated with things that are more or less the same from one 
another. Relations do not follow relata, but the other way around…Mattering is 
differentiating, and which differences come to matter, matter in the iterative 
production of different differences” (pp. 136-7).  
In this difficult web of words, Barad offers two points. First, matter, in its noun form, 
comes into being through relationships with other matter (including 
linguistic/discursive matter). Secondly, what comes to matter—have meaning and 
significance—is also done through these entangled relationships. These two points 
together suggest that boundaries are enacted through entanglement of entities (intra-
actions) and these entanglements bring meaning to the divisions enacted (agential cuts).  
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Importantly, Barad is not alone in suggesting that ontological boundaries are 
done through practice and distinctions among the entities involved can only be layered 
on after the fact. Both Mol’s theory of multiple ontologies and Graham’s rhetorical-
ontological too rely on this ontological flattening. According to Mol “ontology is not 
given in the order of things, but instead, ontologies are brought into being, sustained, 
and allowed to wither away in common, day-to-day sociomaterial practices (2002, p. 6). 
Building on this conception of ontologies, Graham further argues “differently situated 
material activities…produce different objects” (2015, p. 31). To summarize, when 
entities intra-act, ontologies are “brought into being” and through this being “different 
objects” are produced.  
Undoubtedly, this raises challenging questions for rhetorical work. If ontologies 
are done in sociomaterial practices, what, then, is the role of language? If not through 
language, how do certain enactments become rhetorical? In much scholarship, language 
is often treated as that which represents underlying ontologies, and practices often are 
“reduced to talk” (Graham, p. 8). As rhetoricians well know focusing on “talk” is not 
simple feat, but in terms of ontological inquiry, the effect of reducing practice to talk is 
representationalism. Illuminating this relationship between ontological difference and 
representationalism, Barad contends, 
Representationalism is the belief in the ontological distinction between 
representations and that which they purport to represent; in particular, that 
which is represented is held to be independent of all practices of representing. 
That is, there are assumed to be two distinct and independent kinds of entities-
representations and entities to be represented. (2007, p. 46)  
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Under the postmodern rubric, words do the representing. Words are the spear by which 
the world is cut up and access to ontologies is accessed. As a consequence, inquiry and 
theorizing becomes “a spectator sport of matching linguistic representations to 
preexisting things” (Barad, 2007, p. 54). The focus falls on linguistic practices, eliding 
other entities that might participate in creating divisions and boundaries in the world. 
In fact, the need to examine intra-actions and agential cuts is lost because language 
becomes the only practice through which we can know objects. The very idea of 
representation purports the idea that “words” are separate from the “things” that they 
represent. In this sense words serve a mediating role, not an intra-active one.  
Therefore, under the ontologically flattened framework I’m taking in this 
chapter, how I attend to words within enactments becomes a tricky task. As a 
rhetorician, I, of course, recognize the power and influence of language.  However, 
attending to language without slipping into representationalism is key in operating 
under an ontologically flattened methodology. As Graham notes “rhetorical analysis 
traditionally comes with an attendant focus on language and representation” (2015, p. 
81). I am attempting to account for the role of language in intra-actions by treating 
language as part of intra-actions through which agential cuts are made. Further, in 
bridging this gap between a representionalist understanding of ontologies and a more 
new materialist approach in which ontological differences are not given in the world, 
Graham’s rhetorical-ontological inquiry is particularly insightful.  
As mentioned in Chapter Two, Graham makes the argument that “language is 
doing. It has impacts and consequences—social, political, material” (2015, p. 84). 
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Making this shift to treat language as one of the practices through which ontologies are 
staged helps Graham to sidestep manifest issues with representationalism. In this sense, 
words do not represent, words enact, words participate in intra-actions. Indeed, if 
language is doing, then, a study of these practices  
focuses not so much on what people say or what texts mean but rather on how 
representational activity circulates and contributes to a deeper ecology of 
practices in which those acts of representation are embedded (p. 69).  
This means that language can and often does play a vital role in the intra-actions and 
agential cuts that stage ontologies. If, at the outset, language is not “presumed to serve a 
mediating function between independent existing realities” but instead, we focus on 
“the practices and performances of representing” like both Graham and Barad suggest, 
we can both account for the role language plays in intra-actions without assuming 
inherent ontological and representational distinctions (Barad, 2007, pp. 47 & 49). With 
an attunement to the role of language in intra-actions, I can investigate the intra-actions 
in which language plays a powerful role, particularly in the agential cuts that are 
enacted. Indeed, words come into being through intra-actions, as much as they 
participate in the agential cuts made through those intra-actions.  
As I will demonstrate through my analysis in this chapter, in some cases words 
play a particularly powerful role in intra-actions. But the distinction between words and 
other intra-acting entities can only be made through analysis, not in advance of it. Like 
Barad, I am interested in “mattering,” therefore, I must begin from the position of 
ontological flattening in which there are no given ontological differences, but rather, 
ontological differences become enacted in specific contexts. Especially relevant to my 
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dissertation is the ontology of “self.” Under this ontologically flattened rubric, the “self” 
is not is not inherently ontologically different from “non-self,” just as words and 
humans have no a priori distinction from objects and nonhumans, and so on. Instead, 
through specific intra-actions, agential cuts are enacted in which self and non-self come 
to be.  
Taken together, this scholarship has critical implications for my work studying 
the ways in which boundaries are enacted and the cases in which those enactments 
have rhetorical influence. As such, this chapter operates under the idea that “the 
ontology of a thing lies at the intersections of its doing, gathering, and presence,” at the 
intersections of its intra-activity (Graham, 2015, p. 212). I deliberately begin by 
flattening assumptive ontological distinctions, and instead, work to “be attentive to the 
iterative production of boundaries” by examining the chaotic intra-activity that emerges 
(Barad, 2007, p. 93). Thus, I can make a posteriori ontological categorizations based on 
the agential cuts (boundaries) enacted in each case. To illustrate this point, the next 
section details a series of enactments, much like those presented in the previous 
chapter. However, here I’m interested in explicitly addressing how agential cuts are 
enacted and what ontological repercussions those cuts might have.  
From Parasites to Self: Agential Cuts & Ostomy Patients 
Across the data collected for this project, the object formations suggest four primary or 
common agential cuts, which I am calling: parasite, pet, cyborg, and self. Each of these 
agential cuts is staged through particular practices and intra-actions that various 
ostomy pouch wearers and ostomates engage.  In this section, I will describe each of 
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these agential cuts moving from ostomy as discretely non-self to fully self, working to 
unpack the intra-actions present.  
Parasite 
The first of the agential cuts I’d like to explore is the ostomy as a parasite. With strong 
negative connotations, parasitic agential cuts are enacted in cases where the intra-
activity between patients is such that a division between self and ostomy becomes 
distinct, often due to the ostomy’s undesirability and the challenges it presents for a 
patient. Recall Julia and her commercial with the CDC as explored in Chapter Three, 
intra-acting with her ostomy resulted in series of negative experiences for Julia. 
Consequently, throughout her video, Julia continually refers to her ostomy as “it,” 
enacting a very distinct separation between herself and the ostomy. In so doing, Julia’s 
ostomy becomes a parasitic attachment to her, separate but deeply entangled.  
Using the depersonalizing pronoun “it” like Julia does is a common discursive 
practice to refer to an ostomy, thought naming the ostomy is also a common practice for 
many in this community. I noticed this naming practice throughout my ethnography, 
having had the opportunity to meet various ostomies—Stella, Gandalf, Stewie, Sophia, 
and others. What’s particularly interesting about naming is the reason patients often 
provide doing so. Naming is done for a variety of reasons, but commonly, is done as a 
means for patients to distance themselves from their ostomies. As one interview 
participant explained to me, “I was told to name my ostomy so I had someone to blame, 
someone to yell at.” Moreover, explaining why naming is powerful for patients, another 
interview participant said, “I know [naming] helps others to detach—to separate their 
identity.”  
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The agential cut between self and ostomy enacted in each of these cases has 
interesting resemblances to a parasitic relationship. Traditionally parasites rely upon 
their hosts for survival, while the inverse seems true for patients with ostomies.13 That 
is, these patients depend upon their ostomies for survival, yet a separation between 
ostomy and the wearer becomes a discrete characteristic of this intra-action. Indeed, the 
ostomy pouch wearer identity described in Chapter Three seems to be enacted most 
commonly when the ostomy becomes a parasite. Literal parasites are defined by the fact 
that their dependency is at the expense of their host, which is much the same in the 
aforementioned ostomy cases. Even though many of these patients realize that their 
ostomies are medically necessary for survival, the ostomy’s entanglement with the 
wearer is too at the expense of the quality of life and desired everyday experiences of 
the wearer.   
Pet 
Similar to the parasitic agential cut just described, pet14 cut enacts a separation between 
patient and ostomy, but one that whose valence is not necessarily negative. I termed 
this agential cut pet precisely because the separation enacted frequently appears 
accepting, and in some cases even friendly or jovial. For instance, while naming an 
ostomy often is associated negatively, for some ostomy wearers, naming is less so. 
Through her laughter, an interviewee told me that because she has given her ostomy a 
                                                 
13 Notably, I used ostomy metonymically to refer to both stoma (the opening on the abdomen through which the end of the 
intestine is pulled to the surface of the skin) and the actual ostomy pouch. The practice of referring to them simultaneously through 
a single term “the ostomy” or “the stoma” is a common practice within the IBD and ostomy communities.  
14 The notion of the pet or companion is highly theorized in the emerging field of animal studies (see, for example, Haraway, 2008; 
Rudy, 2013). That said, in naming the agential cuts present in ostomy intra-actions, I am theorizing this idea in a different way.  
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name, “when [her] ostomy makes noise in public, [she] can just say, ‘Oh, Sophia feels 
like talking to you!’” Additionally, in a blog post in which the “funniest remarks” from 
patients with ostomies were compiled on The Ostomy Connection, an education and 
advocacy websites for IBD and ostomy patients, one patient said, “I call my stoma 
‘Politician’ because it’s either full of crap or making a lot of noise but not producing15 a 
damn thing.” Through the intra-actions enacted in such remarks, the ostomy becomes a 
pet-like, a distinctly separate object, yet one that is closely linked to the wearer.  
Similarly, in a blog on the Ostomy Outdoors page, the founder of the site 
explains how her ostomy came to be known as Wilbur:  
As strong as the logical part of my brain is, I also have an even bigger side of my 
brain that is pure whimsy. This part sees my stoma as this crazy little critter on 
my belly that likes to dance, sing, and spit…Wilbur…seemed like a perfect name 
for my stoma. After all, in the book [Charlotte’s Web], Charlotte had described 
Wilber as “some pig” and “terrific” (Skiba, 2012). 
As you can see in this passage, naming the ostomy, while enacting a separation, does 
not always come with or result from negative experiences with the ostomy. Instead, it 
seems, at least in these cases, that naming stages a friendship or kinship with the 
ostomy in which the wearer can deal with being entangled with the technology without 
the ostomy becoming a fully integrated part of the self.  
This agential cut is also enacted in cases where the ostomy goes unnamed. For 
example, in my ethnographic work, I observed a long discussion among ostomy pouch 
wearers in which they described having an ostomy as similar to “having a baby.” They 
explained that an ostomy requires you to carry a changing bag and to adjust to life with 
                                                 
15 “Producing output” is a phrase used to describe the waste yielded through the stoma into the ostomy.  
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a new companion. The intra-activity enacted in such descriptions suggests an 
individual self apart from the ostomy, but too stages a more accepting relationship. 
Common across these cases is an ostomy that becomes pet—closely linked, under the 
responsibility of the wearer, but a distinct object with distinct behaviors and needs.  
Cyborg  
The agential cuts enacted when the ostomy becomes cyborg16 moves away from 
relationships in which the boundary around self is exclusive of the ostomy. Instead, the 
agential cut enacted here specifically includes the ostomy as self, but suggests a “more 
than self” status. To illustrate, consider the following tweet by ostomate (Figure 5), 
Vicky Mulholland, who commonly tweets about life with her ostomy.  
                                                 
16 The notion of the more-than-human cyborg has been theorized extensively in disability studies under the concept of the 
“supercrip.” See for example, Lewiecki-Wilson, 2003; Hardin & Hardin, 2004; Booher, 2010. However, little of this work explores the 
supercrip in terms of intra-actions, ontologies, and enactments.  
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Figure 3. Tweet from Vicky Mulholland in which the intra-action with her ostomy enacts an agential cut in which the 
self is cyborg. 
To give brief context, Mulholland’s tweet, as part of the 
#myillnessisnotyourinsult social media initiative, is in response to instances in the 
media in which ostomies, IBD, and other similar conditions are used to insult or 
stigmatize (much in the vein of the Julia video). Even through Mulholland’s brief tweet, 
a particular agential cut is enacted: intra-acting with the ostomy transformed 
Mulholland into “superwoman” giving her more-than-human cyborg status. Through 
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intra-actions with her ostomy, both Mulholland and her ostomy become cyborg, 
superhuman.  
The superhero theme is a common one throughout the IBD and ostomy and 
autoimmunity communities. Sometimes used as a metaphor for expressing the 
immense challenges patients with these conditions must overcome to live “normal” 
lives, the superhuman cyborg ostomate is enacted differently in the cases I’m 
discussing. For instance, Gut Girl is a self-proclaimed IBD superhero, who, through 
wearing her ostomy pouch, “fights IBD” and gives others the “tools” to do so too (see 
Figure 6) (Ringer, 2012). The intra-action of the ostomy, Gut Girl, descriptions of herself 
and her superhero status, her personal experiences with IBD, her role with the IBD 
community, social media, and likely more, entangle such that an agential cut is enacted 
around her self and the ostomy, resulting in ostomy as cyborg self.  
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Figure 4. Gut Girl, the IBD superhero is pictured here displaying her superhero armor fully equipped with an ostomy 
pouch. 
Taken together, these cases demonstrate certain intra-actions, particularly involving 
positive experiences with the ostomy, in which the ostomy and self become cyborg self.   
Self  
The last of the four agential cuts that emerged as common in this project enacts the 
ostomy as self. Unlike the other three ostomy enactments, this one has no unique or 
clever name ascribed to it; it is simply self. The ostomy becomes self when the agential 
cut made surrounds the ostomy such that the ostomy is fully integrated into the self of 
its wearer. Thus, this ontology aligns most directly with the ostomate identity described 
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in Chapter Three. Ostomates like, Gaylyn Henderson of Gutless and Glamorous and 
Heidi from Ostomy Outdoors, as well as many who participated in my project, are 
intra-actively engaged with their ostomies such that their ostomies become themselves.  
For example, during interviews, one participants told me “[the ostomy] is all 
who I am” and another said her ostomy was “absolutely” part of her. Much the same is 
Jessica Grossman, of Uncover Ostomy, who I described in Chapter Two. In several of 
the blog posts on her site, Grossman explains that her ostomy “is part of [her]” or “part 
of who [she] is” (Grossman, 2016). Even more, writing of her experiences with her 
ostomy before she had a takedown surgery to replace her ostomy with an internal 
pouch, Shawntel Bethea, a contributor to The Mighty, wrote, “My body wasn’t weird. I 
was unique…Sure, I was different. I still am. But I have grown to love myself for that” 
(Bethea, 2016). What’s interesting about Grossman and Bethea in particular, whose 
experiences are presented across several blogs is the way in which their descriptions 
shift when they discuss their ostomies. In both cases, the writers begin by saying “my 
ostomy” but seem to seamlessly, perhaps subconsciously, shift to “my body,” “me,” 
and “who I am” without enacting an agential cut between themselves and the ostomy. 
Consider, Grossman’s comments in fuller context:  
I decided right away that I was going to be ok with myself as soon as I woke up 
from surgery. That’s not the case for everyone. I have met many people who 
have suddenly woken up with an ostomy, having no clue what it was until a 
doctor explained the “thing on their abdomen” and who were more scared and 
upset more than they’ve ever been in their lives. I’ve also met people who knew 
they were having surgery, but still needed time to adjust. It is ok to take the time 
you need to love yourself. It doesn’t always happen over night and it’s not a race 
for who can get there first. Don’t get down on yourself because you’re not loving 
your difference the moment it appears (Grossman, 2016, emphasis mine).  
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Throughout this passage Grossman switches between “ostomy” and “I,” which 
suggests her ostomy becomes no different than her hair, her mind, or her personality, 
all of which people regularly talk about distinctly while maintaining those elements as 
part of self. For ostomates like those described in this section, the intra-active 
integration of ostomy into self becomes so seamless that the ostomy’s boundaries 
become indistinct from self.  
Multiple Ostomy Ontologies  
In following Barad, Graham, and Mol, who have compellingly argued that ontologies 
come to be through practices, it becomes clear that the enactments of ostomies the in 
practices described above are not simply different perspectives of ostomies. Instead, 
four ostomy ontologies are being enacted through specific agential cuts. Enacted 
through two agential cuts, the ostomy becomes non-self, in one case an unwanted non-
self and in the other, an acceptable non-self. In contrast, in the two other agential cuts, 
the ostomy becomes self, either more than self or completely integrated (see Table 1).  
Table 1. The Multiple Ontologies of the Ostomy 
Ontology  Explanation 
Parasite Ostomy becomes explicitly distinct from self in 
correlation with negative experiences. 
Pet  Ostomy becomes separate from self in correlation with 
experiences that are accepted or even positive. 
Cyborg  
Ostomy becomes self+. More than human status is 
enacted through entangling with the ostomy technology 
in correlation with positive experiences.  
Self 
Ostomy becomes self, indistinct from other bodily parts 
or identity, often in correlation with positive experiences 
enabled through the ostomy.  
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Accordingly, the question becomes how can the ostomy have four ontologies? How can 
the agential cuts presented in each of these cases enact the same, yet different, object?  
I began this chapter with the methodological position of ontological flattening 
purposefully in order to investigate the possibility of diverse agential cuts. Looking 
more closely at each of these cases suggests that the ontology of the ostomy cannot 
possibly be a priori to intra-actions, but instead, the ontology of the ostomy is enacted 
through specific agential intra-actions. While this point is critical to my argument, it can 
be productively extended by Mol’s theory of multiple ontologies (2002), which provides 
a way to account for the multiplicity of agential cuts enacted with the ostomy.  
Mol’s work hinges on the idea that ontologies are done in practices and that 
examining these practices reveals how objects are enacted in practice. As she explains,  
If practices are foregrounded there is no longer a single passive object in the 
middle, waiting to be seen from the point of view of seemingly endless series of 
perspectives. Instead, objects come into being—and disappear—with the 
practices in which they are manipulated. And since the object of manipulation 
tends to differ from one practice to another, reality multiplies. The body, the 
patient, the disease, the doctor, the technician, the technology: all of these are 
more than one. More than singular (p. 5).  
In focusing on what is done or enacted as both Barad and Mol suggest, theoretical space 
for ontological multiplicity opens up. When we examine how practices stage agential 
cuts in which objects are enacted, the ostomy multiples, just as disease does in Mol’s 
analysis. For example, in describing surgery to treat atherosclerosis, the disease (in 
which blood arteries harden) under examination in Mol’s work, she writes, “Reality 
follows: atherosclerosis is enacted as something that can be pushed aside by a balloon” 
(p. 102). We might say similar things about the cases presented in this chapter: 1) the 
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ostomy is enacted as a parasite, 2) the ostomy is enacted as a companion, 3) the ostomy 
is enacted as more than self, 4) the ostomy is enacted as self.  
 Furthermore, I must emphasize that it is not simply that different versions of the 
ostomy exist or that different people have different perspectives about the ostomy. 
Rather, by assuming no ontological differences at the outset of this chapter, it becomes 
“possible to understand” the ostomy as manipulated in practices,” which as Mol 
explains, has the “far-reaching effect” of multiplying reality (p. 5). The ostomy is not a 
“universal object” but is manipulated in its intra-action with other entities (medical 
histories, personal experience, minds, bodies, selves, surgeries, images, blog posts, 
tweets, etc.). The ostomy becomes a parasite or cyborg through specific practices in 
which intra-actions stage agential cuts. But these agential cuts are neither fixed nor 
permanent, leaving space for the ostomy’s multiplicity.  
Critically though, the ostomy multiple is tied to sites of practice (Mol) or regimes 
of practice (Graham). In Mol’s version, an ontology is “bound to a specific site and 
situation” (p. 55). Take for example, Mol’s discussion of the role of location in enacting 
specific bodily ontology,   
Because doing a woman is not the same thing in the supermarket as it is in the 
classroom, because staging a man in bed is quite different from staging a man at 
a professional meeting, it is possible to investigate what it is to perform this, that, 
or the other…A lot of things are involved. Black ties and yellow dresses. Bags 
and glasses. Shoes and desks and chairs and razors…Out in the streets one does 
not need a penis to perform masculinity. But in communal showers at the 
swimming pool, it helps a lot (p. 38-9). 
 
 101 
The body becomes female indeed due to the practices in which the body is enacted, but 
also due to where those practices are done. That the body becomes female relies upon 
the intra-actions of specific entities including both time and space.  
Extending this point, Graham proposes “regimes of practice” as a way of 
incorporating less geographically specific notions of space (2013; 2015). Clarifying this 
broadened sense of location, Graham and Herndl write,  
Mol (2002) is quite physical in her sense of ‘‘site of practice’’ as a ‘‘where’’—as a 
physical location of a set of practices—an understandable move considering her 
focus on atheroscleroses distributed through different spaces in a hospital. But 
the idea of specific physical sites of practice is less useful in our inquiry into pain 
medicine. We could easily say that the diagnosis occurs in the examination room, 
but that would be a somewhat myopic view. Diagnosis occurs equally in a 
variety of locations, for example, the examination room, the laboratory, the 
library, the Internet. Pain management is a spatially distributed practice…we 
will refer to ‘‘pragmatic regimes of engagement’’ or ‘‘pragmatic regimes,’’ an all-
encompassing term, for example, action, practice, habit. In short, a pragmatic 
regime of engagement is a way of interacting with the world from which 
emerges orders of value and agency attributed to people and objects (Graham & 
Herndl, 2013, p. 114, emphasis mine). 
These pragmatic regimes are especially important for accounting for language in the 
more diffuse understanding of practices and enactments presented in this chapter. As 
Graham explains, regimes or practices “are sites of doing, and doing includes the 
practices of speaking, writing, visualizing, and representing” (2015, p. 35). 
Consequently, language can and often does play an integral role in ontological 
enactments, a particularly important point for rhetorical work. Unlike Mol’s 
praxiographic work in which she identified the multiplicity of disease through 
ethnography of practices in specific locations, my work combines such observations 
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with a variety of other discourse and object formations. Because of this difference, I 
must attend to the role of language in intra-actions presented throughout this chapter.  
Let’s return for a moment to the introduction of this dissertation. There, I made 
the case for a calibrated analysis in which Barad’s intra-activity and Graham’s 
rhetorical-ontological inquiry were combined to establish a study of enactments, some 
of which prove to be rhetorical. In that calibration, I pointed to Graham’s argument that 
language is a type of doing as a critical part of my analysis, and as such, used this 
premise to explore a range of language practices as a means of studying patient’s lived 
experiences through their stories, blog posts, tweets, and conversations with me as well 
as others. In this chapter as I argued for examining the agential cuts that are done or 
enacted in practice, my analysis, like that of the other chapters, focused on the way in 
which words, phrases, descriptions, and the like, brought to the surface various agential 
cuts in which ontological differences were enacted.  
 Too in the opening of this chapter, I briefly touched on the implications of 
representational approaches to ontologies. If on one hand is language—that which 
represents—and on the other hand are objects—that which needs representing—an 
“ontological gap” is created, from which questions regarding our ability to access and 
know objects fall (Barad, 2007, p. 47). In an effort to avoid such theoretical quick sand, 
I’d like to offer a final metaphor for understanding the role of language in the practices 
that stage ontologies.  
There is no doubt, especially for rhetoricians, that language plays an important 
role in practices that stage ontologies. “Events are made to happen by several people 
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and lots of things,” Mol argues. “Words participate, too. Paperwork. Rooms, buildings. 
The insurance system. An endless list of heterogeneous elements that can either be 
highlighted or left in the background, depending on the character and the purpose of 
the description” (2002, p. 26). For the purposes of this project, particularly the work of 
this chapter, language stages the doing. That is, words17 have a special role in enacting 
the agential cuts in which the ostomy becomes pet, parasite, self, or cyborg. As 
evidenced by the cases presented here, the descriptions, reports, confessions, 
powerfully participate in the agential cuts that are made. Language is a necessary entity 
in the enactment of separations from or inclusions into the self.  
Importantly though, language is only the tip of the spear through which these 
cuts are made, not the spear itself. Words may do the cutting, but such cuts are only 
possible through all elements of the spear. The handle, leather, thrower, the space and 
time in which the cut is made, the exigency for the cut—all these elements too must co-
articulate intra-actively to perform a cut. The tip of the spear is but one part of the intra-
action necessary to stage an ontology, and we might focus on the entity that cuts in as a 
means of understanding how certain enactments are made to be rhetorically influential. 
Indeed, words clearly do the cutting from which the ostomy ontologies in this chapter 
are done, however, this is not always the case (as we will see in Chapter Five). 
Nonetheless, recognizing the agential separability made possible through intra-acting 
language requires the expertise of rhetoricians. Who better to understand the role of 
                                                 
17 To be clear, when I refer to “words” I am referring to a nuanced conception of words as embodied movements, metonymic for a 
suite of discursive practices.  
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language in the enactment of ontologies? Who more adequately attuned to the ways in 
which enactments become rhetorical?   
Ultimately, ontological multiplicity is an important aspect of a theory of 
enactments. This chapter argues that the ostomy is ontologically multiple, transformed 
through sites and practices. Further, this chapter sheds light on the diverse entities and 
ontologies that give way to the multiple identities, especially in this dissertation ostomy 
pouch wearer and ostomate. These arguments are critical to the theory-building work of 
this project, but the insights of this chapter are also relevant in contributing to the on-
going conversation regarding how rhetoricians can best conduct ontological inquiry 
without abandoning the important role of language.  
Yet, as Barad, (as well as Mol, Graham, and other new materialist scholars) has 
argued, language is only one important entity in the intra-activity of the world. 
Therefore, identifying who and what else is rhetorically powerful in intra-actions and 
enactments is key to a thoroughly developed theory of enactments. Chapter will take 
up this important work by examining visual elements including images and ways of 
looking in order to investigate how agential cuts might be staged through entities other 
than language.  
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CHAPTER 5: MISFITTING: THE ROLE OF VISUALITY IN ENACTMENTS 
Disability fluctuates, growing visible, then invisible, then visible again, becoming both ever-present and 
haunting― José Alaniz, Death, Disability, and the Superhero: The Silver Age and Beyond 
 
Feminism is about giving women choice. Feminism is not a stick with which to beat other women with. 
It’s about freedom, it’s about liberation, it’s about equality. I really don’t know what my tits have to do 
with it. It’s very confusing—Emma Watson 
  
 
Over the course of the last several chapters, my goal has been to demonstrate the 
analytical value of attuning rhetorical analyses to the intra-actions and agential cuts in 
which particular enactments become powerful. In Chapter Three, such an approach 
revealed the diverse identities that become possible through kairologies of specific 
intra-actions. Further, Chapter Four unveiled how within intra-actions the ostomy 
becomes ontologically multiple through specific intra-active agential cuts via language. 
To assume that language is the only intra-acting entity with the capability of influencing 
agential cuts, however, risks sliding into postmodern preoccupation with language. 
Therefore, at the core of this chapter is an effort to identify who or what else might 
become the tip of the spear—that is, what entities other than language might become 
most influential in agential cutting. 
As the previous chapters briefly alluded to, a powerful element within the IBD 
and ostomy communities is the visual. Julia holds her ostomy away from her body was 
a visual act that participated in the cut between self and non-self (Chapter Three). Gut 
Girl’s identity becomes both solidified and empowered through images of herself in her 
superhero armor (Chapter Four). Moreover, several advocacy campaigns encourage 
IBD and ostomy patients to post pictures of themselves including the Get Your Belly 
Out campaign in which participants post pictures revealing their bellies (ostomy-clad, 
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scarred, swollen, etc.) to make visible these conditions and the IBD Selfie campaign that 
asks participants to post selfies to show everyday life with IBD.  
My point here is that visuality seems to play an integral role in enactments and 
agential cuts, especially in regards to IBD, ostomies, and chronic autoimmune 
conditions. However, the role of these visuals in intra-actions and enactments has not 
been fully theorized, particularly in cases where superficially similar images take on 
very different rhetorical lives. Consequently, this chapter sets out to investigate how we 
might adequately account for visuals under the rubric of enactments to make sense of 
how and why particular images become powerful. Drawing on the notion of 
“misfitting” from disability theory, I will explore two final cases to investigate how 
agential cuts are staged in visual enactments and what is at stake in such agential cuts. 
As part of this analysis, I will also turn to Gries’ insights regarding visual rhetorical 
transformations and the role of particular ways of seeing to understand how certain 
enactments fit in certain rhetorical contexts while others do not. First though, I’d like to 
introduce to the main characters of this chapter: Bethany Townsend (Figure 7) and Sam 
Cleasby (Figure 8).  
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Figure 5. Bethany Townsend (Walker, 2014).  Figure 6. Sam Cleasby (Cleasby, 2015b). 
Bethany Townsend 
In 2014, a young woman by the name of Bethany Townsend posted online a picture of 
herself sun-bathing in a bikini. Seemingly, there is nothing exciting or newsworthy 
about such a post, especially in the age of the selfie (Jurriëns, 2016). However, within 
days of posting, Bethany’s picture had gone viral, with over 12.4 million views (Walker, 
2014). Bethany’s image stood out from the millions of other online selfies because she 
wears to ostomy pouches. Since posting, Bethany’s image has been viewed worldwide, 
being championed as a heroic act that not only gives, but elicits, confidence in herself 
and others with IBD, however, as she explains it, the image was initially simply 
intended for her husband’s viewing.  
Sam Cleasby 
Also in 2014, UK blogger Sam Cleasby, uploaded a blog entry about going to the 
bathroom. However inappropriate this entry might initially sound, Sam’s story wasn’t 
about what happened behind the bathroom stall door. Instead, this entry was an 
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emotionally-charged and intimate letter entitled “Dear lady who tutted at me for using 
the disabled loo.” In this post, Sam details an embarrassing and hurtful incidence in 
which she was scoffed for using a disabled bathroom without looking disabled, even 
though Sam is. Her visual marker for disability—her ostomy—is just hidden beneath 
her clothes. About a year after this entry, another of Cleasby’s blog posts attracted 
substantial attention. This time, instead of being criticized for lacking visual evidence of 
her disability, Cleasby was criticized for looking disabled. That is, in a series of images 
posted to her blog, wearing lingerie and skirts, Cleasby reveals her ostomy, and was 
subsequently chastised for “sexualizing disability.”  
At the core of both Townsend and Cleasby’s cases are images of female, ill 
bodies. More than three years later, these women, their images, and the receptions their 
images received, remain influential within the IBD and ostomy communities, which 
begs the question, what about these images made them so rhetorically powerful? 
Despite both gaining rhetorical traction, Townsend’s and Cleasby’s cases incited quite 
conflicting responses, which requires me to further ask, how might an enactment 
framework enable me to account for these divergences? What might an examination of 
these images as enacted through specific agential cuts reveal about their agentive 
capabilities? On one hand, Townsend was celebrated for bravery and beauty in 
displaying her ostomy. On the other, Cleasby was condemned for not looking disabled 
in one context, yet looking too disabled and too sexy in another. Put another way, 
Townsend fits her rhetorical context, while Cleasby does not—she misfits.  
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Misfitting 
The idea of fitting and misfitting is an apt metaphor for making sense of Townsend and 
Cleasby’s conflicting receptions. Developed by disability studies scholar, Rosemarie 
Garland-Thomson, misfitting responds to what she saw as a pressing concern to better 
understand “lived identity and experience of disability as situated in place and time” 
(2011, p. 591). Like this dissertation, Garland-Thomson relies heavily upon the work of 
Barad to establish this disability theory framework in which entities (what she refers to 
as becomings) emerge in the world, instead of simply existing with inherent ontological 
properties. Misfitting, Garland-Thomson explains, is  
an encounter in which two things come together in either harmony or 
disjunction. When the shape and substance of these two things correspond in 
their union, they fit. A misfit, conversely, describes an incongruent relationship 
between two things: a square peg in a round hole (p. 593, emphasis original).  
Moreover, misfitting, is an “explanatory concept” to think through “a particular aspect 
of world-making in material-discursive becoming” (pp. 591-2). In terms of enactments 
of particular bodies and identities, then, misfitting occurs when “world fails 
flesh…whether it is a flight of stairs, a boardroom full of misogynists, an illness or 
injury, a whites-only country club, subzero temperatures, or a natural disaster” (p. 600). 
Certain bodies, in their intra-active becomings, misfit their environments or situations. 
People in wheelchairs misfit stairs. Bodies with penises misfit bathrooms labeled 
“Women.” Left-handed students misfit right-handed desks.  
When material-discursive becomings are enacted in spaces and times that are 
designed and equipped for different enactments, a misfit occurs. In other words, misfits 
are a type of agential cut. For example, when a paraplegic misfits stairs, the 
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entanglement of person, wheelchair, injury, stairs, etc., is consequently marked as 
disabled. In an effort to fit then, the paraplegic might navigate to a wheelchair ramp. 
Physical misfittings, like the wheelchair and stair example, for disabled and non-
normalized bodies, more broadly, are abundant; however, to assume all misfits are 
environmental or architectural shrinks the analytic potential of this concept.  
That is, enactments can misfit in ways that extend beyond physical space, as I 
will demonstrate with Townsend and Cleasby. For patients with autoimmune diseases, 
including those with IBD and ostomies, the square pegs and round holes are more than 
physical. As an “invisible disease” IBD’s symptoms do not manifest visibly which 
results in disease severity and even existence coming into question (Joachim & Acron, 
2000; Donoghue & Siegel, 2000). IBD patients often find themselves invisible to society 
whether by concealing their own disease or by having their disease doubted from lack 
of visible evidence (Defenbaugh, 2013; Moore, 2013; Valeras, 2010).  
Certainly, patients with IBD and ostomies can physically misfit, however, more 
commonly, these patients misfit visually. Because IBD is seemingly invisible to the 
public, patients deploy a range of visual strategies to not only make their disease visible 
but to consequently bring disease into being. In other words, patients commonly 
attempt to visually enact their disease. As is oft cited in visual theories and scholarship, 
ways of seeing become ways of knowing (Foucault, 1973; Daston & Galison, 2007; 
Fountain, 2014). An important intra-active entity in making IBD or ostomies known, 
then, is the visual—images, displays, gazes, and the like. When the visual intra-acts, 
particular agential cuts are made possible which stage fits and misfits. Using misfitting 
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as a metaphor, the goal of this chapter is to understand how and when Townsend fits 
while displaying her ostomy while Cleasby misfits and is shamed both for failing to 
display her ostomy as well as for doing so.  
Before jumping to a more thorough discussion of the Cleasby and Townsend’s 
cases though, I must first address the way I am approaching visual elements as intra-
active entities, especially images and the ways images are viewed. Under an enactment 
framework, images become entities that circulate, intra-act, and engage in agential 
cutting. This position departs from much visual rhetoric work that treats images as 
synchronic representations, therefore, I turn now to Gries’ “rhetorical transformation” 
as a productive heuristic for examining these images as intra-actively co-articulated 
within particular enactments. Her work suggests that these images are neither static 
representations, nor disengaged from intra-active engagements, which helps to account 
for how these images take on divergent rhetorical roles as they are circulated. Images 
are lively, chaotic, entities that come into being through their entanglement with other 
entities.  
Situating Gries’ notion of rhetorical transformation within my own work, in the 
next section, I consider how agential cuts are enacted in highly visual enactments and 
which entities are most powerful in agential cutting regarding visuals. I specifically 
contend two ways of seeing—the clinical and male gazes—agentively influence 
enactments. Therefore, I introduce scholarship on these gazes and synthesize this work 
with Gries and my enactment theory to situate the subsequent analysis of Townsend 
and Cleasby.  
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Transformative Gazing  
The mainstays of visual rhetoric scholarship, according to Gries, are “representational 
and synchronic approaches” that fail to “fully account for an image’s rhetorical 
complexity” (2015, p. 58). She insists,  
we need theories and empirical methods that better account for an image’s 
intense, unfolding, and distributed materializations in order to make visible how 
they become consequential in divergent ways” (p. 58).  
Taking up this call, Gries theorizes rhetorical transformations as an alternative way to 
study images that attends to the “process in which [images] become rhetorical in 
divergent, unpredictable ways as they circulate, transform, and catalyze change” (p. 28). 
In order to examine these rhetorical transformations, Gries suggests we trace “singular 
images” through their “distinct, albeit divergent, rhetorical lives (p. 28). Thus, as an 
approach, rhetorical transformation lends itself productively to my project’s interest in 
unpacking conflicting enactments, especially as this chapter aims to illustrate how the 
enactments in Townsend’s and Cleasby’s images become so rhetorically divergent.  
However, it’s important to note that a rhetorical transformation does not simply 
suggest we examine images as they circulate and transform as inert objects. Indeed, this 
approach requires a reconfiguration of how we understand images (Gries, p. 7). When 
treated as freeze frames, visual artifacts either come to stand in for objects or are treated 
as floating signifiers that scholars give meaning. Rhetorical transformation requires that 
we move beyond treating images and other “visual things,” as Gries calls them, as 
“already materialized” objects for analysis, and instead, situate visuals as “mediators, 
able to transform, modify, and rearrange collective space as they co-influence 
assemblages in which they are and become a part” (p. 62). Just as Barad argues all 
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entities in the world come into being and become meaningful through intra-actions 
with other entities, Gries argues, visuals “are not determinate things that embody 
specific fixed characteristics and properties” (p. 70).  
Under the rubric of rhetorical transformations, Gries proposes that we study an 
image as an event—“a dynamic network of distributed, unfolding, and unforeseeable 
becoming” (p. 27). In this sense, images become entities that intra-act, entities that 
participate in agential cuts, and entities that participate in enactments that may or may 
not fit. Gries uses rhetorical transformations as a way of questioning how things 
become powerful—what entities intra-act, in what space and through what time. Much 
the same, this dissertation questions how specific enactments become powerful and 
what consequences that has for bodily and identity boundaries, making a rhetorical 
transformation approach apt for examining the images of Townsend and Cleasby as 
they circulate and become meaningful. Put another way, both Gries’ work and this 
dissertation are interested in how agential cuts are made and what rhetorical 
implications such cuts engage.  
Therefore, critical to examining visuals as dynamic becomings in rhetorical 
transformations, visuals need be traced “as they undergo divergent change and flow—
as pure event” (Gries, 2015, p. 29). This, in turn, helps to illuminate the “rhetorical 
roles” and “rhetorical life” that develop from the rhetorical transformation of these 
images (p. 36). For example, Gries traces the divergent changes and flows of the Mona 
Lisa to uncover the “complex and unpredictable” rhetorical life that “Mona Lisa has 
come to lead” (p. 36). As Gries describes, 
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[the Mona Lisa] took on a variety of rhetorical roles, many with transnational 
consequences. As early as 1919, for instance, Mona Lisa worked to protest 
against the museumification of art when surrealist artist Marcel Duchamp 
provided a version of her with a moustache and a goatee. Later, in the 1960s and 
1970s, it became a diplomat, as the Mona Lisa was loaned to the United States in 
an attempt to improve Franco-American relations, and the image made a 
stunning appearance in John F. Kennedy’s speech at the unveiling of the 
National Gallery of Art (p. 34). 
Here we can briefly see how the Mona Lisa circulated, transformed, and catalyzed 
change through various spaces and times (p. 27). In one intra-active entanglement, the 
Mona Lisa became activist, in another, diplomat. Treating the Mona Lisa as an 
unfolding, dynamic event, shapes the way in which Gries accounts for what the image 
comes to mean in intra-active relationships with various entities (audiences, space, time, 
policy, culture, etc.—none of which pre-exist these intra-actions).   
The result of such work is a reframing of how images become rhetorical and how 
and when agential cuts are made. As we will see through a more thorough discussion of 
Townsend and Cleasby, visual elements, like language in Chapter Three, can come to 
play a powerful and influential role in the agential cuts that are staged in particular 
enactments. Grounding rhetorical transformations in intra-actions stages specific 
agential cuts itself. According to Gries:   
in our intra-actions with them, visual things under study only become 
temporarily determinate when we take a snapshot of their mobility and make an 
‘agential cut,’ marking them (objects), as well as other things we engage with to 
perform research, off from us (subjects) (p. 70). 
The cut that is made between viewer and viewed through images undoubtedly effects 
the rhetorical role and life in which images are transformed. However, the cut between 
viewer and viewed is not the only cut made possible when examining images as events 
in rhetorical transformations, nor is the viewer/viewed the only cut worth exploring. 
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Indeed, this chapter is interested in the diverse agential cuts that stage fits and 
misfits—how images take on particular intra-active roles that fit or not. Identifying who 
or what is most influential agential cuts with visuals is a primary concern of this 
chapter. As Gries makes clear, it is not that “in any given phenomena, all entities 
equally contribute in degrees and types of influence, nor that human beings must 
always be involved” (p. 69). Specifically, Gries cites a variety of entities that might alter 
intra-actions and participate in visual phenomena, one of which is particularly relevant 
for the types of enactments staged with Townsend and Cleasby: the gaze (p. 28). Gries 
explains,  
as images materialize in different versions and enter into divergent associations, 
they become rhetorically diverse as they work alongside other entities, human 
and nonhuman, abstract and concrete, to alter collective life. Such alteration 
includes, as many rhetorical scholars have noted, establishing a particular way of 
seeing or gaze (pp. 27-8).  
This is a seemingly passing point in Gries argument, however, I think the idea that 
gazes or ways of seeing have the potential to intra-actively engage in powerful ways is 
worthy of further development.  
What becomes clear in looking at Cleasby and Townsend is that the ways in 
which their bodies were seen, or gazed upon, plays a powerful role regarding if and 
when their enactments fit or misfit. Different gazes intra-act with the images of 
Townsend and Cleasby and influence the fitting and misfitting that occurs. Particularly, 
as these images intra-act with two ways of seeing—the clinical and male gazes—diverse 
agential cuts are staged. So as to more fully explore these gazes before tracing their 
intra-active role in both Townsend and Cleasby’s images, the next sections will very 
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briefly describe each gaze, highlighting the relevance of these gazes in the enactments of 
Townsend and Cleasby.  
The Clinical Gaze  
First theorized by Foucault (1973), the clinical gaze is an “observing gaze” (p. 107) 
deployed through the eye of a trained physician, in which a disease is brought to 
“declare its truth” (p. 112). That is, through this particular way of seeing disease, a 
doctor gazes upon symptoms and signs of a disease, which in turn, brings that disease 
into being. In terms of intra-actions, visual things (e.g., x-rays, blood tests, visually 
evident symptoms like swelling or bruising) entangle with the trained clinical gaze of a 
medical expert, and through this co-articulation, a disease or condition is staged.   
For those in the IBD and autoimmune disease community, more broadly, 
bringing these diseases into being with the clinical gaze is not a simple feat. That is, IBD 
does not often manifest in visible ways. Autoimmune activity occurs within the body, 
under layers of opaque tissue, making the visibility of these conditions often impossible 
without intra-action with apparatuses, such as microscopes, pathologies, MRI machines, 
etc. Making IBD visible as it intra-acts with the clinical gaze of a medical expert is made 
possible because medical professionals have access to such apparatuses to help gaze 
upon the disease. However, the clinical gaze has not taken permanent residence strictly 
within the sight of medical professionals. 
Indeed, recognizing the migration of this particular way of seeing into the public 
sphere, Johnson redefines the clinical gaze as a “diagnostic hermeneutic,” an 
“interpretive frame” in which those beyond trained experts “take on the diagnostic gaze 
of the physician, searching body and speech for symptoms (2010, p. 470). The diagnostic 
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hermeneutic, in other words, provides a way for the public, media, and others to 
appropriate the particular way of looking that medical professionals train for years in 
order to deploy. Because society has become inculcated in the culture of medicine and 
science—specifically in the ethic of embracing visual evidence above much else—the 
clinical gaze has been absorbed into public culture such that certain bodies, particularly 
those who enact certain identities (e.g., disabled, ill, ostomate) must provide visual 
evidence in order to support those identities. The clinical gaze has trickled beyond of 
the domain of experts and society has adopted it as a way visually assessing the 
conditions of others, which in turn, stages particular agential cuts regarding bodies in 
the public. The diagnostic hermeneutic is capable of enacting cuts between what self 
becomes self and non-self, who or what becomes able disable, and who becomes ill and 
or not.18   
For instance, Graham’s work on fibromyalgia explores the difficulty patients 
have in validating their disease without the entanglement of medical technologies that 
bring pathological evidence into view (2009). Graham explains that visual data from 
Positron Emission Tomography (PET) scans lead to the “legitimization of fibromyalgia” 
(p. 385). Put another way, the intra-activity of the body, fibromyalgia, symptoms, 
patient reports, PET scans, and the clinical gaze come together to visually and 
rhetorically to enact and legitimize the ill body and identity. However, the public does 
                                                 
18 The types of agential cuts I’m interested in this chapter are slightly different than those discussed in the previous chapters. Until 
now, I’ve mostly been interested in cuts regarding self, non-self, human, and non-human. In this chapter, though, I’m more 
interested in cuts among able-bodiedness and sexuality. Following Barad, I recognize such cuts as “specific form[s] of embodiment 
that [are] co-constituted through boundary-making practices” (2007, p. 158).  
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not often, if ever, have access to a patient’s PET scans. Fibromyalgia, IBD, and other 
such conditions, then, are not easily revealed to the public’s clinical gaze. Enactments of 
these conditions must find ways to fit without intra-acting with medical apparatuses 
like PET scans. For those with IBD and ostomies, like Townsend and Cleasby, posting 
pictures online is one way of doing so.  
However, as a rhetorical transformation approach reminds us, Townsend, 
Cleasby, and others cannot control the entities in which their images might intra-act 
once their images are circulated and transformed. While the clinical gaze might be one 
such entity that intra-acts with these images, it is often not the only one. Under other 
gazes, the “becoming” of these images “intensifies with each new actualization and 
with each new encounter” (Gries, 2015, p. 28). Therefore, I’d like to briefly explore the 
other predominant intra-acting gaze entangled with these images: the male gaze.  
The Male Gaze 
Many scholars within feminist and disability studies have raised questions and 
concerns regarding ways of looking at particular bodies (Mulvey, 1975; Haraway, 1987; 
Bordo, 1993; Price Herndl, 2001; Doane, 2003). Through this work, the male gaze, like 
the clinical gaze, has been theorized as an especially problematic way of looking. This 
male gaze is an objectifying, controlling gaze of the dominant regime—sometimes 
referring literally to men, but in other cases to hegemonic and oppressive forces such as 
science, medicine, or the government (Mulvey, 1975; Balsamo, 1996; Caeton, 2011; 
Brunner, 2013; White-Farnham, 2013; Lowry, 2013). Much has been written on the male 
gaze and its relationship to and effects on the female body, and scholars including 
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Garland-Thomson (2009), Mulvey (1975), and Doane (2003f), have focused primarily on 
the male gaze as one that directly sexualizes the female body by men.  
For example, Doane argues the male gaze “is in control” (2003, p. 80) and 
Garland-Thomson writes, the male gaze “is a position of privilege…which entitles men 
to look at women,” as an act of “dominance” (2009, p. 41). Similarly, the male gaze, 
according to Price Herndl, is “concerned with commodity, with sexuality” (2001, p. 
264). Overall, this work identifies a particular way of seeing in which the viewed female 
body becomes commodified, controlled, and sexualized, often for lust and 
reproduction. As a gaze that dominates and objectifies, the male gaze is often compared 
to the normalizing gaze described in Foucault’s panopticon, a type of viewing that 
surveils and “makes possible to classify and to punish…[to] establish over individuals a 
visibility through which one differentiates [those under surveillance] and judges them 
(1977, p. 187). Such ways of looking enact particular agential cuts regarding what is 
normal and abnormal, desirable and undesirable, and that which should be displayed 
and that which should be hidden.  
Further, Bordo argues that it’s not merely being surveilled by the male gaze that 
deems particular enactments desirable, normal, or acceptable. Seeing other bodies 
entangled with the male gaze—witnessing the male gaze as an outsider—also creates 
pressure to stage particular bodies. Bordo explains, images in which bodies have 
normalized, “function as models against which the self continually measures, judges, 
disciplines, and corrects itself” (1993, p. 25). In terms of enactments, this surveilling 
male gaze normalizes through intra-active entanglements with bodies, sexuality, 
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anatomy, society, viewers, images, and more. The consequence of intra-activity in 
which the male gaze co-articulates is the need for certain bodies to normalize and stage 
particular enactments. That is, in order to fit, bodies must visually normalize to the 
expectations of the male gaze. When the male gaze is engaged, enactments of images 
and the bodies within those images, take on particular rhetorical roles, often divergent 
from that which is staged with the clinical gaze. Put another way, the clinical and male 
gazes require visual enactments to fit in different ways.  
In the following analysis, I examine Townsend and Cleasby to understand how 
the various intra-actions with the male and clinical gazes stage fits and misfits. As 
images of Cleasby and Townsend circulate and intra-act with the male gaze in some 
moments and clinical gaze in others, how do the intra-actions entangled with these 
images change? What agential cuts are enacted through these gazes and consequently, 
what role do these gazes play in the fitting and misfitting of Townsend’s and Cleasby’s 
enactments? To investigate how and toward what end agential cuts are enacted with 
these gazes, the next section will more fully explicate Townsend’s and Cleasby’s 
images, tracing their rhetorical lives as they transform and catalyze fits and misfits.  
 
 121 
Bethany Townsend  
 
Figure 9. Bethany Townsend (Walker, 2014). 
Clearly, in her picture, Townsend is wearing her colostomy bags as she presumably 
sunbathes. When asked about the image, Townsend reported “it was just a picture that I 
got my husband to take on holiday and it was just for me and him really (“Dare to 
Bare,” 2014). After receiving positive feedback from her husband and others, Townsend 
shared the image with Crohn’s and Colitis UK—an organization that raises awareness, 
money, and support, for those with IBD in the UK—transforming the image far beyond 
a personal picture for her husband. Not long after, Townsend was featured on a variety 
of news and pop culture broadcasts in the UK, explaining her picture and her ostomies. 
 122 
In response, thousands of other ostomy and IBD patients tweeted in support of 
Townsend, calling her an inspiration for the IBD and ostomy communities. In fact, one 
Twitter responder wrote that Townsend is “such an inspiration, especially in a world 
that’s so judgmental about how a woman should look in a bikini” (Walker, 2014). In 
response to this positive feedback, Townsend explained she shared this picture to 
demonstrate women with ostomies “have nothing to be ashamed of” (Blumm, 2014).  
However, before this image was circulated to the more public audience, 
Townsend admitted it was her husband who encouraged her to take and post the 
photo. She explained her husband told her, “If we go on holiday, I want you to wear a 
bikini” because as her husband puts it, Townsend has a “great body” despite having 
her ostomies. In fact, in various iterations of her story, Towsend remained steadfast that 
she did not wear a bikini or reveal her ostomies in public for over three years because 
she had a lack of confidence (Blumm, 2014). Yet, with the encouragement of her 
husband, what I understand as intra-action with the male gaze, Townsend revealed her 
ostomies and body to her husband and the public.19  
Even more, the accepting male gaze involved in Townsend’s case becomes a 
powerful entity in the intra-actions and agential cuts staged. Through the intra-action of 
Townsend, her ostomies, her husband, the male gaze, this image, the bikini, and social 
                                                 
19 Importantly, I consider the male gaze involved in these enactments specifically because Townsend states that this image was 
intended for the gaze of her husband (Blumm, 2014). As feminist scholars point out, it is difficult and often unproductive to assume 
that any images of women are victim to the male gaze because the images appear sexual or provocative. In many cases, women 
advance their sexuality and empowerment through displaying their bodies in ways that disregard the male gaze (Stuart, Kurz, 
Ashby, 2012; Greco, 2015 ). Therefore, I am to make no judgment about the way Townsend dresses or displays her body sexually (or 
not). Instead, I am accounting for the explicit relationship, noted by Townsend herself, between Townsend’s image and the male 
gaze of her husband (and possibly others, as the image circulated publically). 
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media, Townsend’s image visually enacts a normalized body. This intra-action 
agentially cuts the body as acceptable and sexual. Put another way, the image as a 
“pure event” transforms through intra-action with “particular way of seeing” (the male 
gaze) (Gries, 2011, p. 28). The recurring emphasis on how Townsend’s husband found 
the image attractive and acceptable became an influential entity in the enactment of 
Townsend’s image, helping the image to fit within the male gaze. However, this 
image’s rhetorical life was not only entangled with the male gaze.  
As Townsend’s image materialized within the Crohn’s and Colitis UK, the 
organization remarked, this image helped to “shine a bright light on…Inflammatory 
Bowel Disease” (“Bethany Townsend’s photo,” 2014). Crohn’s and Colitis UK’s 
explanation points to this image’s intra-action with the clinical gaze in the public. That 
is, Bethany explains the popularity and wide-reaching effects of this image weren’t “just 
a big deal for [her], but for other Crohn’s sufferers” because it “shone a much-needed 
spotlight on bowel disease” as current treatment options are limited (Kenyon, Edwards, 
Meddings, & Harvey-Jenner, 2014). As Townsend’s image intra-acted with the public’s 
clinical gaze of the public, IBD itself could come into being. An agential cut regarding 
disease is enacted. IBD was made visible as Townsend’s image circulated with society, 
entangled with Crohn’s and Colitis UK. Thus, the image not only became validation for 
IBD and ostomies, for chronic illness that otherwise goes unseen and unknown, but the 
image also fit with the clinical gaze. Displaying her ostomy provided the visual 
evidence required by the clinical gaze, allowing Townsend to fit.  
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In review, Townsend’s image manifested in rhetorically powerful ways through 
the normalized agential cuts of both the clinical and male gazes. Her image could enact 
the rhetorical role of disabled or chronically ill as well as desirable female. The agential 
cuts made across the gazes align, hence, in both enactments the image actualized as 
positive, celebratory, and empowering. However, what happens when the male and 
clinical gaze enact conflicting rhetorical lives for a single image? How is the rhetorical 
becoming of that image transformed? What if visual enactments misfit? If a visual 
enactments fits under one gaze but not another, what happens? Can simultaneously, 
divergent visual enactments be reconciled? Turning to Cleasby image that was 
criticized for looking (or not) disabled helps answers these very questions. The next 
section will detail visual enactments with Cleasby in which she was criticized due to 
misfitting.  
Sam Cleasby 
Blogger, Sam Cleasby writes regularly about her experiences with IBD, making her a 
well-known IBD and ostomy community member. Her website and blog have become a 
place to explore IBD and ostomy issues regarding “self-esteem, body image, and loving 
yourself” (Cleasby, 2015). While her entire platform works to empower, educate, and 
promote IBD patients with IBD awareness, two of her blog entries—“To the woman 
who tutted at me for using the disabled loo” and “Sexualizing disability or normalizing 
life with an illness?”—are especially relevant in investigating visual enactments and 
agential cuts. Together, Cleasby’s entries reveal entanglements among IBD, the clinical 
gaze, the male gaze, and the female body, in which misfits are enacted. Unlike 
Townsend, intra-actions regarding Cleasby’s disease, identities, and body misfit both 
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the clinical and male gazes, resulting in backlash and rejection of Cleasby’s enactments. 
In what follows, I will unpack each entry, emphasizing the role of each gaze in the 
agential misfitting staged.  
To the Woman Who Tutted at Me for Using the Disabled Loo 
Before exploring this first blog entry, I must offer a spoiler of sorts. This entry contains 
no images. The majority of this chapter so far has focused on pictures as the “visual 
thing” transformed; however, in this entry, the “visual thing” transformed is her 
physical, fleshy bodyself.20 Contrasting the visual event described in this first entry with 
the literal images of Cleasby included in the second entry provides an illustrative 
tracing of how the clinical and male gazes were at work in the intra-activity and 
enactments of Cleasby as female and chronically ill. Like images, Cleasby in photograph 
or in flesh is a “visual thing” existing in a “dynamic state of flux” of “location, form, 
medium, genre, and activity” (2016, p. 158, emphasis mine).21 Although visual rhetoric 
scholarship tends to focus on images as the “visual things” we study, visuality extends 
far beyond that which a camera can capture (Gries, 2013). The medium of the visual 
thing under examination in this first blog entry is Cleasby’s bodyself in its physical 
manifestation, and much like examining an image as it transforms, I am working to 
track how the visuality of Cleasby intra-acts in particular contexts.  
With that clarification, the opening lines of this blog read:  
Dear lady who loudly tutted at me using the disabled loos,  
                                                 
20 I use “bodyself” here as a way to not invoke an agential cut between Cleasby’s body and self, as is often done in causal discourse.  
21 I must also make note of the role of language in the enactments staged in Cleasby’s case, especially. Using a blog to explore 
visuality in enactments requires me to walk a difficult line. In each enactment described throughout this analysis I recognize 
language as an influencing entity, but am working to remain focused on the rhetorical transformation of the visual elements.  
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I know you saw me running in, with my able bodied legs and all. You saw me 
opening the door with my two working arms. You saw me without a wheelchair. 
Without any visible sign of disability. You tutted loudly as I rattled the handle 
with my hands that work perfectly and my able voice call to my kids that I’d be 
out in just a minute (Cleasby, 2015a).  
Here, Cleasby explains what her recent experience of using the public disabled 
bathroom must have looked like to the woman watching her. With her “able bodied 
legs,” “two working arms,” and “without a wheelchair,” or “any visible sign of 
disability,” the on-looking woman had no reason to believe that Cleasby was justified in 
using the disabled bathroom. The gaze of this woman did not intra-act with entities that 
would enable an agential cut in which Cleasby could become disabled. Without a 
wheelchair, missing ligaments, or any other “visible sign” of disability, the clinical gaze 
could not enact an agential cut such that Cleasby was fit for the disabled bathroom. 
Cleasby continues,  
My lack of wheelchair may have suggested to you that I was some lazy cow who 
didn’t care. Some inconsiderable bitch who was using something I wasn’t 
entitled to. (I actually carry a card to explain that I’m entitled to and have a 
disability key if you’d have cared to ask). You may have seen my face blushing 
as I caught your eye and assumed I was showing guilt at blagging the disabled 
loos. The fact is that I have no bowl. I have a pouch form from my small intestine 
which can’t handle volume and so I have to go to the toilet and poo several times 
a day. My lack of large intestine means that my stool is totally liquid as I have no 
means of absorbing the fluids in food and so it’s really hard to hold it when I 
need to go. I sometimes have accidents which means a large toilet that has a sick 
right by me means I can clean myself up when things go awry.  
The stark and honest language in this passage demonstrates the challenges of both 
living with an invisible disease and engaging with the clinical gaze. For Cleasby, her 
invisible disability enables the clinical gaze to transform her into a “lazy cow” and 
“inconsiderate bitch” who was using something she “wasn’t entitled to” (Cleasby, 
2015a). The clinical gaze intra-acting with Cleasby, the visuality of her body and disease 
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(or lack thereof), and the location of this enactment, agentially separates Cleasby from 
that which should occupy the disabled bathroom. Cleasby misfits the disabled 
bathroom. If Cleasby’s visuality included disabled arms or legs, a wheelchair, or some 
other visual sign of disability, the intra-activity staged in this case might enable her to 
become disabled (Barad, 2007, p. 148).  
 Cleasby ends this blog by calling readers, and society more generally, to action, 
which in many ways might be understood as a call for the dismantling of the public’s 
clinical gaze:  
The next time you see someone who doesn’t “look disabled” using a toilet. Or 
someone busting through and crashing into the toilets noisily. Take a moment. 
Remember that not all people who have the right to use disabled toilets are in a 
wheelchair. Some of us have a jpouch, a lot of us have an ostomy bag that needs 
emptying and changing with the use of space, a skin, and a bin. And even more 
of us just don’t want to shit our pants in public. Think about the nearly 300,000 
people in the country who have inflammatory bowel disease…who need to use 
the toilet urgently, noisily, smellily…It’s an embarrassing enough thing to deal 
with before having to see disapproving looks. 
In this passage, Cleasby directly addresses how looking disabled and being disabled are 
not interchangeable. Despite this, as the visuality of Cleasby co-constitutes in the intra-
activity with the clinical gaze, the agential cuts staged are powerfully influenced by the 
gaze itself. As Gries suggests, “things” beside humans, in this case the clinical gaze22, 
have the “potential to alter reality” as it materializes in “multiple and distributed 
encounters” (2015, p. 32). When the clinical gaze co-articulates in this intra-action, 
Cleasby’s bodyself misfits, because the entity (or types of entities) that would enable her 
                                                 
22 I treat the clinical gaze, and gazes more generally, as not contained within a particular human, but as articulated within intra-
actions. Gazes occupy space between entities that become viewer and viewed.  
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to fit are invisible. Because her ostomy is concealed, she misfits when intra-acting with 
the clinical gaze.  
Sexualizing Disability or Normalizing Life with an Illness? 
The second of Cleasby’s blogs under review here was posted approximately a month 
after the disabled bathroom entry. In this post, Cleasby reacts to the critique that images 
she posted of herself were “sexualizing disability.” (Cleasby, 2015b). Below are two of 
the images that were directly criticized (Figures 10 and 11).  
 
Figure 10. Cleasby revealing her ostomy (Cleasby, 2015b). 
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Figure 71. Cleasby revealing her stoma (Cleasby, 2015b). 
In the first of these images, Cleasby’s ostomy is revealed, though is perhaps not the 
central focus of the photo. The second image, however, highlights Cleasby’s stoma—the 
healthy end of intestine pulled to the surface of the skin, over which an ostomy pouch is 
worn to collect digestive waste. 
Describing the reason she decided to have her husband take these images and 
her own motive for posting them, Cleasby writes, 
I wanted to show that my stoma didn’t remove me from my femininity, 
sexuality, or who I was before. I wanted to show the world that it was nothing to 
be ashamed of, that I was proud of my ostomy (Cleasby, 2015c).  
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However, when these images were circulated online, they were not received positively 
by all audiences. In fact, Cleasby says, “I have been subject to a few comments about 
sexualizing disability…and I wonder am I guilty of that?” (Cleasby, 2015c). In working 
toward an answer, she explains how such a critique is even possible,  
It’s so easy to use a woman’s body against them, to suggest that showing flesh is 
in some way a dart in the heart of feminists everywhere…It is odd isn’t it that 
when we see semi-naked photographs of men that there is no backlash, no one 
suggesting they are belittling the campaign by showing their bodies (Cleasby, 
2015c).  
Here, Cleasby recognizes the role and implications of the male gaze in the “showing” of 
a woman’s body and flesh. As these passages point to, the male gaze intra-acts in 
particularly influential ways, making “particular articulations” of this image 
meaningful and staging specific agential cuts in which the image becomes sexualized 
(Barad, 2007, p. 148). This enactment of a sexualized image, however, was not received 
positively like Townsend’s image; instead, sexualization of this image was condemned 
by a series of comments claiming the image is gross, disgusting, and attention-seeking 
(Cleasby, 2015c). Cleasby’s images become powerful as the diseased or disabled body is 
enacted, but are confronted with resistance in their becoming as sexual. These 
enactments conflict in their rhetorical becomings. The disabled body enacted in these 
images cannot simultaneously be a sexualized body. The disabled body misfits the male 
gaze.  
Tracing across these posts suggests that Cleasby finds herself and the IBD 
community at odds under the scrutiny of the clinical and male gazes. In one enactment 
(using the disabled bathroom), intra-action with the clinical gaze incited pressure to 
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visually enact disability in order to legitimize Cleasby and her disease. Yet, when 
images of Cleasby circulate and transform with the male gaze, she is criticized for 
sexualizing and objectifying the disabled body. This tension arises, at least in part, 
because images as circulating events that unfold, mediate, transform, shift, and 
materialize in particular intra-actions cannot have a singular, intended audience. 
Rather, “both intended and unintended audiences play an interactive role in remixing, 
appropriating, and spreading images” and circulation of these images is not 
controllable (Gries, 2016, p. 158). Cleasby’s images perhaps were intended for intra-
action with a clinical audience, enactments are not under the direct influence of any one 
entity. Thus, despite Cleasby’s intentions for these images, when circulated, they 
perhaps unpredictably intra-act with the male gaze, staging a second misfit for Cleasby.  
Misfits & The Fantasy of Stable Bodies 
When a particular intra-action misfits an element within its becoming, an opening for 
rhetorical incongruence occurs. For example, the image and the gaze are incongruent 
when the image of Cleasby does not necessarily conform or normalize in the way that 
the clinical gaze nor the male gaze requires. As the image of Cleasby comes into being 
with either the clinical or male gaze, it misfits. In one instance, the clinical gaze fails to 
intra-act with what would be expected as a sign of disability (e.g. wheelchair), therefore, 
the gaze and the image misfit, leading to an agential cut in which Cleasby becomes able, 
and therefore, misfit for the disabled bathroom. Similarly, because the disabled body 
typically cannot become sexy under the male gaze, the images of Cleasby’s stoma and 
ostomy misfit with the male gaze and enact an agential cut in which the images become 
both sexualized and disable, two agential cuts that are not simultaneously acceptable. 
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Misfitting occurs when particular entities co-articulate visually enacting a non-
normalized body, be it disabled, able, sexy, or otherwise.   
Furthermore, when images are transformed such that they become misfits, they 
come to stand out. Misfits do not normalize. Referring to a way of being in the world 
called “doing being ordinary” (Sacks, 1984), Garland-Thomson suggests that misfitting 
manifests when certain enactments do not do the ordinary. She elaborates,  
A reasonable fit in a reasonably sustaining environment allows a person to 
navigate the world in relative anonymity, in the sense of being suited to the 
circumstances and conditions of the environment, of satisfying its requirements 
in a way so as to not stand out, make a scene, or disrupt through countering 
expectations (2011, p. 596).  
Accordingly, Cleasby’s image gains attention as it does not satisfy the requirements of 
the gaze with which it intra-acts. Both the clinical and male gazes require a normalized 
body, and when such an image is not enacted with Cleasby, rhetorical dissonance 
transpires. She is criticized and shamed. She misfits.  
Conversely, the notion of fitting helps to uncover how and why Townsend’s 
image becomes popular and influential. Her image, when intra-active with the clinical 
gaze, enacts a disabled body, and when intra-active with the male gaze of her husband, 
enacts a sexually acceptable body. In many ways she “satisfies the requirements of her 
environment” just enough by participating in a normalized activity (sunbathing) in the 
appropriate environment (on vacation, near a pool), that when her image intra-acts with 
the clinical gaze, it never fully becomes disabled. Instead, the image enacts an able, 
female, and sexualized body and identity for Townsend. Her ostomy only enacts IBD, 
but does not necessarily transform the image into that of a disabled person. As a former 
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model, the image of Townsend features her slim, tanned body—a body that current 
society accepts as sexual—and when the ostomy entangles with this sexualized body, 
the image transforms into a heroic and brave enactment. Notably, “the ideology of 
ability exerts enormous pressure on…whether a body is viewed as having sexual 
properties” and those who are agentially separated as disabled are rarely allowed to 
enact sexuality (Siebers, 2008, p. 163, 175). Unlike Cleasby, Townsend’s image becomes 
rewarded for staging a body that is at once fitting under the clinical gaze and the male 
gaze. Townsend fits.  
When it comes to intra-actions in which visuals are involved, the gaze can 
become the tip of the spear that enacts cuts. Within enactments, the gaze becomes the 
powerful influence through which certain bodies become acceptable as disabled, able, 
sexual, etc., If and when different gazes conflict in their agential cutting, tension arises, 
transforming those images in ways that were not necessarily intended or anticipated. 
As Garland-Thomson summarizes,  
attending to the dynamics of misfitting and fitting urges us to cultivate the rich 
particularity that makes up embodied human diversity…Our experience of 
living eventually contradicts our collective fantasy that the body is stable, 
predictable, or controllable, creating misfits for all of us…The concept of 
misfitting shifts this model. The body is dynamic…sometimes it fits and at other 
points or moments, it does not (2011, p. 603).  
No doubt, the body and images of bodies as stable is a “fantasy” that dissipates within a 
enactment framework. Images dynamically and often unpredictably fit in certain 
enactments and misfit in others. When analyses trace the agential cuts made possible 
through the vibrant actualization of visuals, the consequences of particular intra-actions 
emerge. Simply put, “the material particularity of encounter determines both meaning 
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and outcome” (Garland-Thomson, 2011, p. 598). Understanding the intra-actions of 
Townsend’s and Cleasby’s images in relationship with the male and clinical gazes helps 
to uncover how the images enact disability and sexuality as well as how the images 
become rhetorically divergent.  
Visual Enactments & Rhetorical Inquiry  
Ultimately, the insights of this chapter not only contribute to a theory of enactments, 
but also suggest important implications for rhetorical inquiry. In this final section, I will 
connect the findings of this chapter to the theory-building goal of this dissertation and 
broader applications for studies within rhetoric, especially regarding visuals. In so 
doing, I hope to challenge future work to attune analyses to an intra-active model so as 
to better address the lives of visuals, as well as other entities, as they fit and misfit 
environments, contexts, and intra-active entanglements.   
Taking images as events that are staged intra-actively and that become 
meaningful through agential cuts explores another dimension of enactments. As I 
argued in Chapter Three, focusing on the entity that especially encourages an agential 
cut, enables us to understand how certain enactments become rhetorically salient. 
Building on this notion, this chapter suggests that, like language, particular ways of 
seeing, stage specific cuts that come to fit or misfit. Bringing the insights of Barad, 
Garland-Thomson, and Gries together demonstrates another avenue that rhetorical 
scholars can pursue in an effort to attend more fully to lived experiences as well as 
diverse bodily and identity boundaries.  
Much in the way rhetoricians are highly equipped to understand that role of 
language in entanglements and enactments, we too are well-suited to interrogate the 
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role of visual entities “become capable of coproducing all kinds of actions” (Gries, 2013, 
p. 69). Visuals, like language, and potentially a range of other entities, have the potential 
to contribute within intra-actions in important ways. Attuning our work to such 
agential capacity sheds light on the tensions that emerge when visual entities travel 
across gazes, through spaces, within time, and among diverse entities to enact 
identities, bodies, and rhetorical roles.   
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION  
We may not choose our emotions or our attachments, but once we recognize them, we can cultivate them in certain 
ways—Jenell Johnson, American Lobotomy: A Rhetorical History  
 
 
Each of chapters in this dissertation tells a different story, and each story uncovers a 
new reality regarding what it is like to be chronically ill, what it is like to have and be a 
body that attacks itself, and what it is like to wear an ostomy. Telling these stories 
brings to light the difficulty of living with diseases and conditions that might otherwise 
go unseen. I have been profoundly moved several times throughout this project by the 
gratitude and sense of relief expressed toward me and this project by the women I’ve 
worked with. Telling the stories of how these women live and how IBD and ostomies 
transform their lives has been inexplicably humbling, and caring enough to tell these 
women’s stories is precisely the reason they have allowed me to do so. 
 This has been rewarding work, yet I know I have told only a few of the many 
stories and experiences worth telling about IBD, ostomies, autoimmunity, and patients’ 
lived experiences more broadly. As Johnson poignantly writes,  
There is something missing…tens of thousands of stories that will never be told. 
Those stories, and the faces, voices, and lives behind them, haunt this story, as 
they haunt all histories. Histories are intrinsically rhetorical. They select and 
interpret a certain reality for their audiences and each time something is made 
present, something is made absent by default (2015, p. 178).  
While Johnson’s sentiment here speaks to a type of historical story that this dissertation 
does not tell, the insight is relevant here. As must be the case in an enunciative analysis, 
I’ve selected particular stories to tell in this dissertation—stories of ostomies, stories of 
internal civil wars, stories of bathroom stalls—which at once makes certain insights 
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present and others absent. In collaboration with the women I observed and interviewed 
throughout this project, the stories I’ve aimed to tell seek to make visible the rich 
possibilities for both disciplinary insight and intervention in the domains of chronic 
illness, patienthood, embodiment, identity, and materiality.  
However, as I conclude this dissertation, one important story remains to be told. 
That is, I must recognize my own entanglements and investments within this project. To 
do so, I begin by offering a series of reflections regarding my role as researcher in this 
project. Then, I reflect on the notion “entangled ethnography”—a methodology 
developed by anthropologists Ginsburg and Rapp (2013)—as it effectively describes the 
type of work I performed through this project. I hope to not only share important 
aspects of my approach but also spark a conversation within the rhetorical studies of 
health and medicine regarding the type of work we do and how we go about 
conducting that work.  
Entangled Ethnographer 
Nearly ten years ago I was diagnosed with Crohn’s disease, a type of IBD. And, like 
many of the women present in this dissertation, I have spent weeks in the hospital. I 
have longed for the ability to participate in activities like running, traveling, and going 
to parties with friends. With a swollen, bruised, and stitched belly, I have looked in the 
mirror and questioned my ability to look attractive. And, later the same day, I have 
been questioned by college professors, bosses, and even strangers for not looking sick. I 
have lost sleep over the potential of needing an ostomy, a technology that has often 
seemed an unfair reward for having a terrible disease. Each and every day I live and 
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experience many of the incredibly personal and intimate experiences described by the 
women I have worked with throughout this project.  
The experiences shared, the boundaries agentially cut, and the enactments staged 
throughout this dissertation are not distant to me through some analytic screen. I am 
more than participant-observer, and my work requires more than recognition of my 
position and self-reflexivity. I did not simply attend and participate in activities during 
my ethnographic work, nor did I “objectively” write down the words of my interview 
participants. And, no doubt, my position, experiences, and identities play a significant 
role in the way I conduct my work and theorize about IBD, autoimmunity, and patient 
experience. I do not believe, however, that being an IBD patient should disqualify me or 
the findings of my work. In fact, having IBD has lead me down scholarly paths that 
would not otherwise have been possible. Simply put, my entanglements make me all 
the more equipped to conduct this research.  
In offering these reflections, I hope my work draws attention to what I consider 
to be one of the key questions in rhetorical studies of health and medicine: how do we 
attend to our personal identities and entanglements? It is not uncommon for 
rhetoricians of health and medicine to study and theorize about conditions that scholars 
are personally connected to (for example, Segal, 2005; Johnson, 2015; Koerber, 2013). 
Often rhetoricians simultaneously occupy many roles in their work ranging from 
researcher to patient, caretaker, and in some cases, healthcare provider. Thus, our field 
must have more thorough and sustained methodological and theoretical conversations 
regarding how these positions specifically shape our work and our discipline. As many 
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other rhetoricians of health and medicine find themselves in similar entangled 
positions, I hope this project might start a more engaged conversation about how we 
attend to our identities and how we manage the insights they foster. To begin this 
conversation, I’d like to explore “entangled ethnography” as I consider it to be a 
particularly helpful and sustainable approach that rhetoricians of health and medicine 
might adopt to better attend to our own entanglements. In what follows, I will describe 
this methodology and argue for its value in simultaneously positioning researchers and 
examining others’ lived experiences.  
 In their study of learning disability transition programs in New York City, 
Ginsburg and Rapp deploy what they call “entangled ethnography” as a way to 
transform “longstanding ethnographic methods: participant observation fieldwork, 
long-form qualitative interviews, life histories, and analysis of media and secondary 
documents” (2013, p. 187). Specifically, these authors use the term  to describe being 
“simultaneously inside and outside the world [they] were studying through ties of 
kinship or caring” (p. 88). As parents of children with learning disabilities, Ginsburg 
and Rapp found themselves “productively caught up in the projects” they were 
conducting, “at times taking an active role in enabling the very activities [they] were 
examining” (p. 187). Ginsburg and Rapp’s positions as both inside and outside the 
communities of their research poses interesting challenges to the knowledge claims 
possible through their ethnographic work. They readily admit that they “actively” 
participated in their own study at times, though they just as readily see this 
participation as a critically important part of their work. 
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 Being researchers as well as co-participants challenged these ethnographers to 
continually examine how their roles influences those they were studying. Even more, 
Ginsburg and Rapp see entangled ethnographic work as part of an ethical commitment 
to their research participants. They explain,  
Had we not been able to reflect on our own experiences, the research pathway 
might have never become apparent to us nor would we have been in a position 
to contribute new knowledge on this crucial but emergent area of concern. Our 
own entanglements helped us to understand the significance of this life 
transition [in a learning disability program] as an encompassing challenge to the 
ongoing project of disability rights, and not just for the particular circumstances 
for our own children (p. 193).   
Here, we see Ginsburg and Rapp accomplishing many of the goals I also set out to 
achieve in terms of my own entangled positionality. That is, the authors “reflect” on 
their own experience and then use those reflections as a “position to contribute new 
knowledge” and to “understand the significance” of their work. Much the same, I 
aimed to reflect upon and draw on my own identities and experiences throughout this 
project in order to better understand the experiences of Julia, Gut Girl, Jessica 
Henderson, and every other patient observed.   
What’s more, it is because Ginsburg and Rapp see the goal of their ethnography 
not only to learn about those they study, but also to actively intervene if and when 
possible, that their entangled ethnographic approach is particularly productive. 
Entangled ethnography aptly describes how I see the work of this project as well. As an 
entangled ethnographer in the autoimmune disease community, I can leverage my 
expertise as an autoimmune patient, while recognizing the deep, complex challenges 
and circumstances of those who participate in my qualitative research, and ultimately 
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attempt to serve as an “ally in making public the realities of…human difference” 
(Ginsburg & Rapp, 2013, p. 196).  
In advocating for an entangled ethnographic approach, I am also taking a 
position on autoethnography. Through I agree with Crawford and others, that 
“autoethnography provides another way in which researchers might productively 
account for their own experiences and identities” (1996, p. 161), I do not wish to fully 
(re)position myself as a part of my data. I consider an entangled ethnographic approach 
to most appropriately authorize me to conduct my ethnographic work by positioning 
myself as both insider and outsider, without completely submitting myself as an object 
of inquiry.  
For example, in contrast to the entangled ethnography conducted by Ginsburg 
and Rapp, in which they accounted for and included their own participation in the 
research, their knowledge claims extend beyond their own experiences. They used their 
positions as a triangulating mechanism through which they understood and made 
claims about those they were studying. In contrast, an autoethnographic piece by 
Poulos (2010) is written exclusively as a creative narrative (except for a few final 
reflective paragraphs that serve as an afterword) about Poulous’s own experience with 
the subject matter under inquiry. Poulous does little to triangulate this experience with 
others’ experiences nor does he work to generalize the insight from this experience for a 
broader community.  
Autoethnographic work undoubtedly has its place among viable methodologies, 
however, because I do not have an ostomy pouch, my status as an insider is only 
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partial. Even more, as is made manifestly clear in my personal life as well as in my data 
curation, autoimmune disease can and often is variable for each patient. Taking my own 
life as data without triangulating it in the way that entangled ethnography requires 
would be a risky step toward speaking for others—a move I earnestly work to avoid. 
Therefore, I advocate for entangled ethnography as a productive way to accomplish 
RHM’s exigencies, without integrating my personal experiences into my work. 
Throughout my exploration of autoimmune disease, I used entangled 
ethnography as a productive and ethical methodological framing for my research, to 
account my insider/outsider status, while attending to the diverse enactments and 
lived experiences of many others within the IBD community. Three years of entangled 
ethnographic observations and interviews nested within larger public cases enabled me 
to trace boundaries and binaries across a diverse range of patient experiences and 
contexts in an effort to theorize the best ways in which I might understand and theorize 
such rhetorical practices. Nevertheless, much work remains, especially in regards to 
technology, agency, materiality, and intervention. In the final section, I will describe 
what I believe are both limitations to this study and areas for future research. In so 
doing, I hope to foster additional work on lived experience, enactments, and boundary-
making processes for patients as well as other stakeholders.  
Future Directions 
One of the primary future directions for work that extends this dissertation is 
engagement with rhetoric of technology scholarship. At times, I have mentioned and 
briefly discussed insights that rhetoric of technology offers this study (see Chapter 
Three), yet these discussions have merely skimmed the surface of what more through 
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engagement with rhetoric of technology might produce. In particular, the notion of 
“technology” itself and the extensive work that has been done regarding embodiment 
and technology, particularly along the lines of posthumanism and digital spaces23, 
likely could build upon this enactment framework in a variety of domains including 
virtual reality (e.g., medical students can virtually practice surgical technologies, long-
term hospitalization patients can virtually visit places beyond hospital walls, and 
patients with cognitive injuries can virtually practice moving injured or paralyzed limbs 
to stimulate brain activity) and medical technologies (e.g., 3D printed organs, smart 
tattoos, pacemakers, implantable RFID, and cochlear implants). Future work that 
synthesizes enactments more robustly with rhetoric of technology would surely enrich 
the work I’ve begun here.  
Further, future scholarship that directly engages the role agency plays in 
enactments as well as the insights enactments bring to our definitions of agency seems 
particularly important as the field moves toward interventional goals. I have operated 
under Barad’s particular notion of agency (see Chapter Two), however, the insights of 
this dissertation have the potential to build upon and extend how our field theorizes 
agency, especially moving toward diffuse agency across intra-actions including 
nonhuman entities like ostomies. Ontological flattening, in particular, requires a 
distributed approach to agency that need be more fully theorized (see Chapter Three). 
In so doing, we have the opportunity to more fully engage with non-discursive entities 
that participate agentively within rhetorical contexts.  
                                                 
23 For example, Jack, 2016; Meloncon, 2013; Grabill & Pigg, 2012; Sun, 2009. 
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Finally, the questions I’ve asked and the issues I’ve raised over the course of this 
project have lead me into complicated theoretical terrain. Nevertheless, I’m confident 
that the enactment approach advocated for here lays the groundwork for more directly 
interventional work. In fact, this theoretical conversation affords a rich understanding 
of the lived experiences of IBD, ostomies, and autoimmunity, which in turn, highlights 
a variety of sites of intervention that could be pursued in future scholarship. For 
instance, the Julia controversy in Chapter Two exposes a place where the insight of 
rhetorical studies and technical communication could be incredibly helpful. The CDC 
clearly had a particular audience in mind with their Tips from Former Smokers 
campaign, which obscured the complex rhetorical territory of more diverse audiences 
within the IBD and ostomy communities. This dissertation illustrates the continued 
need for health organizations and other authoritative voices to more effectively and 
comprehensively engage with diverse patients and experiences. Indeed, one of the most 
pressing outreach avenues for this research is with organizations like the CDC and 
others I collaborated with during my ethnography.  
Moreover, during observations and interviews, I noticed a variety of 
communicative practices in which the insights of my work could be useful. Patients 
often expressed concerns over the ways healthcare providers assumed boundaries of 
the body, especially in misplacing control and agency with sentiments like: “your body 
failed you, therefore you need an ostomy” or “changing your diet might help cure your 
IBD.” Too, society’s normalized sense of what certain bodies and identities should look 
like and which practices are acceptable for particular people identifies another space 
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where I feel the findings of my work could improve patient experiences and outcomes. I 
hope through continued inquiry into the domains of IBD and autoimmunity, as well as 
sustained collaboration with organizations and patient groups, I might be able to 
develop a website or at the very least, a series of artifacts (e.g., infographics, fact sheets, 
role play activities) to help patients understand and navigate these problematic 
situations. It’s clear that patients are gathering in digital spaces in order to help each 
other succeed in a variety of practices and situations, therefore, I hope these insights 
would enrich those conversations.  
In the end, I hope this project sparks a variety of conversations in rhetorical 
studies and technical communication regarding the type of work we do and how we go 
about conducting such work, as well as, what assumptions we hold regarding divisions 
and boundaries and how we might attune our analyses to more comprehensively 
engage with lived experiences within health and medicine and beyond. With this 
dissertation, I have attempted to tell stories that at once re-articulate duality and 
boundary-making practices and transform the approaches we take in rhetorical studies. 
As Mol reminds us, “there are a lot of ways to live…and daily life is what, when it 
comes to it, matters most to people” (2002, pp. 181 & 184). My goal was and continues 
to be strengthening our capacity to conduct entangled work, attend to lived experience, 
and find ways to intervene. Expanding our theories and methodologies to make way for 
the diversity of everyday life seems like an excellent place to start.   
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APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
The following includes a list of preliminary interview questions used throughout this 
study. Additional follow-up questions were asked per individual interviews.   
1. Please describe your history with IBD and diagnosis.  
2. What types of treatments have you considered or used since your diagnosis?  
3. Please describe your experiences with selecting these treatments?  
4. What kind of conversations did you and your healthcare provider have about 
your treatments, specifically your ostomy or j-pouch? 
5. What other resources did you consult in selecting a treatment or understanding 
how a treatment may impact you and your life? 
6. What changes, if any, have your ostomy or j-pouch require in your: 
a. Social life 
b. Everyday routine  
7. How do you feel about your body and appearance in general? 
8. What would you consider your most positive feature of your appearance/body?  
9. What would you consider your most negative feature of your appearance/body?  
10. What factors, if any, do you think affect how you think and feel about yourself?  
11. In what ways, if any, do you think your ostomy or j-pouch has changed how you 
view yourself and your body?  
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APPENDIX B: SURVEY QUESTIONS 
The following is a complete list of survey questions. This survey was sent out via 
various social media (e.g., Reddit, Facebook) and health advocacy groups within IBD 
and ostomy communities. In total 103 responses were obtained with this survey. 
Importantly, the results of this survey were not directly presented in this dissertation, 
however, I’ve no doubt the findings influenced other portions of this study.  
 
1. Please indicate your age 
a. < 20 years old  
b. 20-29 years old  
c. 30-39 years old  
d. 40-49 years old 
e. 50-59 years old  
f. 60-69 years old  
1. Please select your gender.  
a. Female 
b. Genderqueer/Androgynous 
c. Intersex  
d. Male  
e. Transgender  
f. Transsexual  
g. Cross-dresser  
h. Female-to-male  
i. Male-to-female 
j. My identity was not listed (please specify) x 
2. What is your highest level of education? 
a. Did not complete high school 
b. High school/GED 
c. Some college 
d. Associate's degree 
e. Bachelor's degree 
f. Master's degree 
g. Advanced graduate work or Ph.D. 
h. Other (please specify) 
3. What is your current marital status? 
a. Single, never married 
b. Married or domestic partnership 
c. Separated 
d. Divorced 
e. Widowed 
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4. Please select all of the following that apply to you and your chronic illness. 
a. Crohn's disease 
b. Ulcerative colitis 
c. J-pouch, S-Pouch, K-Pouch 
d. Ostomy  
5. Please select the answer that most accurately describes when you were initially 
diagnosed with IBD. 
a. Less than a month ago 
b. Within the last 6 months 
c. 6-12 months ago 
d. More than 1 year ago 
e. More than 5 years ago 
f. More than 10 years ago 
g. I have not been diagnosed yet  
6. Please select the answer that most accurately describes how long you have had a 
medical technology for IBD (i.e., j-pouch, ostomy). 
a. Less than a month ago 
b. Within the last 6 months 
c. 6-12 months ago 
d. More than 1 year ago 
e. More than 5 years ago 
f. More than 10 years ago 
g. I do not have any medical technologies for my IBD 
h. I do not currently have a medical technology for my IBD but I have a 
surgery scheduled within the next year 
i. I do not currently have a medical technology for my IBD but it is likely 
that I will have one within the next 5 years 
j. I used to have a medical technology for my IBD but I no longer do  
7. Is your medical technology permanent?  
a. Yes 
b. Maybe 
c. I don't know 
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8. To what extent do you disagree or agree with the following statements: 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree (2) Agree (3) 
Strongly 
Agree (4) 
My life has changed 
significantly since I 
received my medical 
technology. 
    
I am happy that I have a 
medical technology. 
    
Having a medical 
technology has 
improved my quality of 
life. 
    
Having a medical 
technology has 
improved my overall 
health.  
    
 
9. To what extent do you disagree or agree with the following statements: 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
(3) 
Agree (4) 
Strongly 
Agree (5) 
My life has 
changed 
significantly since I 
was diagnosed 
with IBD. 
     
I am happy now 
that I have been 
diagnosed with 
IBD. 
     
Being diagnosed 
with IBD has 
improved my 
quality of life. 
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10. From 1 (most information) to 7 (least information) please rank the sources in 
order of how much information you receive from them regarding your IBD.  
______ Gastroenterologist  
______ Family member 
______ Support group 
______ Another healthcare provider (please specify) 
______ Website (please specify) 
______ Social media site  
______ Other (please specify)  
 
11. From 1 (most information) to 7 (least information) please rank the sources in 
order of how much information you receive from them regarding your ostomy 
or j-pouch. 
______ Gastroenterologist  
______ Family member  
______ Support group  
______ Another healthcare provider (please specify)  
______ Website (please specify) 
______ Social media (please specify)  
______ Other (please specify)  
 
12. From 1 (most information) to 7 (least information) please rank the sources in 
order of how much support you receive regarding your IBD. 
______ Gastroenterologist  
______ Family member 
______ Support group 
______ Another healthcare provider (please specify)  
______ Website (please specify)  
______ Social media (please specify) 
______ Other (please specify)  
 
13. Which complications have you experienced with your ostomy or j-pouch?   
a. I have not experienced any complications 
b. Discomfort or pain  
c. Difficulty in engaging in social activities 
d. Medical complications (pouchitis, failure, allergic reactions, etc.) 
e. Social stigma 
f. Changes in body image 
g. Emotional or psychological distress 
h. Other (please specify) 
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14. To what extent do you disagree or agree with the following statements: 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree 
(3) 
Agree 
(4) 
Strongly 
Agree (5) 
This 
statement 
does not 
apply to 
me. (6) 
I consider my j-
pouch part of 
my identity. 
      
I consider my 
ostomy part of 
my identity.  
      
When I describe 
myself, I include 
my j-pouch. 
      
When I describe 
myself, I include 
my ostomy. 
      
Receiving a j-
pouch has 
changed how I 
see myself. 
      
Receiving an 
ostomy has 
changed how I 
see myself. 
      
Receiving a j-
pouch has 
negatively 
affected my self-
perception. 
      
Receiving an 
ostomy has 
negatively 
affected my self-
perception 
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15. To what extent do you disagree or agree with the following statements: 
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Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
(3) 
Agree (4) 
Strongly 
Agree (5) 
This 
statement 
does not 
apply to 
me. (6) 
I consider 
my j-pouch 
part of my 
body.  
      
I consider 
my ostomy 
part of my 
body. 
      
Receiving a 
j-pouch has 
changed my 
body image.  
      
Receiving an 
ostomy has 
changed my 
body image.  
      
When I look 
at my body, 
my j-pouch 
is the first 
thing I 
notice. 
      
When I look 
at my body, 
my ostomy 
is the first 
thing I 
notice. 
      
Receiving a 
j-pouch has 
changed 
how I dress. 
      
Receiving an 
ostomy has 
changed 
how I dress. 
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16. To what extent do you disagree or agree with the following statements: 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
(3) 
Agree (4) 
This 
statement 
does not 
apply to 
me. (5) 
I consider my IBD 
part of my 
identity.  
     
When I describe 
myself, I include 
my IBD. 
     
Being diagnosed 
with IBD has 
changed how I see 
myself. 
     
Being diagnosed 
with IBD has 
changed how I 
think about 
myself. 
     
When I look in the 
mirror, the first 
thing I think about 
is my IBD. 
     
IBD has changed 
my body image.  
     
IBD has affected 
my self-
perception.  
     
IBD has affected 
my self-esteem.  
     
 
17. How has your IBD changed your body image? 
a. IBD has not changed my body image. 
b. IBD has negatively affected my body image. 
c. IBD has positively affected my body image. 
d. I prefer not to answer. 
 
18. How has your ostomy changed your body image? 
a. I do not have an ostomy. 
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b. My ostomy has not changed my body image. 
c. My ostomy has negatively affected my body image. 
d. My ostomy has positively affected my body image. 
e. I prefer not to answer.  
 
19. How has your j-pouch changed your body image? 
a. I do not have a j-pouch. 
b. My j-pouch has not changed my body image. 
c. My j-pouch has negatively affected my body image. 
d. My j-pouch has positively affected my body image. 
e. I prefer not to answer.  
 
20. How (if at all) has being diagnosed changed your life? (short answer) 
 
21. How (if at all) has receiving a j-pouch changed your life? (short answer) 
 
22. How (if at all) has receiving an ostomy changed your life? (short answer) 
 
23. To what extent do you disagree or agree with the following statements: 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
(3) 
Agree 
(4) 
Strongly 
Agree 
(5) 
Does not 
apply to 
me. (6) 
Being 
diagnosed with 
IBD has 
changed how 
my doctor and 
I communicate. 
      
Being 
diagnosed with 
IBD has 
changed how 
my family and 
I communicate. 
      
Being 
diagnosed with 
IBD has 
changed how 
my coworkers 
and I 
communicate. 
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Being 
diagnosed with 
IBD has 
changed how 
my friends and 
I communicate. 
      
Being 
diagnosed with 
IBD has 
changed how 
my partner and 
I communicate. 
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24. To what extent do you disagree or agree with the following statements: 
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Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
(3) 
Agree (4) 
Strongly 
Agree (5) 
Does 
not 
apply 
to me. 
(6) 
Receiving a j-
pouch has 
changed how I 
communicate with 
my doctor.  
      
Receiving an 
ostomy has 
changed how I 
communicate with 
my doctor.  
      
Receiving a j-
pouch has 
changed how I 
communicate with 
my family. 
      
Receiving an 
ostomy has 
changed how I 
communicate with 
my family.  
      
Receiving my j-
pouch has 
changed how I 
communicate with 
my coworkers.  
      
Receiving my j-
pouch has 
changed how I 
communicate with 
my friends.  
      
Receiving my 
ostomy has 
changed how I 
communicate with 
my friends.  
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Receiving my j-
pouch has 
changed how I 
communicate with 
my partner.  
      
Receiving my 
ostomy has 
changed how I 
communicate with 
my partner.  
      
 
25. Have you ever named your ostomy? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. Prefer not to answer  
 
26. Have you ever named your j-pouch? 
a. Yes 
b. No  
c. Prefer not to answer  
 
27. After receiving your j-pouch or ostomy, how likely are you to do the following 
activities? 
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Very 
Unlikely 
(1) 
Unlikely 
(2) 
Somewhat 
Unlikely 
(3) 
Likely (4) 
Very 
Likely (5) 
This 
statement 
does not 
apply to 
me. (6) 
Ask for a 
promotion at 
work. 
      
Try 
something 
new. 
      
Take a 
vacation or 
travel. 
      
Go 
shopping. 
      
Introduce 
yourself to 
someone 
new. 
      
Tell others 
about your 
chronic 
illness. 
      
Apply for a 
new job. 
      
Go to the 
gym. 
      
Socialize 
with my 
friends 
and/or 
family. 
      
Go on a date.       
 
28. Which of the following do you use as coping strategies for your IBD? 
a. I don't feel like I need to use coping strategies. 
b. Call a friend or family member. 
c. Sleep. 
d. Work out. 
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e. Eat. 
f. Avoid social activities. 
g. Engage in social activities. 
h. Attend a support group. 
i. Engage in social media sites related to IBD. 
j. Engage in other social media sites. 
k. Craft. 
l. Tell others about IBD. 
m. Other (please specify) 
29. Which of the following do you use as coping strategies with your j-pouch or 
ostomy?  
a. I don’t feel like I need to use coping strategies. 
b. Call a friend of family member.  
c. Sleep. 
d. Work out. 
e. Eat. 
f. Avoid social activities.  
g. Engage in social activities.  
h. Attend a support group. 
i. Engage in social media sites related to IBD. 
j. Engage in social media sites. 
k. Craft. 
l. Tell others about IBD. 
m. Other (please specify). 
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